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ARTICLE

The Other American Law
Elizabeth A. Reese*
Abstract. American legal scholarship focuses almost exclusively on federal, state, and
local law. However, there are 574 federally recognized tribal governments within the
United States, whose laws are largely ignored. This Article brings to the fore the exclusion
of tribal governments and their laws from our mainstream conception of "American law"
and identifies this exclusion as both an inconsistent omission and a missed opportunity.
Tribal law is no less "American law" than federal or state law. It is made, enforced, and
followed by American citizens, and tribal governments have a distinct place as
subsovereigns within the American system of overlapping sovereigns. Nor is tribal law an
unimportant or small part of the American legal landscape, since these 574 legal systems
govern millions of Americans and as much land as California. And yet, tribal law is
excluded from our shared conception of "American law"-and therefore from our research
projects, classrooms, and even conversations. This exclusion perpetuates the othering of
Indians and the invisibility of both Indian people and their governments. Tribal
governments were previously delegitimized and described as "lawless" in order to
legitimize legal theories of conquest. But tribal law is real, and it is time to end its
marginalization. Moreover, tribal law is vast, varied, and often innovative. As
demonstrated by the three examples in this piece, tribal governments struggle with the
same problems that the other American sovereigns face, and their similarities, differences,
successes, failures, and innovations can inform other American sovereigns' work or public
law questions more broadly. Omitting tribal law from American legal scholarship is not
only a troubling inconsistency; it is a missed opportunity to tap a potentially valuable
resource-a disservice to the search for good government ideas. Tribal law belongs in the
mainstream study of American law and legal systems. This Article places it there.

* Bigelow Fellow and Lecturer in Law, University of Chicago Law School. This work is only
possible thanks to the guidance, advice, and feedback of Greg Ablavsky, Douglas Baird,
William Baude, Nikolas Bowie, Maggie Blackhawk, Adam Chilton, Seth Davis, Adam
Davidson, Bridget Fahey, Matthew Fletcher, Tom Ginsburg, Daniel Hemel, Todd
Henderson, Nicolas Hidalgo, Aziz Huq, Alison LaCroix, Genevieve Lakier, Leah Litman,
Erin Miller, Martha Minow, John Rappaport, Joseph Singer, and Robert Williams. Thank
you to my students, the Breckinridge section, for helping me prioritize these ideas with
their insightful perspectives. K'uunda to Bonnie St. Charles and Catherine Steubing for their
excellent research assistance. This piece is dedicated to my four great uncles from Ohkay
Owingeh, who served in four of the branches of the United States military and who so
bravely believed in an America that could not yet fully believe in them.
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Introduction
Legal scholarship is a subpart of scholarship in general, and one goal of scholarship in
general is to improve our knowledge about the world. The larger, non-Indian community
simply does not know very much about tribal institutions and law . .. [and if anything]
may well conjure up negative images of the system of justicefound there.

-Philip P. Frickey1
In the United States, there is a set of subnational governments through
which American citizens exercise representative self-governance. These
governments each make and interpret a unique body of American law through
their own distinct legal systems. These governments have a set of powers
shaped by a complex relationship with the federal government. This Article is
about these American governments.
They are not states, local governments, districts, or territories, but
something else entirely. These governments are the 574 Indian tribes.
American tribal governments experiment with government structures, define
rights, adjudicate disputes, develop service programs, and outlaw conduct.
They make laws that address everything from the smallest contract disputes to
the most important questions of constitutional rights and structure. And it is
time we all paid more attention.
Within the United States, there are 574 federally recognized 2 tribal
governments (variously called tribes, nations, bands, pueblos, communities,
and Native villages). Yet their experiences receive precious little attention.
This Article points out the error of excluding tribal law from our mainstream
study of American law and legal systems. Tribal governments are federally
recognized governments within-and thus part of-the United States system.
Tribal laws are passed by American citizens and govern vast swaths of land and
millions of Americans. Tribal law is American law, and as such it ought to
occupy an equally prominent place alongside federal, state, and local law.
Beyond pointing out the error-and injustice-of this omission, this
Article demonstrates that there is much to gain from embracing tribal law.
After hundreds of years of contact, violence, treatymaking, and then existence
within the legal, cultural, and geographic boundaries of the United States,
Indian tribes are now comingled American sovereigns struggling with similar
problems and often playing in the same sandbox of legal ideas as the other
1. Philip P. Frickey, Address at University of Kansas Conference on Tribal Law and
Institutions, February 2, 2008: Tribal Law, Tribal Context, and the Federal Courts, 18 KAN.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 24, 32-33 (2008).
2. About Us, U.S. BUREAU INDIAN AFFS., https://perma.cc/AR37-R3YF (archived Jan. 25,
2021). This project focuses exclusively on federally recognized tribes-and not staterecognized or unrecognized tribes-because they share a more similar place in the
American legal framework.
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American governments. And yet the governing work, laws, innovations,
successes, failures, and reinventions of tribal governments are rarely studiedif not entirely unknown to many. It is time to end the invisibility of this other
American law.
Tribal law's invisibility is all the more inexcusable given how far reaching
tribal jurisdiction is within the United States. Indian Country is a large part of
the United States. It would, perhaps, surprise many Americans to learn that the
Navajo Nation governs an area that is approximately the size of West
Virginia 3 and that its courts adjudicate over 50,000 cases every year. 4 At least
nineteen other tribes each govern an area larger than Rhode Island, and tribal
governments collectively control more land than California. 5 And Native
American 6 people are one of the fastest growing populations, growing at
almost four times the rate of the general population.7 We are sorely lacking
updated data on Indian people, tribal members, and reservation residents. 8 The
U.S. Census Bureau estimates that between 5.7 million 9 and 6.9 million10
Americans are American Indian or Alaska Native, and nearly 3 million in that
group were enrolled members of a federally recognized tribe as of 2013.11 As of

3. Navajo Tourism Dep't, Fact Sheet, DISCOVER NAVAJO, https://perma.cc/37WY-RU2Y
(archived Jan. 10, 2021) [hereinafter Navajo Facts].
4. Courts & Peacemaking in the Navajo Nation: A Public Guide,JUD. BRANCH NAVAJO NATION,
https://perma.cc/99EB-Z67A (last updated Jan. 30, 2018).
5. Reservation and trust-land areas compose 56 million acres, and Alaska Native
corporations and villages control 44 million acres, for a total of 100 million acres.
NAT'L CONG. OF AM.

INDIANS, TRIBAL NATIONS AND

THE UNITED STATES: AN

INTRODUCTION 10 (2020) [hereinafter NCAI REPORT], https://perma.cc/9KZG-BABJ.
Another 19 million acres in Oklahoma are likely reservation lands. See McGirt v.
Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452, 2482 (2020) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
6. The terms "Native American" and "Indian" are used interchangeably throughout this
paper to reflect the divide in what different members of the group-including
scholars-prefer, and also to normalize the common use and presence of both for
readers. See Michael Yellow Bird, What We Want to Be Called: Indigenous Peoples'
Perspectives on Racial and EthnicIdentity Labels, AM.INDIAN Q., Spring 1999, at 1, 3, 7.
7. NCAI REPORT, supra note 5, at 12.
8. See Data Disaggregation, NCAI POL'Y RSCH. CTR., https://perma.cc/29K6-AKM7
(archived Jan. 10, 2021).
9. Selected Population Profile in the United States: Table S0201, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://perma.cc/RQQ5-27ZL (archived Feb. 6, 2021) (providing the American
Community Survey 2019 estimate of "American Indian and Alaska Native alone or in
combination with one or more other races").
10. National Population by Characteristics2010-2019, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://perma.cc/JK22-

S6JV (archived Jan. 10, 2021) (to locate, click "View the live page" and then click
"Annual Estimates of the Resident Population by Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin: April
1, 2010 to July 1, 2019").
11. Tribal Population, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://perma.cc/S8D6Y5MQ(last updated Dec. 21, 2018).
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2017, 1.3 million people lived in Indian Country or on Alaska Native land,
including over 628,000 non-Indians. 12 And, as a result of the Supreme Court's
recent decision in McGirt v. Oklahoma, that number could more than double
with the addition of another 1.8 million Oklahomans, only 10% to 15% of
whom are Indian. 13 This is not even counting all the people who live off
reservation but are nevertheless impacted by tribal law because they work for
or do business with tribes. The Forest County Potawatomi Community in
Wisconsin, for example, has only twenty-four non-Indians living on its
reservation but employs over 2,200 non-Indians and provides healthcare
services in the surrounding community, serving more non-Indians than
Indians. 14 Tribal law impacts many Americans.
Tribal governments are just another kind of subnational American
government 15 -like states that exist as subnational sovereigns whose powers
are limited and shaped by federal law-growing in the federal framework's
shadow. 16 Ignoring or siloing the laws and experiences that come from tribal
governments presents an incomplete and incorrect picture of America and its
laws.17 If American legal scholars want to understand, learn from, and evaluate
American law, we must include all of America's laws.
12. See Table B02001, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://perma.cc/N5Z2-7U4W (archived Feb. 6,
2021) (to locate, click "View the live page"; then click "Geo"; then select "American
Indian/Alaska Native Area/Hawaiian Home Land"; then select "All AIA/ANA/HHL in
United States") (calculations on file with author); Table B02010, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://perma.cc/SF43-AVWA (archived Feb. 6, 2021) (calculations on file with author).
13. McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452, 2482 (2020) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
14. See DIV. OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELS., WIS. DEP'T OF ADMIN., TRIBES OF WISCONSIN 8,

41(2020), https://perma.cc/PL3M-FN8W.
15. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831) (calling tribes "domestic
dependent nations").
16. Jason P. Hipp, Essay, Rethinking Rewriting: Tribal ConstitutionalAmendment and Reform,
4 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 73, 81 (2013) (examining tribal constitutions as subnational
constitutions drafted in the federal framework's shadow or in response to it); Jennifer
Hendry & Melissa L. Tatum, Justicefor Native Nations: Insights from Legal Pluralism, 60
ARIz. L. REV. 91, 113 (2018) (discussing instances where tribes have strategically adopted
parts of U.S. legal culture); MacDonald v. Redhouse, 6 Navajo Rptr. 342, 343-46
(1991) (No. A-CV-54-90), 1991 Navajo Sup. LEXIS 11, at *3-12 (relying on federal
constitutional law cases as persuasive authority when analyzing a bill-of-attainder
issue). Note to readers: In order to increase and facilitate accessibility to the tribal court
opinions cited in this Article, I have chosen to deviate from Bluebook rules and include
case numbers and parallel citations to internet databases where available for
reported cases.
17. Scholars have made a similar push recently about state constitutional law. See JEFFREY
S. SUTTON, 51

IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS:

STATES AND THE MAKING

OF AMERICAN

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 8, 17 (2018) (suggesting that advocates should challenge state
constitutional law more often); SANFORD LEVINSON, FRAMED: AMERICA'S FIFTY-ONE
CONSTITUTIONS AND THE CRISIS OF GOVERNANCE 14 (2012) ("[A]ny consideration of

American constitutionalism must pay ample attention to America's other fifty
footnote continued on next page
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The 574 federally recognized tribes are governments composed of
American citizens who make and enforce law that governs large swaths of the
United States, but we don't readily think of them as American governments or
their law as American law. There is no widely accepted definition for
American law precisely because it is a changing social construct comprising
what both laypeople and scholars agree counts as such. 18 A robust accounting
of the boundaries of American law is beyond the scope of this piece.
Nevertheless, what we consider to be within the boundaries of American law
matters because the term undoubtedly communicates an identity and a
legitimacy, dividing those laws that are an accepted part of the United States
legal system and culture from those that are not. Generally, we think of the
rules that come out of the various halls of United States governments as
"American law." 19 Tribal law fits that definition. Tribal governments are
integrated into the United States system, fly the United States flag, 20 and are
subject to federal authority-specifically Congress's plenary power. And yet
tribal governments undoubtedly remain outside of our shared conception of
American law, largely absent from seminal works on the subject, 21
Restatements, 22 and our law school classrooms. This must be either because
laypeople and scholars don't think of tribal governments as American
governments or because they don't think of tribal governments at all. America
has absorbed these governments through conquest, preserved their right to
self-government, and asserted plenary power over them-yet it still treats
Indian tribes and their people like outsiders.
The current exclusion of tribes is conspicuous and, indeed, no accident.
What I have named the other American law could also be described as the
othered American law. The United States has both created its identity and
justified its existence in contrast to the Indians it has displaced. The primitive,
lawless, or vanishing Indian was a fictitious but politically necessary
constitutions, those of the states."). See generally EMILY ZACKIN, LOOKING FOR RIGHTS IN
ALL THE WRONG PLACES: WHY STATE CONSTITUTIONS CONTAIN AMERICA'S POSITIVE

RIGHTS (2013) (emphasizing undervalued rights in state constitutions).
18. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN & GRANT M. HAYDEN, AMERICAN LAW: AN INTRODUCTION,

at x-xi (3d ed. 2017).
19. Id. at x.
20. See, e.g., Roberto A. Jackson, Tribal Education Introduces Space Camp Students at
Community Council, GILA RIVER INDIAN NEWS (Aug. 16, 2019), https://perma.cc/T9VWKBDE (showing a photograph of the American flag on display at a Gila Indian River
Community Council Meeting).
21. See FRIEDMAN & HAYDEN, supra note 18, at 353 (index showing only one mention of
tribal law).
22. See AM. L. INST., CAPTURING THE VOICE OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE: A HANDBOOK
FOR ALI REPORTERS AND THOSE WHO REVIEW THEIR WORK 4-11 (rev. ed. 2015),

https://perma.cc/Z2NA-LPGP.
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construct. 23 These old assumptions and portrayals of Indians and their
governments have become unseemly with age, looking far more like
propaganda than fact. This Article does not argue that we ought to pay
attention to tribal law now out of guilt or because of the prior ugliness. Instead,
it suggests that this history explains our ignorance and the status quo of
excluding tribal governments.
Tribal nations are diverse, and some are very different from other
American sovereigns. This, however, does not mean that tribal governments
are not now part of the American family of governments or that tribal law
does not belong within American law. Rather, it means that our conception of
American law is too narrow and needs to grow to fit the work and experience
of tribal nations, recognizing the reality that the United States is a union of not
just fifty states, five territories, and a federal district, but also 574 tribes.
By situating tribal law as American law, this Article breaks with earlier
works of tribal law scholarship accepting tribal law as different and separate
from American law. 24 These works treat tribal law more like an international
sovereign's law or as a site for comparative insights on American law.25 Prior
works have argued that tribes are underappreciated laboratories for legal
innovation and experimentation. 26 While this Article also argues that tribes
have much to offer if included in the mainstream, it also suggests that tribes

23. See, e.g., Gregory Ablavsky, "With the Indian Tribes' Race, Citizenship, and Original
Constitutional Meanings, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1025, 1040-42, 1042 n.67 (2018); Robert A.
Williams, Jr., The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trail of Decolonizing and
Americanizing the White Man's IndianJurisprudence, 1986 Wis. L. REV. 219, 290.
24. See, e.g., Carole Goldberg, Review Essay, A Law of Their Own: Native Challenges to
American Law, 25 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 263, 282 (2000) (book review) (describing recent
claims that tribal law should influence federal Indian law to curb the latter's colonial
impulses); Robert Odawi Porter, The Inapplicability of American Law to the Indian
Nations, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1595, 1620 (2004).
25. Tonya Kowalski, The Forgotten Sovereigns, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 765, 769, 789 (2009)
(framing American law as impacting tribes and framing tribes as having comparativelaw insights for American law); Elizabeth Ann Kronk Warner, Tribes as Innovative
Environmental "Laboratories,"86 U. COLO. L. REV. 789, 795 (2015) (arguing that the
"combination of tribal law and American law can create a 'synergistic result[]'
benefitting both the tribe and the federal government" (footnote omitted) (quoting
Gloria Valencia-Weber, Tribal Courts: Custom and Innovative Law, 24 N.M. L. REV. 225,
256 (1994))).
26. See Katherine Florey, Making It Work: Tribal Innovation, State Reaction, and the Future of
Tribes as Regulatory Laboratories, 92 WASH. L. REV. 713, 718-19 (2017); Elizabeth Ann
Kronk Warner, Justice Brandeis and Indian Country: Lessons from the Tribal
Environmental Laboratory, 47 ARIz. ST. L.J. 857, 858-59 (2015); Valencia-Weber, supra
note 25, at 261 ("Indian courts [are] the laboratories for new concepts that can benefit
the [Anglo-American] majority judicial system."); Angela R. Riley, Indians and Guns,
100 GEo. L.J. 1675, 1729 (2012) (discussing "Indian nations as self-selected laboratories
for gun laws").
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should not need to prove their value to warrant mainstream attention. Instead,
they simply belong in the mainstream, alongside our study of the other
governments of the United States, because they are also a part of this nation.
This view rejects a comfort-especially among many Indigenous legal
scholars-with characterizing tribal nations as American outsiders, while
acknowledging that such comfort is importantly rooted in the former status of
tribal nations as politically independent. The "abuses of the past and present
[are] too vivid, and the memory of freedom [is] too lasting[,] for many Indians"
to simply see themselves as "another domestic minority group" within the
United States. 27 American identity for American Indian people and tribal
nations is understandably complex. The political identities of tribal
communities-including whether they see themselves and their laws as
American-are internal matters for those communities. But as a matter of
federal law, tribal governments are a part of the United States system. The ship
has sailed concerning whether the United States, and the scholars that study its
laws, can justifiably deny that tribes are a part of the United States. The United
States chose conquest, and so unless tribes regain independence, we cannot also
deny that the tribes are a part of this nation's system of government. Tellingly
called "domestic" nations even from the early days of Indian law, 28 tribal
governments are no less the authors of this nation's laws than any other legally
recognized government in the United States.
Part of recognizing tribal law as American law is liberating it from the
current place of obscurity it occupies in the legal field. Tribal law is currently
lumped with federal Indian law into the field of Indian law. Tribal law is a
broad type of American law-like state law-that covers a wide spectrum.
Federal Indian law is a kind of federal law that-like federalism-deals with
rules of subsovereignty. This incoherent lumping is a disservice to both kinds
of law, but it particularly marginalizes tribal law because federal Indian law
dominates Indian law as a field. Tribal law is considered a very niche subset of a
field that is already quite small.
In some ways, this move coincides with a movement to mainstream
federal Indian law. Scholars have argued for decades that "[f]ederal Indian law
does not deserve its image as a tiny backwater of law"29 and should instead be
given more prominence as a part of federal law that examines legal questions
30
of conquest, race, rights, and subsovereignty-as a part of property law,
27. VINE DELORIA, JR., BEHIND THE TRAIL OF BROKEN TREATIES: AN INDIAN DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE 2-3 (1974).

28. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
29. See, e.g., Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism,
and Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARv. L. REV. 381, 383 (1993).
30.

Joseph

William Singer, Sovereignty and Property, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1991)
[hereinafter Singer, Sovereignty]; Joseph William Singer, Indian Title: Unraveling the
footnote continued on next page
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federal courts, 31 constitutional law, and broader federal law principles. 32 This
Article builds on the call to mainstream the legal experience of Indians in the
United States. But it also questions the prevailing definition of Indian law and
calls for a fundamental restructuring of the field, which currently pays far too
little mind to tribal law and is oversaturated with federal Indian law. Federal
Indian law is not really Indian law. Or, as the legendary Vine Deloria Jr. put it,
"what is missing in federal Indian law are the Indians." 33 Federal Indian law is
not the law of Indian people; it is primarily the law of conquest. Though
Indians certainly fought for the survival of tribal governments, they were not
the architects or primary beneficiaries of federal Indian law. Many see this
unique, conquest-focused subset of federal law as a way to include Indians and
their laws in legal academia. This is a mistake. Indians and their tribes are the
objects of federal Indian law, not its architects. To focus on federal Indian law
as a way of including the Indian experience suggests that Indians' primary
contribution to law is not their own laws but instead the laws the United States
has come up with to legitimize or shape Indians' conquest. Tribal governments
and Native people are, of course, much more than that.
The laws governing these 574 different and independent sovereigns are a
vast, varied, and fruitful area of American law. Tribal governments are
American governments that struggle with the same kinds of pressing legal
questions that the other American sovereigns face, and tribal governments
arrive at solutions with broader applicability. To illustrate this point, this
Article presents and explores three tribal law case studies, each of which is an
abbreviated example of the kinds of scholarship that are possible and should be
common.
First, twelve tribes across the country are challenging a fundamental
assumption about criminal procedure and defendants' rights. Their creative

Racial Context of Property Rights, or How to Stop Engaging in Conquest, 10 ALB. GOV'T L.
REV. 1, 9 (2017) [hereinafter Singer, Indian Title] ("[A]ll land titles in the United States
originate in Indian title." (emphasis omitted)).
31. Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal Courts, 56 U.
CHI. L. REV. 671, 701-02 (1989) (arguing that federal Indian law belongs "in federal
courts' jurisprudence" because it involves "[a]nalytically comparable problems" with
"vivid insight[s]" for the tolerability, desirability, and sustainability of "subgroup[] ...
self-governance").
32. See Maggie Blackhawk, FederalIndian Law as Paradigm Within Public Law, 132 HARV. L.
REV. 1787, 1847 (2019); Kowalski, supra note 25, at 769 (arguing that including Indian
law in general legal curricula serves normative goals of social justice and accuracy).
33. Vine Deloria, Jr., Essay, Laws Founded in Justice and Humanity: Reflections on the Content
and Character of Federal Indian Law, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 203, 205 (1989); see also Williams,
supra note 23, at 294 (noting that the current system "force[s] tribal nations to litigate
their disputes with the conqueror's subjects, or the conqueror itself, under the
eurocentric vision of justice dispensed by the conqueror's courts").
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interpretation of familiar language demonstrates that we can use more than
just residency to define the "community" of persons for the purposes of the
"fair cross section" requirement for an impartial jury. This insight may prove
particularly valuable because America remains residentially segregated, and
constitutional law recognizes the shortcomings of racially homogenous
juries. 34
Second, the story of the rise and fall of a charismatic populist leader from
the Navajo Nation provides an interesting case study for separation-of-powers
scholarship. Without adopting a written constitution, the tribe developed a
three-branch system of government with a unitary executive. It did so in direct
response to a corruption scandal involving its Tribal Council Chairman
exercising too much power over the other branches. The Nation's governance
crisis emphasizes the importance of a variety of independent institutionsinsulated from appointment conflicts-in checking executive corruption
because, in this instance, democratic elections were unable to discourage
corruption. Moreover, the rise of one of those institutions-the Navajo
Supreme Court-and the role it took in developing a common law separationof-powers doctrine based on Navajo Fundamental Law has implications for
functionalism and formalism debates.
Finally, the Citizen Potawatomi Nation provides a unique example of
institutional design to further democratic representation. Frustrated with low
voter turnout resulting from a citizen diaspora, the Nation redesigned its
legislative districts to exceed the boundaries of its land base, creating a map
based on where its citizens lived. The United States faces a similar problem of
low turnout among overseas voters and could implement the Potawatomi
model to create a new electoral district with a fascinating demographic mix:
highly educated Americans living abroad and active military serving overseas.
The resulting district could represent as many as nine Electoral College votes.
Ending the invisibility and marginalization of tribal law and
conscientiously engaging with tribes and their law ought to benefit all those
involved. Not only is taking a step toward respecting and including tribal law
the intellectually consistent response to this omission once it is recognized; it is
also a vital step toward ending our part in enabling a dangerous status quo of
ignorance. The invisibility of tribal governments has a real cost: It makes bad
and harmful law. Congress often writes laws as if there are only two kinds of
governments. Tribes are left out, with real consequences for their ability to
provide services or even ensure basic health and safety. 35 Judges make
34. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 99 (1986) ("In view of the heterogeneous population
of our Nation, . . . the rule of law will be strengthened if we ensure that no citizen is
disqualified from jury service because of his race.").
35. U.S. COMM'N ON C.R., BROKEN PROMISES: CONTINUING FEDERAL FUNDING SHORTFALL
FOR NATIVE AMERICANS 5-6 (2018), https://perma.cc/7Z3S-AS7F (endorsing congressional

footnote continued on next page
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assumptions, overgeneralize, or altogether ignore tribal law-even when its
relevance is undeniable. 36 Tribal law ought to inform federal Indian law,
which has suffered from being unmoored from the realities of tribal law, tribal
governance, and tribal diversity. The risk is that the rest of America will
judge-and may discard-tribal nations before it can fully understand and
appreciate what tribes are, what they are doing, and what they have to offer
the rest of the country.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I offers a brief introduction to
contemporary tribal governance. Part II examines and critiques the
marginalization of tribal law. As discussed above, colonial rhetoric has
permeated American society's view of tribal law as inferior and other, pushing
tribal law out of the mainstream and into the niche field of Indian law. Even
within Indian law, tribal law is marginalized compared to federal Indian law,
but a deeper understanding of tribal law should inform federal Indian law, not
be overshadowed by it. Part III demonstrates, through the three
aforementioned examples, the kinds of insights that tribal law can offer
scholars of public law. Finally, Part IV briefly discusses what heeding this call
to mainstream tribal law would look like and what the challenges and
opportunities might be.
I.

Contemporary Tribal Governance

Federal Indian law is about conquest-the diminishment of Indian
sovereignty as a matter of federal law. This Article is not about the
diminishment of, but rather the exercise of, Indian sovereignty-the laws made
by tribes to govern themselves. Yet to understand contemporary tribal
governance, one needs at least a basic understanding of the broad strokes of
federal Indian law since it determines what tribes can and cannot do.
A.

The Scope of Tribal-Government Powers

It is impossible to understand the powers of today's tribal governments
without including a bit of history, because tribal powers are retained powers.
They can only be accurately described as what remains of the original whole.
Indian tribes were once the completely independent nations-of varying sizes

funding to address "unmet essential utilities and core infrastructure needs in Indian
Country," which amount to a "civil rights crisis").
36. See generally Frickey, supra note 1, at 31; Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Supreme Court's
Legal Culture War Against Tribal Law, 2 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTs. L. REV. 93, 110,
115 (2007).
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and structures-that governed the continent. 37 In the earliest days of the
United States, tribes were largely military allies or enemies.3 8 The Bureau of
Indian Affairs (BIA) began in the Department of War and remained there until
1849.39 As the United States grew in size and strength, tribal nations became
less necessary allies, or less of a threat, and instead became a problem for the
expansionist United States. "Indiannations" needed to exist enough to sell land
to the United States, but not enough to undermine state and federal
sovereignty. 40 Having lost much of their lands and power, tribes became, as the
Supreme Court put it, a "conquered"people, subject to the United States by the
laws of conquest. 4 1
But conquest wasn't dissolution. The Supreme Court laid the foundations
of federal Indian law in the 1800s, holding that "a weaker power does not
surrender its independence-its right to self government, by associating with a
stronger, and taking its protection."42 Indian tribes were no longer
independent foreign nations; they were instead "domestic dependent
nations."43 Tribes could no longer conduct foreign relations independently of
the United States: Any tribe's attempt to politically ally with or sell land to
other foreign nations would have been an act of "hostility" against the United
States, which asserted an exclusive right to "protect[]" the Indian tribes.44 Yet
"[a]ll the rights which belong to self government [were] recognized as vested in

37. George Washington urged peace treaties with these nations, fearing that further wars
with Indians resisting conquest would destabilize the United States. See Gregory
Ablavsky, The Savage Constitution, 63 DUKE L.J. 999, 1020-21 (2014); see also Johnson v.
M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 547-48 (1823) (noting "[some] Indian tribes or
nations . . . were the allies of France in the war" and "were free and independent,
owing no allegiance to any foreign power whatever, and holding their lands in
absolute property").
38. See, e.g., Ablavsky, supra note 37, at 1019-20, 1019 n.103 (discussing the centrality of the
Haudenosaunee (Six Nations) Confederacy to the eighteenth-century military struggles
over present-day New York and Ohio and the role the splitting of the Confederacy
played in the Revolutionary War).
39. Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), U.S. BUREAU INDIAN AFFS., https://perma.cc/RT92-5PF2
(archived Jan. 10, 2021).
40. See Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 587-88 (holding that "discovery gave [the United States]
an exclusive right to extinguish the Indian title of occupancy, either by purchase or by
conquest," rather than considering tribes or individual Indians to have absolute title to
sell their lands).
41. Id. at 589. It was "impossible" to "govern [Indians] as a distinct people" because they
were "savages" committed to fighting for "their independence," making conquest the
inevitable "law of the land" that "c[ould not] be questioned." Id. at 590-91.
42. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978) (emphasis added) (quoting Worcester v.
Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832)).
43. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
44. See id. at 17-18; see also Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 574.
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[the Indian tribes]."45 This meant that state law had no force within tribal
boundaries and that state citizens did not have the right to enter without tribal
consent. 46 Moreover, the Court made clear that since tribal powers of selfgovernment "existed prior to the Constitution," tribes were not bound by the
Constitution. 47 Most notably, they were not bound by the explicit
constitutional limitations on state action found in the Bill of Rights and other
amendments.4 8
These early foundations of tribal sovereignty balanced against federal
power, and the ostensible consequences of conquest have guided federal Indian
law ever since. Broadly speaking, tribal governments still retain all powers
that have not been abrogated by treaty, 49 removed via federal statute, 50 or lost
by virtue of their status as domestic dependent nations. Tribes lost most of
their lands through treaties or executive orders, 5 1 and perhaps the greatest loss
of tribal power is the lost geographic reach of tribal law. Lands still within a
tribe's control are collectively referred to as Indian Country.52 Federal statutes
have generally limited what tribes can do with these remaining lands.53
Though tribes retain jurisdiction over Indians who commit crimes on their
land, Congress gave the federal government concurrent jurisdiction to
prosecute a set of "major" Indian crimes, as defined under the Major Crimes
Act, and exclusive jurisdiction over non-Indian-on-Indian crime.5 4 Congress
has also capped all tribal court punishment at a $15,000 fine or three-year
prison sentence per offense.5 5 This makes the federal government the de facto
exclusive prosecuting authority for all serious crimes involving Indians
because a tribe's concurrent jurisdiction over all crimes-including those
defined in the Major Crimes Act-is subject to these limits.56 Finally, the
Supreme Court has held that certain powers are "inconsistent" with domestic-

45. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 580 (McLean, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
46. See id. at 561 (majority opinion).
47. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896).
48. Id.
49. See, e.g., United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905) (treaty-rights case).
50. See, e.g., Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565-66 (1903) (congressional-power case).
51. Rebecca Onion & Claudio Saunt, Interactive Time-Lapse Map Shows How the U.S. Took
More Than 1.5 Billion Acres from Native Americans, SLATE: THE VAULT (June 17, 2014,
11:38 AM), https://perma.cc/8PVG-XTZR.
52. "Indian country" is defined by federal statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 1151.
53. For example, the Secretary of the Interior still oversees, facilitates, and approves all
tribal land sales and purchases. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 5102-5105, 5107-5108.
54. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1152-1153 (enumerating offenses).
55. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(7)(C)-(D).
56. Id.
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dependent-nation status.5 7 This judicial doctrine-known as implicit
divestiture-has been widely criticized as an unjustified expansion of the
Court's role. 58 Implicit divestiture is also how tribes have lost much of their
ability to govern non-Indians or nonmembers. The Court has held that "the
inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of
nonmembers of the tribe."59 With one narrow exception, tribes cannot
criminally prosecute non-Indians, even for committing crimes against tribal
citizens. 60
Tribes retain broad power to civilly regulate their lands and their
members, but "[t]ribal assertion of regulatory authority over nonmembers
must be connected to that right of the Indians to make their own laws and be
governed by them."6 1 Thus, tribal regulation of, or adjudicatory jurisdiction
over, 62 nonmembers (including taxation 63 ) is "presumptively invalid"64 with
two exceptions: first, if the nonmember "enter[ed] consensual relationships
with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or
other arrangements," or, second, if the nonmember's "conduct threatens or has
some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the
health or welfare of the tribe."65 In these cases, land ownership is an important
if not "dispositive" factor, 66 as nonmember-owned land is unlikely to host
conduct interfering with the heart of tribal sovereignty, and as nonmember
57. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978).
58. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Supreme Court and FederalIndian Policy, 85 NEB. L. REV.
121, 157, 160 (2006); Philip P. Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism: The
Judicial Divestiture of Indian Tribal Authority over Nonmembers, 109 YALE L.J. 1, 37, 45
(1999); David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism of the
Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1573,1595,1598-99 (1996).
59. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981).
60. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208 (1978). As a result of the Violence
Against Women Act's reauthorization in 2013, tribes have special jurisdiction to
prosecute non-Indians with certain ties to the prosecuting tribe for crimes of domestic
violence, dating violence, and violations of certain protection orders. See Violence
Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, §§ 904-905, 127 Stat. 54,
120-24 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1304 and 18 U.S.C. § 2265).
61. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 361 (2001).
62. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 453 (1997) (explaining that adjudicatory
jurisdiction over nonmembers is no broader than regulatory jurisdiction over
nonmembers).
63. Though tribes are able to tax members, they rarely do, and instead rely on tribal
economic ventures. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, In Pursuit of Tribal Economic
Development as a Substitutefor Reservation Tax Revenue, 80 N.D. L. REV. 759, 771-74 (2004).
64. Plains Com. Bank v. Long Fam. Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 330, 341 (2008) (quoting
Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 659 (2001)); see also Strate, 520 U.S. at 459.
65. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565-66 (1981).
66. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 360.
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conduct on tribally owned land often involves commercial or other consensual
arrangements. 67
In summary, tribes are limited in the powers they can exercise over nonIndians, but retain almost all of their powers over Indians, especially their
citizens.6 8 Except for limits on sentencing authority, tribes have close to full
independence to make and enforce laws for their own citizens on tribal land.
Furthermore, except for federal laws that clearly apply to tribal
governments, 69 tribes operate independently of federal, state, or local laws.
The inherent right to tribal self-governance has been consistently and
continuously affirmed, leaving tribal governments with the responsibility of
making laws that govern everything from their citizens' fundamental rights to
mundane matters like garbage pickup. Since the population of Indian Country
has, until very recently, been primarily Indian, tribes spend most of their time
as broadly powerful sovereigns governing Indians.
B.

The Contemporary Practice of Tribal Governance

Collectively, the 574 federally recognized tribal nations govern an area
larger than California, and tribal lands include 260 miles of America's
international borders.70 The largest tribe, the Navajo Nation, governs an area

67. See, e.g., Plains Com. Bank, 554 U.S. at 330 (holding that the tribal court lacked
jurisdiction over a discrimination claim against Indians concerning the sale of nonIndian owned fee land); Dolgencorp, Inc. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, 746 F.3d
167, 169, 173-74 (5th Cir. 2014) (upholding tribal court jurisdiction over a suit
involving tortious conduct during an employment-education program for tribal youth
at a store located on tribal land, where the corporation consented to tribal court
jurisdiction in its lease documents), aff'd mem. by an equally divided court sub nom. Dollar
Gen. Corp. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016).
68. Different law governs Alaska Native tribes, whose lands are not Indian Country but
are rather held by state-chartered tribal corporations. See Alaska v. Native Vill. of
Venetie Tribal Gov't, 522 U.S. 520, 523, 532 (1998). Alaska Native tribes have similar
self-government powers as other tribes, though Alaska state courts generally exercise
more concurrent powers. See John v. Baker, 982 P.2d 738, 759 (Alaska 1999).
69. There is a circuit split on federal laws of general applicability. Compare Donovan v.
Coeur d'Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113, 1115-16 (9th Cir. 1985) (concluding that
federal laws of general applicability may apply to Indian tribes even if silent on the
issue of applicability, but providing three exceptions to this rule), with NLRB v. Pueblo
of San Juan, 276 F.3d 1186, 1194-99 (10th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (interpreting a Supreme
Court decision on statutes of general applicability as applying only in the context of
property rights and as dealing with "issues of ownership, not with questions pertaining
to the tribe's sovereign authority to govern the land" (citing Fed. Power Comm'n v.
Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 116 (1960))).
70. See NCAI REPORT, supra note 5, at 10-11.
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the size of West Virginia, 71 while many of the over 100 California tribes have
very small land bases and populations.7 2
These nations represent a great diversity of legal cultures and structures,
and they have undergone tremendous constitutional changes over the last 200
years.7 3 Some nations have written constitutions with branches of government
or other institutional structures reminiscent of-and at times directly
borrowed from-the United States, 74 while others maintain precolonial,
culturally traditional government structures-even theocratic ones.75 This
structural diversity is a result of precolonial diversity and the Indian
Reorganization Act (IRA) of 1934, which encouraged tribes across the country
to adopt fairly formulaic written constitutions. 76 Initially, 181 tribes accepted
the IRA, while 77 rejected it. 77 The IRA continues to haunt tribal governance.
While many tribes kept their IRA constitutions and still more have adopted
them, for others, these boilerplate U.S.-style governments didn't fit their
communities and therefore lacked legitimacy, support, and effectiveness. 78
Today, around 60% of tribes have governments based on IRA constitutions.7 9
71. See Navajo Facts, supra note 3.
72. See Duane Champagne, Remaking Tribal Constitutions: Meeting the Challenges of Tradition,
Colonialism, and Globalization, in AMERICAN INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND THE

REBUILDING OF NATIVE NATIONS 11, 24 (Eric D. Lemont ed., 2006); NCAI REPORT, supra
note 5, at 10; FOREST SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., FOREST SERVICE NATIONAL RESOURCE
GUIDE TO AMERICAN INDIAN AND ALASKA NATIVE RELATIONS app. C (1997),

https://perma.cc/BCA5-SB3L.
73. HARVARD PROJECT ON AM. INDIAN ECON. DEV., THE STATE OF THE NATIVE NATIONS:
CONDITIONS UNDER U.S. POLICIES OF SELF-DETERMINATION 1, 18-19 (2008) [hereinafter
HARVARD NATIONS]; DUANE CHAMPAGNE, SOCIAL CHANGE AND CULTURAL CONTINUITY
AMONG NATIVE NATIONS 67-68 (2007).
74. See HARVARD NATIONS, supra note 73, at 19; FELIX S. COHEN, ON THE DRAFTING OF

TRIBAL CONSTITUTIONS 32 (David E. Wilkins ed., 2006); NCAI REPORT, supra note 5, at
24; Champagne, supra note 72, at 18-20.
75. See NCAI REPORT, supra note 5, at 24; HARVARD NATIONS, supra note 73, at 18. Many of
the Pueblo Indian Tribes have religious leaders who appoint their secular political
leadership. See, e.g., JOE S. SANDO, PUEBLO NATIONS: EIGHT CENTURIES OF PUEBLO INDIAN

HISTORY 13-15 (1992).
76. HARVARD NATIONS, supra note 73, at 19; see also ELMER R. RUSCO, A FATEFUL TIME: THE
BACKGROUND AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE INDIAN REORGANIZATION ACT 301

(2000); Champagne, supra note 72, at 18-20 (discussing the general form of these IRA
constitutions).
77. THEODORE H. HAAS, U.S. INDIAN SERV., DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, TEN YEARS OF TRIBAL

GOVERNMENT UNDER I.R.A. 3 (1947). Oklahoma and Alaska tribes were not involved in
these IRA elections because the IRA was extended to them later through a different
process. Id. at 2-3.
78. HARVARD NATIONS, supra note 73, at 19-20 (contrasting Apache nations that have made
IRA constitutions work with Lakota tribes that continue to struggle with political
instability); Champagne, supra note 72, at 19-20.
79. NCAI REPORT, supra note 5, at 24.
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Only recently have many tribal governments been able to take over the
provision of government services from the federal government. Following the
IRA, federal policy was to legally terminate tribes and encourage the relocation
and cultural assimilation of tribal citizens. 80 This sparked a new wave of tribal
activism and led tribal leaders to fight for more independence and less federal
paternalism. 8 1 In response, Congress passed the Indian Self-Determination and
Education Assistance Act of 1975.82 The Act let tribes contract with the federal
government to provide the services the federal government had previously
provided directly to Indian people. 83 This widely utilized program, along with
many similar ones that followed in its wake, ushered in a new selfdetermination era. In just a few decades, tribal self-determination was already
proving itself to be a more effective way to strengthen tribal communities.
Real median household income for tribes without gaming grew by 33%
between 1990 and 2000, far outstripping the 4% growth nationally. 84 Since per
capita federal spending did not increase during this period, research suggests
self-determination was behind the economic growth. 85
The self-determination era is marked not only by tribes taking over
government services, but also by an explosion of lawmaking and new
government programs. Tribes across the country have passed innovative laws
and built effective government programs in a wide variety of areas,86 including

80. See Act of Aug. 3, 1956, ch. 930, 70 Stat. 986 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 309,
309a) (offering reservation Indians financial assistance and job training in exchange for
moving to large cities with the hopes that doing so would assimilate them); CHARLES
WILKINSON, BLOOD STRUGGLE: THE RISE OF MODERN INDIAN NATIONS 85 (2005); Act of

Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1360) (conferring jurisdiction upon five states over criminal offenses and civil
actions occurring on Indian reservations within those states); H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83d
Cong., 67 Stat. B132 (1953) (committing Congress to a policy of termination of Indian
tribes); Michael C. Walch, Note, Terminating the Indian Termination Policy, 35 STAN. L.
REV. 1181, 1186 & n.30 (1983) (collecting termination statutes).
81. For an extensive and well-done history of this movement, see generally WILKINSON,
supranote 80.
82. Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 25, 42, and 50 U.S.C.);
HARVARD NATIONS, supra note 73, at 20-21.
83. See Indian Self-Determination and Educational Assistance Act, §§ 102-103, 88 Stat. at
2206-07 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 5321-5322); HARVARD NATIONS, supra note 73, at 21.
84. HARVARD NATIONS, supra note 73, at 7-8.

85. Id. at 8-9.
86. See

also NAT'L CONG. OF AM.

INDIANS,

SECURING

OUR FUTURES

11-17 (2013),

https://perma.cc/696Z-6T6D (highlighting tribal-government initiatives in education,
employment law, housing, financial education, food and agriculture, energy, natural
resources, and business law).
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consumer protection, 87 child welfare, 88 criminal justice, 89 estates, 90 and
environmental law. 91 The sheer number of federally recognized tribes and the
broad diversity across tribal institutions, laws, and cultures make the spectrum
of topics available for study exciting. And when very different tribes converge
on ideas, those ideas may deserve special consideration.
Tribes' decisions are having a growing impact on the country, suggesting
we ought to pay attention to find good ideas as much as to sound the alarm if
we find bad ones. But the question remains: Why aren't tribal governments
already in the mainstream? The next Part explores and criticizes the
marginalization of tribal law.
II.

The Marginalization of Tribal Law

Tribal law is marginalized both within Indian law and outside of it.
Colonial portrayals and rhetoric systemically delegitimized tribal law and
shaped public perceptions. Within Indian law, tribal law is overlooked, cast as
niche, mistakenly conflated with federal Indian law's exceptionalism, or given
less priority. All of this is a mistake. We need a clean break from old,
misinformed assumptions, and we need to rethink the field of Indian law and
its priorities.

87. For example, the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation have a
robust Financial Credit and Consumer Protection Program. See Harvard Project on
Am. Indian Econ. Dev., Honoring Nations: 2006 Honoree-Homeownership; Financial,
Credit & Consumer Protection Program 2-3 (n.d.), https://perma.cc/T5JA-YR5M.
88. At least eleven tribal codes with mandatory-reporting provisions designate all tribal
members as mandatory child-abuse reporters. RACHEL ROSE STARKS, ADRIAN T. SMITH,
&

MARY BETH JAGER, MIRIAM JORGENSEN & STEPHEN CORNELL, NATIVE NATIONS INST.
NAT'L INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ASS'N, TRIBAL CHILD WELFARE CODES AS SOVEREIGNTY IN
ACTION: A GUIDE FOR TRIBAL LEADERS 9-10 (2016).

89. Tribal courts across the country have wellness- or healing-based criminal-justice
systems or programs that integrate tribal culture. See, e.g., All Programs,TRIBAL ACCESS
TO JUST. INNOVATION, https://perma.cc/GT2Z-F662 (archived Jan. 10, 2021) (collecting
fifty different examples of innovative tribal criminal-justice programs); see also Joseph
Thomas Flies-Away & Carrie E. Garrow, Healing to Wellness Courts: Therapeutic
Jurisprudence +, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 403, 409-19. The Muscogee (Creek) Nation
created a criminal-reentry initiative for its citizens that has kept recidivism among
participants at approximately 5%. Muscogee Creek Reintegration Program, TRIBAL ACCESS
TO JUST. INNOVATION, https://perma.cc/M93Y-88EN (archived Jan. 10, 2021).
90. The Colorado River Indian Tribes' Probate Code exempts important cultural or
religious artifacts from its normal intestacy rules, allowing tribal members and their
kin to decide how such items should be distributed. COLO. RIVER INDIAN TRIBES PROB.
CODE art. I, ch. 5, § 5.515 (2003).
91. The Swinomish tribe has a community-specific climate-change plan. See OFF. OF PLAN.
& CMTY. DEV., SWINOMISH INDIAN TRIBAL CMTY., SWINOMISH CLIMATE CHANGE
INITIATIVE: CLIMATE ADAPTATION ACTION PLAN (2010), https://perma.cc/KBX6-YGNZ.
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A. Delegitimizing Tribal Law
The first piece of American legal scholarship about Indians appeared in the
Harvard Law Review in 1888. The piece, Indians and the Law by Austin Abbott,
was a call to action. Indians, he argued, desperately needed law.92 Though
Abbott referred to tribes as "bodies politic" and quoted portions of the Supreme
Court case Cherokee Nation v. Georgia that affirmed tribal nationhood, he did
not concede that tribes had real law or self-governance.9 3 He described Indian
reservations as "immense areas of land within the United States ... inhabited by
a considerable population ... in a condition of lawlessness." 94 Abbott paused to
note that since "Indians are increasing in numbers" and "property rights," we
could no longer assume that "time might ... be trusted to put an end to the
shameful condition of lawlessness." 95 He then concluded that the Dawes Act
would put an end to this "anarch[y]" and bring "civilized justice" by offering
American citizenship, civil rights, and allotment of tribal lands.9 6 Tribes may
have been governments of some kind, but, according to Abbott, they had no
law and little value of their own.
Forty years later, and six years after the Indian Citizenship Act,97 Jacob
Henry Landman made a case for studying tribal law in the pages of the
Michigan Law Review, dismissing evolutionary theories that assumed Indians
were less evolved, while contradictorily suggesting that scholars study the
"primitive man of our day," the "primitive mind," and "primitive law" to
understand the spread of legal ideas.9 8
As recently as 1971, John Phillip Reid noted in the New York University Law
Review-seemingly without noticing the dehumanizing undertones-that
Europeans who came into contact with the Cherokee and claimed they had no
law were wrong; they simply could not see the law right in front of them
because they made the mistake of trying to "force primitive facts into current
theories" instead of "think[ing] Cherokee." 99
Many early studies of tribal law, including both these articles and longer,
more famous works-such as Llewellyn and Hoebel's 1941 book The Cheyenne
Way-were framed as legal studies of primitive peoples in contrast to the
92. Austin Abbott, Indians and the Law, 2 HARV. L. REV. 167, 167 (1888).
93. Id. at 167-69.
94. Id. at 175.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 175-76.
97. Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b)).
98. Jacob Henry Landman, Primitive Law, Evolution, and Sir Henry Sumner Maine, 28 MICH.
L. REV. 404,408-10,412 (1930).
99. John Phillip Reid, The Cherokee Thought: An Apparatus of Primitive Law, 46 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 281, 281-83 (1971).
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civilized ways of American law and society. 100 The Cheyenne Way was even
considered progressive for its time because it celebrated parts of the tribal legal
traditions it described, 10 1 thus breaking with the academy's widespread belief
that Indians were lawless. However, these works evaluated tribal law with an
"evolutionary view" that assumed a "hierarchy of sociocultural systems" and
carried an "ethnocentric bias." 102 This assumption that Indians were primitive
and hence less worthy or incapable of governing themselves played an
important role in American colonialism and predominated the legal academy
as much as it did the rest of the country. 103
Indian history and law scholar Robert Williams explains that these
"myths" about Indian people and tribes are central to a "colonizing legal
discourse" that strategically utilizes "alienating norms." 104 As he describes,
"eurocentric beliefs [are] elevated to the status of... universal principle[s]," and
thus both tribes' failures to conform to those principles and myths
highlighting Indian inadequacies are used to justify disrespecting tribes or
denying them "equal status." 105 Historically, othering Indian tribes and
deciding they were savage or uncivilized justified taking their resources. 106
Likewise, the myth of the so-called vanishing Indian gave the new
inhabitants of the United States both better title and an exclusive claim to
modernity. 107 In the mid-nineteenth century, Harvard Law professor and
former Governor of Massachusetts Emory Washburn mournfully declared
that "nothing but tradition now remains ... [,] not a drop of [Indian] blood,"
despite Indian communities living not far from where he spoke.108
100. See, e.g., K. N. LLEWELLYN & E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY: CONFLICT AND
CASE LAW IN PRIMITIVE JURISPRUDENCE 1-19, 29 (1941); Robert Redfield, 9 U. CHI. L.

REV. 366, 368-69 (1942) (reviewing LLEWELLYN & HOEBEL, supra) (comparing the
Cheyenne to ancient Hebrews).
101. See Redfield, supranote 100, at 368.
102. Ajay K. Mehrotra, Book Note, Law and the "Other": Karl N. Llewellyn, Cultural
Anthropology, and the Legacy of The Cheyenne Way, 26 LAW & SoC. INQUIRY 741, 758
(2001) (reviewing LLEWELLYN & HOEBEL, supranote 100).
103. See generally ROBERT F. BERKHOFER, JR., THE WHITE MAN'S INDIAN: IMAGES OF THE
AMERICAN INDIAN FROM COLUMBUS TO THE PRESENT (Vintage Books 1979) (1978)

(documenting the creation of the "image of the Indian" in America to rationalize or
justify policy).
104. Williams, supra note 23, at 290-91.
105.

Id. at 290.

106. See ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., SAVAGE ANXIETIES:
CIVILIZATION 202-15 (2012).

THE INVENTION OF WESTERN

107. See JEAN M. O'BRIEN, FIRSTING AND LASTING: WRITING INDIANS OUT OF EXISTENCE IN

NEW ENGLAND, at xiii, xv (2010) (stating that "[t]he overwhelming message" of
hundreds of New England local history documents from 1820 to 1880 "was that local
Indians had disappeared").
108. Id. at xi.
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Constructions of Indians as extinct, primitive, uncivilized, or doomed to
disappear helped alleviate America's moral guilt and replaced it with a sense of
morally righteous mourning and inheritance. Philip Deloria's seminal work
Playing Indian documents this phenomenon throughout American history.
Deloria describes how white Americans have mourned the "vanishing Indian"
and described themselves as the heirs not only of the land but also of
"Indianness."109 Americans have claimed Indianness by "playing Indian"
themselves and constructing an Indian that is simultaneously a savage and a
noble creature of the past. 110
The belief that Indians were primitives who belonged in the past is so
strong that, throughout American history, when non-Indians were confronted
with real contemporary Indians, their response was not to question their
assumptions but to deny the Indianness of the contemporary Indians.111 An
1877 Supreme Court decision offers a vivid example. In United States v. Joseph,
the Court held that Pueblo Indians were "Indians only in feature" and
ultimately too "intelligent," "virtuous," and "civilized" to be an Indian tribe. 112
Thirty-six years later, the Court changed its mind when presented with
different sources, deciding that in fact the Pueblos were an Indian tribe,
"considering their Indian lineage, isolated and communal life, primitive
customs and limited civilization." 113 The consequence of erasing and
primitivizing Indians is that we forget or dismiss Indians and their
contributions, including their law. As described by Linda Tuhiwai Smith,
"[o]ne of the supposed characteristics of primitive peoples was that we could
not use our minds or intellects . . . [,] invent things, . . . create institutions or
history,... [or] produce anything of value."114
In addition to the debasing primitivization that tribal nations have
suffered, they have also been subject to ethnification and racialization. 115
109. PHILIPJ. DELORIA, PLAYING INDIAN 63-64(1998).

110. Id. at 5-7.
111. See O'BRIEN, supra note 107, at xv ("A toxic brew of racial thinking-steeped in their
understanding of history and culture-led [non-Indians] to deny the Indianness of
Indians.... [N]on-Indians convinced themselves that New England Indians had become
extinct...."); Bethany R. Berger, Red: Racism and the American Indian, 56 UCLA L. REV.
591, 651-52 (2009) (describing protests against Northeast tribes whose "profitable
commercial enterprises," "modern governments," and mixed racial status led protestors
to question whether the tribes' members were "really Indian").
112. 94 U.S. 614,616-17 (1877).
113. United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 47 (1913).
114. LINDA TUHIWAI SMITH, DECOLONIZING METHODOLOGIES: RESEARCH AND INDIGENOUS

PEOPLES 25 (1999).
115. See Sebastian Felix Braun, Building on Native Sovereignty: From Ethnic Membership to
National Citizenship, in NATIVE AMERICAN NATIONALISM AND NATION RE-BUILDING:

PAST AND PRESENT CASES 29, 39 (Simone Poliandri ed., 2016) (describing the federal
footnote continued on next page
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While it is fairly rare to encounter a present-day scholar or judge calling tribal
nations "primitive," tribal sovereigns are still raced and othered in a way that
serves the same function: to control and limit tribal-government identities and
justify wariness of tribal powers. As Bethany Berger describes it, "the basic
racist move at work in Indian law and policy is to racialize the tribe, defining
tribes as racial groups in order to deny tribes the rights of governments." 116
Tribes did not have a precolonial concept of a pancontinental collective
identity. The very idea of an "Indian" is a European invention that suited the
political purpose of delegitimizing these sovereigns. 117 The requirement that
tribal members have some degree of "Indian blood" came not from tribes but
from the federal government. 118 Like other governments, tribal governments
had naturalization processes that allowed them to extend citizenship,
including through marriage. 119 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court rejected the
Cherokee citizenship of William Rogers for jurisdictional purposes since, in its
view, he remained a "white man" who could never be an "Indian." 120 Though
the Court called the Cherokee Nation a "nation," it did not use the appropriate
terminology of naturalization or citizenship, but instead the familial term
"adoption." 121
Likewise, the idea of an Indian "tribe" is a construction of the United States
government, which used the word interchangeably with "nation" when doing
so suited its interests. 122 In truth, there are 574 precolonial governments
surviving to this day that we ought to call by the names they call themselves. The
historical and cultural dynamics discussed above either erased tribal law or
government's "strategy of ethnification"); Sarah Krakoff, Inextricably Political: Race,
Membership, and Tribal Sovereignty, 87 WASH. L. REV. 1041, 1043 (2012) (describing the
racialization of American Indians).
116. Berger, supra note 111, at 599.
117. See Carole Goldberg, Descent into Race, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1373, 1373-74 (2002).
118. Paul Spruhan, A Legal History of Blood Quantum in FederalIndian Law to 1935, 51 S.D. L.
REV. 1, 46 (2006).
119. See, e.g., United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 567-68 (1846) (noting that both the
defendant and the victim were white men who had incorporated into the Cherokee
Nation and had become citizens from the time they agreed to join the tribe in removal);
John Rockwell Snowden, Wayne Tyndall & David Smith, American Indian Sovereignty
and Naturalization:It's A Race Thing, 80 NEB. L. REV. 171, 191-200 (2001) (describing the
historical naturalization processes of the Maha or Umonhon (Omaha) Nation and the
Winnebago tribe).
120. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) at 572-73 ("[A] white man who at mature age is adopted in an
Indian tribe does not thereby become an Indian....").
121. Id. at 571, 573.
122. See Ablavsky, supra note 23, at 1039-42 (stating that, in the Founding era, the term
Indian "tribe" was used by some to connote "primitiveness," "savagery," "difference,"
and "common descent," while the term Indian "nation" was used to connote
"independence" and "equality").
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insisted on seeing it only through the constructed lens that othered,
delegitimized, racialized, and dehumanized it, thereby denying it any hope of
equal status in America.
The othering of tribes suffused how Indians and tribes were welcomed-or
not welcomed-into the United States. Although the Supreme Court clarified
in 1831 that tribes were not "foreign nations" but actually "domestic dependent
nations," Indians were still not American citizens. 123 Tribal nations were
conquered domestic nations within the United States, but still not of it. They
lost their independence and ostensibly gained the protection of a new nation,
but not full citizenship in that nation. Even the Fourteenth Amendment did
not change the marginalized status of tribal nations and their citizens. 124 The
Court described tribes during this period as "alien, though dependent, power[s]"
and Indians as similar to the U.S.-born children of foreign ambassadors. 125
Citizenship was often exchanged for land or granted as a first step in a process
intended to allow for land taking. 126 Indians wouldn't gain birthright
citizenship in the United States until the Indian Citizenship Act of 1924.127
Similar rhetoric describing Indian tribes as a cultural, racial, or political
other permeates Supreme Court doctrine from the 1830s to the present day. 128
The Court handles questions of tribal power over nonmembers as questions
about whether a culturally and racially different group should have power
over real Americans rather than as simple jurisdictional questions about the
capacity or powers of the United States' own subsovereigns. The concern, as
the Oliphant Court said in 1978, is that non-Indian Americans in tribal court
will be "trie[d] ... not by their peers ... nor the law of their land, but by ... a
different race." 129 Likewise, the Hicks Court in 2001 called the non-Indians
potentially subject to tribal civil jurisdiction "outsiders," 130 and, in
concurrence, Justice Souter expressed concern that the mix of tribal, federal,
and state law in tribal courts would be "unusually difficult for an outsider to
sort out." 131
123. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
124. See Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 102 (1884).
125. Id.
126. See Stephen Kantrowitz, White Supremacy, Settler Colonialism, and the Two Citizenships of
the FourteenthAmendment, 10J. CIV. WAR ERA 29, 31-38, 46 (2020).
127. Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b)).
128. See Daan Braveman, Tribal Sovereignty: Them and Us, 82 OR. L. REv. 75, 75-77 (2003); see
also Katherine Florey, Beyond Uniqueness: Reimagining Tribal Courts' Jurisdiction, 101
CALIF. L. REV. 1499, 1504-05 (2013).
129. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 210-11 (1978) (quoting Ex parte Crow
Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 571 (1883)).
130. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 371 (2001).
131. Id. at 384-85 (Souter, J., concurring).
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I include this examination of the long-standing marginalization of Indians
in the hope that, after acknowledging these deep-seated delegitimizing
constructions that have informed both law and legal discourse, we can reject
them. The current omission of tribal law from the mainstream is not because
tribal law is inherently unworthy of our attention, but because of this history.
As the body of more accurate scholarship on tribal law grows-and as tribes
themselves grow in size, governing capacity, and visibility-these old
assumptions and their continued influence on how we see and think of
tribes become increasingly inappropriate. 132 They are at best outdated
overgeneralizations and at worst dehumanizing propaganda.
Rather than assuming that tribal governments have nothing to offer or are
simply too different or small to belong in the mainstream of American law, I
propose we do the opposite. We assume that tribal governments are simply
governments like any other. We engage with tribal governments and tribal
law with minds open to previously impossible ideas and observations.
B.

Marginalization Through "Indian Law"

A second-order task is a reckoning within the field of Indian law. There
are several dynamics within the field that marginalize tribal law. "Indian law"
as a field lumps together two very different kinds of law: "tribal law" and
"federal Indian law." This is the doctrinal equivalent of lumping together
"federalism" and all of "state law." It is also a poor name choice. While both
kinds of law have to do with Indians, federal Indian law was made primarily by
non-Indians to govern Indians, to legitimize conquest, and to erode tribal
sovereignty. Therefore, federal Indian law is more accurately "conquest
federalism" than "Indian" law. We would never call the contemporary study of
Jim Crow laws or even the Reconstruction Amendments "Black law." 133 The
far better candidate for the name "Indian law" is simply and exclusively tribal
law-the law made by Indians. 134 In this section, I explore three ways this
132. Steven Wilf, The Invention of Legal Primitivism, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 485, 491
(2009) (arguing that the construction of legal primitivism was part of the "framework
of colonialism" and reveals how modern legal theorists saw themselves through
contrast).
133. While laws that governed the conduct of Black Americans in the antebellum period
were known as "Black Codes," my point here is that labeling a contemporary subject of
study "Indian law" or "Black law" suggests the law came from that group, or at the very
least it suggests an agency or some sort of ownership. Thus the named group being
merely the object of regulation-particularly oppressive regulation-feels a poor, if not
perverse, fit for the term.
134. Created and controlled by non-Indians, federal Indian law was such a paternalistic
system that scholars like Bobo Dean remarked that the Indian Self-Determination Act,
enacted in 1975, marked Indian participation or "consent of the governed" for the first
real time in the enterprise. S. Bobo Dean, The Consent of the Governed-A New Concept in
footnote continued on next page
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lumping-aside

from being intellectually

incoherent-contributes

to the

invisibility of tribal law.
1.

Federal Indian law's domination

A recent survey of the field by Grant Christensen and Melissa Tatum,
which canvassed 3,334 pieces of Indian law scholarship published between 1985
and 2015, found that the most cited works are generally about federal Indian
law. 135 Tribal law articles, by contrast, are rare. 136 Federal Indian law's
dominance actively undermines tribal law because it casts tribal law as
comparatively niche. Federal Indian law presents itself as the part of the field
that addresses broader questions, while tribal law is considered narrow, tribally
specific, and relevant only to other tribal governments. Christensen and
Tatum's survey acknowledges that many excellent pieces of scholarship are
seldom cited or considered influential in the field simply because they deal
with "niche issues that may affect only one tribe or region" 137 -in other words,
because they are about tribal law.
In his survey of the field for articles that address Indian law "on the
ground," Matthew Fletcher explains that while some of the "best Indian law
articles" are "narrow and deep" because they examine one tribe, they rarely
receive "attention from elite reviews, and therefore elite scholars and
judges." 138 Elite reviews are instead drawn to "broad and shallow" works that

Indian Affairs?, 48 N.D. L. REV. 533, 538-39 (1972) (discussing the Indian SelfDetermination and Education Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203 (codified
in scattered sections of 5, 25, 42, and 50 U.S.C.)).
135. See Grant Christensen & Melissa L. Tatum, Reading Indian Law: Evaluating Thirty Years
of IndianLaw Scholarship, 54 TULSA L. REV. 81, 85, 87, 94-95 (2018).
136. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, American Indian Legal Scholarship and the Courts: Heeding
Frickey's Call, 4 CALIF. L. REV. CIR. 1, 16-18 (2013) [hereinafter Fletcher, American Indian
Legal Scholarship and the Courts]. Articles are rare outside the American Indian Law
Review, but one pops up every few years or so. See, e.g., Robert A. Williams, Jr., Linking
Arms Together: Multicultural Constitutionalism in a North American Indigenous Vision of
Law and Peace, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 981 (1994); Robert B. Porter, Building a New Longhouse:
The Casefor Government Reform Within the Six Nations of the Haudenosaunee, 46 BUFF. L.
REV. 805 (1998); Donna Coker, Enhancing Autonomy for Battered Women: Lessons from
Navajo Peacemaking, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1999); Kenneth H. Bobroff, Retelling Allotment:
Indian Property Rights and the Myth of Common Ownership, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1559 (2001);
Justin B. Richland, "What Are You Going to Do with the Village's Knowledge?" Talking
Tradition, Talking Law in Hopi Tribal Court, 39 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 235 (2005); Matthew
L.M. Fletcher, Tribal Employment Separation: Tribal Law Enigma, Tribal Governance
Paradox, and Tribal CourtConundrum, 38 U. MIcH.J.L. REFORM 273 (2005).
137. Christensen & Tatum, supra note 135, at 95 & n.74 (citing, for example, articles on the
fishing rights of the Wisconsin Chippewa and domestic violence under Navajo
common law).
138. Fletcher, American IndianLegal Scholarship and the Courts, supranote 136, at 2, 16-17.
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"put all Indian tribes in the same doctrinal and theoretical boat, . . . have
inaccurate representations of Indian country realities, and . . . offer solutions
that have little or no chance of being effective." 139 This leads to a concerning
dissonance between the good scholarship that reflects the reality of the
diversity of Native nations and the complexities of tribal law, and scholarship
that ignores these factors but nonetheless garners attention.
Tribal law scholars, in turn, often assume that the field is "niche" and has
limited relevance, but they needn't do so. Rarely have scholars placed the
experience or insight of tribes outside of this silo and suggested broader
implications. 140 There is certainly tribal law scholarship with broader
relevance, 14 1 but it often leaves broader implications unaddressed and instead
frames the problem as a uniquely Indian problem. 142 If tribal governments are
struggling with similar American public law questions, the similarities are
usually discussed only to evaluate the influence of federal or state solutions on
tribal governments. 143 Rarely is it suggested, even briefly, that tribal
governments' experiences are relevant to other American sovereigns. 144 This
assumption of limited relevance is evident in the audience tribal law

139. Id. at 17.
140. Some of these rare articles include Rob Williams's piece on the multiculturalism in Six
Nations constitutionalism and Donna Coker's piece on Navajo Peacemaking courts'
handling of domestic violence. See Williams, supra note 136, at 991 n.24; Coker, supra
note 136, at 4-6.
141. See infra note 175, 181-182 (listing articles on the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA)).
142. See generally Nell Jessup Newton, Tribal Court Praxis: One Year in the Life of Twenty
Indian Tribal Courts, 22 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 285 (1997) (illustrating the institutional
competency and fairness of tribal courts through a survey of the eighty-five cases
published in the 1998 Indian Law Reporter).
143. See, e.g., Carole B. Goldberg, Individual Rights and Tribal Revitalization, 35 ARIz. ST. L.J.
889, 914-15, 937 (2003) (examining the complex tensions and challenges of tribes
embracing individual rights, and concluding that Anglo-American individual rights
pose the greatest threat to tribal revitalization when injected into tribal communities
without tribal participation and autonomy).
144. See, e.g., Developments in the Law-Indian Law, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1652, 1666-68, 1667 n.49
(2016) (arguing for independent executives in tribal constitutions); cf Patrick M. Garry,
Candice J. Spurlin, Jennifer L. Keating & Derek A. Nelsen, Tribal Incorporationof First
Amendment Norms: A Case Study of the Indian Tribes of South Dakota, 53 S.D. L. REV. 335,
335-36 (2008) (noting that South Dakota tribes' incorporation of community interests
into individual rights "may prove instructive to ... First Amendment freedoms," but
not fleshing out this observation); Barbara Ann Atwood, Tribal Jurisprudence and
Cultural Meanings of the Family, 79 NEB. L. REV. 577, 656 (2000) (stating that "the nonNative audience" could learn from the "different ways of conceptualizing and healing
breaches in family relations").
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scholarship usually identifies: other Indian tribes or potential Indian law
practitioners. 145
Angela Riley's seminal work Good (Native) Governance146 is a prime
example. The article builds on Riley's earlier work,1 47 which discussed how
tribes are labeled "illiberal actors" since they are often more comfortable with
assigning roles and duties to persons based on immutable status, an idea
completely at odds with liberal conceptions of individual rights, though Riley
suggests that the unique aspects of Indian sovereignty ought to place them
"beyond the bounds of a standard liberalism analysis." 148 Tribal good
governance-like tribal sovereignty-must then be outside the traditional
norms of liberalism, and thus tribes ought to "reject conventional notions of
good governance." 149 Riley therefore concludes that tribes shouldn't be forced
to comply with the norms of mainstream "good governance," so she
"propose[s], instead, a theory of 'good Native governance."' 150 I would reframe
Riley's piece as documenting how tribal governments are not only identifying
the limits of conventional notions of good governance but reinventing
mainstream good governance since it fails to work for them. 151

145. See DAVID E. WILKINS, THE NAVAJO NATION POLITICAL EXPERIENCE, at xiii (4th ed. 2013)

(mentioning the relevance of his work for comparative analysis in U.S. government,
politics, and Native studies, but suggesting that the primary audience is Din people);
Robert B. Porter, Strengthening Tribal Sovereignty Through Government Reform: What Are
the Issues?, 7 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y, Winter 1997, at 72, 73 (speaking directly to Native
nations); Porter, supra note 24, at 1618-19 (identifying Indian law scholars as the
primary audience for Indian law scholarship, though noting it is used to some extent
by "lawyers and non-lawyers working with Indians, as well as Indians themselves"); Pat
Sekaquaptewa, Key Concepts in the Finding, Definition and Considerationof Custom Law in
Tribal Lawmaking, 32 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 319, 320 (2008) ("My intended primary
audience includes my peers-tribal judges, leaders, council members, and tribal law
academics-particularly those who are also stakeholders.").
146. Angela R. Riley, Good (Native) Governance, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1049 (2007).
147. Id. at 1051.
148. See Angela R. Riley, (Tribal) Sovereignty and Illiberalism, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 799, 802, 804,
813 (2007).
149. Riley, supra note 146, at 1054.
150.

Id.

151. Frank Pommersheim's book advocates for a tribe-centered view of Indian law that
would produce an "indigenous version of tribal sovereignty." FRANK POMMERSHEIM,
BRAID OF FEATHERS: AMERICAN INDIAN LAW AND CONTEMPORARY TRIBAL LIFE 193

(1995).
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2.

Bleed-over "exceptionalism" from federal Indian law

Indian law is perceived as complicated and different from the rest of
American law. 152 Even scholarship that tries to bring Indian law out of
obscurity still emphasizes its differences. A giant in the field, Philip Frickey,
spent much of his career arguing that "[f]ederal Indian law does not deserve its
image as a tiny backwater of law." 153 He charted the "exceptionalism" of federal
Indian law for violating many federal law norms 154 and argued that it deserved
more prominence in public law in spite of155 -or even because of-its unique
"doctrinal incoherence." 156
Frickey's version of federal Indian law has been expanded upon by a new
generation of scholars. These scholars argue that federal Indian law is simply a
subset of federal law that examines the legal questions of conquest and the
particular challenge of a subsovereignty that is not state sovereignty. Joe
Singer has argued for placing federal Indian law more prominently in property
law. 157 Judith Resnik has suggested its integration into federal courts. 158 And
recently, Maggie Blackhawk has argued that federal Indian law is central to
constitutional law and has insights for broader federal law principles. 159
I wholeheartedly agree with these scholars that federal Indian law deserves
more prominence in federal law. But whether or not they are correct, it
implies nothing about tribal law. Federal Indian law is supposedly exceptional
152. See, e.g., Philip P. Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism in Federal Public Law, 119
HARV. L. REV. 431, 436, 488 (2005) [hereinafter Frickey, (Native) American
Exceptionalism];Philip P. Frickey, Context and Legitimacy in FederalIndian Law, 94 MICH.
L. REV. 1973, 1974 (1996) (reviewing POMMERSHEIM, supra note 151) (explaining that
federal Indian law is "sealed off from the public law mainstream" because it is so
different). See generally Getches, supra note 58, at 1576.
153. Frickey, supra note 29, at 383.
154. Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism, supra note 152, at 436, 488 (suggesting that
making sense of a federal Indian law rooted in a messy history of constitutionalism and
colonialism deserves the "courage of our confusions"); Philip P. Frickey, Domesticating
Federal Indian Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 31, 49 (1996) (stating that federal Indian law is
defined by "collectivist, separatist, and unique legal elements").
155. See Philip P. Frickey, Scholarship, Pedagogy, and Federal Indian Law, 87 MICH. L. REV.
1199, 1214-15 (1989) (reviewing WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A
NUTSHELL (2d ed. 1988)) ("[E]nhanced scholarly status for federal Indian law is unlikely
to develop without a recognition that insights in this area may cast light on some
fundamental general problems of American public law .... "); Frickey, supra note 154, at
49 (suggesting that federal Indian law's "unique legal elements" should not be lost in an
attempt to "mainstream" it into constitutional law).
156. Philip P. Frickey, Adjudication and Its Discontents: Coherence and Conciliation in Federal
Indian Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1754, 1754, 1757 (1997).
157. Singer, Sovereignty, supra note 30, at 3; Singer, Indian Title, supranote 30, at 9.
158. Resnik, supra note 31, at 701-02.
159. Blackhawk, supra note 32, at 1795, 1847.
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because it violates federal law norms and expectations. This exceptionalism in
federal law does not make the laws passed by tribal governments similarly
exceptional-though many assume it does. The uniqueness of federal Indian
law may put tribes in interesting and unexpected situations as sovereigns, but
it does not necessarily mean that the substantive law tribes are making to
govern themselves must also be so unusual that we can presumptively assume
these laws belong outside the mainstream.
3.

The deceptive acceptance of federal Indian law

Finally, the existence of an overarching category called "Indian law" allows
scholars who are unfamiliar with Indian tribes to engage with the part of
Indian law that is most comfortable, familiar, and accessible-federal Indian
law-and then walk away content that they have "included Indians." However,
we cannot mistake including federal Indian law for including "Indians" within
American law, lest we forget who made this law. Who and what, then, are we

really including?
Federal Indian law is not the law of Indian people; it is primarily the law of
their conquest and the erosion of their tribal sovereignty. Though Native
people and tribal governments have undoubtedly fought for and are largely
responsible for the survival of tribal governments, they are not the architects
or beneficiaries of this law. Indian tribes are the objects far more than the
actors in federal Indian law. Indeed, Indian policy was once described as how to
deal with the "Indian problem." 160 Federal Indian law isn't the law of Indians or
by Indians; it's the law made by non-Indians for Indians, with only recent input
from tribal governments as their lobbying efforts have grown more
powerful. 161 The Court decided long ago that Indian consent was irrelevant,
allowing federal Indian law to continue as the work of (almost entirely) white
men. 162 The one part of federal Indian law tribes are parties to are treaties, and
those are only sporadically upheld. The rest of federal lawmaking involves, at
160. See, e.g., S. COMM. ON LAB. & PUB. WELFARE, INDIAN EDUCATION: A NATIONAL TRAGEDY-

A NATIONAL CHALLENGE, S. REP. No. 91-501, at 13-14 (1969) (quoting the House Select
Committee on Indian Affairs as offering "the final solution of the Indian problem,"
including stricter assimilationist boarding schools and ultimately tribal termination).
161. See Kirsten Matoy Carlson, Lobbying as a Strategy for Tribal Resilience, 2018 BYU L. Rev.
1159, 1162-63, 1221.
162. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Tribal Consent, 8 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 45, 52, 109 (2012)
(providing an overview of case law demonstrating that "tribal consent is, for the
Supreme Court, of little import"); Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 588
(1823) ("Conquest gives a title which the Courts of the conqueror cannot deny .... ");
Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 289-90 (1955) ("Every American
schoolboy knows that the savage tribes of this continent were deprived of their
ancestral ranges by force and that . . . it was not a sale but the conquerors' will that
deprived them of their land.").
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best, listening to, considering, or consulting with Indians. The result of this
status quo is that attempts to diversify the fields of federal law or public law to
include Indians do not produce or promote scholarship that actually focuses on
or expands our knowledge of the laws or the lived experiences of Native
peoples. Instead, much of it is just more papers about the same handful of
Supreme Court cases.
Even the best and most innovative works in federal Indian law generally
stay in this familiar lane. For example, in a recent piece, Maggie Blackhawk
argued that we need a "more inclusive paradigm" in American public law,
specifically one that incorporates federal Indian law in how we think about
constitutional history and evaluate our constitutional framework. 163 I agree.
But the continued focus on federal Indian law as a way of diversifying legal
academia to include the experience of Native people too often elevates or
promotes more discussion of John Marshall's vision of tribal sovereignty, not
tribes' visions. Tribal law is where and how tribes have been quietly exercising
and developing their vision of tribal sovereignty.
III. American Public Law Insights from American Tribal Law
Tribal law has had plenty of successes, failures, innovations, reinventions,
and everything in between over the last two thousand (and two hundred)
years. There are a variety of ways that tribal law can expand or challenge our
thinking about American law beyond simply redefining its scope. Tribal laws
innovate, maintain precolonial laws, and also borrow, reject, or reinvent
federal and state legal ideas or structures. The diversity and vast number of
tribal nations mean that there is a lot of different lawmaking happening across
Indian Country. The three examples presented in this section knock down the
myth of tribal law as primitive or fundamentally too different to be American,
and they also demonstrate tribal law's capacity to provide insights beyond the
borders of Indian Country.
The first example, which concerns tribal criminal procedure, illustrates
how tribes reinvent legal concepts or challenge old assumptions, thereby
expanding the scope of what is assumed to be possible. Twelve tribes around
the country are challenging assumptions underlying the Sixth Amendment
right to impartial juries. Rather than assuming that the "community" of
persons that they must use to assemble their jury pools has to be exclusively
composed of reservation residents, these tribes are instead defining
"community" more broadly to include non-Indian people with adequate ties to
the tribe regardless of where they live.
163. Blackhawk, supranote 32, at 1793, 1847.
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The second example is a complex case study in government structure and
separation-of-powers law and also a fascinating legal history of the rise and fall
of a charismatic populist leader who held on to power for decades in the
Navajo Nation. The tribe's experience is defined by the intersection of its
rejection of both a written constitution and a unitary executive, combined
with the reinvigoration of traditional precolonial law: Navajo Fundamental
Law. Eventually, the tribe developed a three-branch government with a
unitary executive. The importance of independent institutions, the people's
continued support for the corrupt leader, and the common law development of
separation-of-powers law provide insights for federal separation-of-powers
law as well as for our current political moment.
Finally, the Citizen Potawatomi example explores a tribal innovation. The
tribe began with a boilerplate constitution handed to it by Oklahoma in the
1930s. After citizens moved away from the reservation and voter turnout
plummeted, the Citizen Potawatomi redesigned its legislative districts to
exceed the boundaries of its land base and reach all the way to what really
mattered: its people.
A note on methodology: I selected examples that illustrate how tribal law
can contribute even to a field where it is generally considered difficult to say
anything new: federal constitutional law. Within the confines of that subject
matter, I chose examples that also illustrate the value of tribal law's diversity
and numerosity. Since today's tribal governments-a diverse group of
contemporary sovereigns spread all across the country-struggle with many of
the same questions that dominate the rest of American public law, it was not
difficult to quickly find many examples from different areas of constitutional

law.
I also sought to feature examples that showcased different aspects of the
diversity of tribal nations, communities, and legal systems. The tribes featured
in these examples are diverse in size: One of the smaller tribes included in the
first example, the Alabama-Coushatta Tribe of Texas, has around 1,300 tribal
members, 164 while the Navajo Nation profiled in the second example is more
than 200 times that size. 165 The three examples I chose are also geographically
diverse: The tribes represented have lands within the borders of Arizona,
Louisiana, Michigan, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Texas,
Utah, and Washington. And the examples showcase diverse approaches: The
first examines a group of tribes making similar legal choices, while the second
and third involve an in-depth examination of two tribes' reform efforts that at
once are grounded in their unique histories and have insights that transcend
164. Our History, ALA.-COUSHATTA TRIBE TEx., https://perma.cc/P79T-4N73
Jan. 10, 2021).
165. Navajo Facts, supra note 3.
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them. Finally, I made sure that the examples would collectively include a
diverse set of tribal laws: new, old, novel, borrowed, reformed, successful, and
disastrous. In the following pages, you will see governments using their laws to
address the problems facing their people. That these governments are Indian
tribes sometimes adds important context or complications, but at their core
these examples are simply American public law.
A.

The VAWA Tribes' Constitutional-Rights Reinvention

Tribes can make governing choices free from the constraints of the U.S.
Constitution. In fact, the case that decided as much concerned precisely the
same issue examined here: jury composition. In that case, Bob Talton filed a
federal habeas corpus petition to stay his fast-approaching execution. 166 He
claimed he was indicted by an inadequate number of jurors under both the U.S.
Constitution and the constitution of the prosecuting government: the
Cherokee Nation. The Cherokee Nation had previously required only five
grand jurors, but it then passed an amendment increasing the number to
thirteen in November 1892. Talton was indicted in December 1892 by five
grand jurors, empaneled before the new law took effect for the spring term. 167
The Supreme Court held that Talton had no claim in federal court. 168
Talton's alleged murder of another Cherokee citizen on Cherokee land was "an
offence against the local laws of the Cherokee nation." 169 The Cherokee Nation
was a separate sovereign whose powers "existed prior to the Constitution, [and
thus were] not operated upon by the Fifth Amendment." 170 Thus, Talton's issue
with the retroactivity of grand jury requirements under Cherokee law was
"solely [a] matter[] within the jurisdiction of the courts of that nation." 171
Because they were not parties to the Constitution, tribes remain
"unconstrained by those constitutional provisions framed specifically as
limitations on federal or state authority." 172 Congress has the plenary power to
impose limits on tribal governments to protect individual rights, but it has
largely let tribal governments decide for themselves how to balance their
citizens' individual rights and tribal governments' powers. 173 Even during the

166. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 376-77 (1896) (statement of the case).
167. Id. at 377 (statement of the case); id. at 378 (majority opinion).
168. Id. at 381-82, 384 (majority opinion).
169. Id. at 381.
170. Id. at 384.
171. Id. at 385.
172. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978).
173. See id. at 56-57, 62-64; see also Mark D. Rosen, Evaluating Tribal Courts'Interpretationsof
the Indian Civil Rights Act, in THE INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT AT FORTY 275, 282 (Kristen
footnote continued on next page
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IRA period, the tribes were not pressured to adopt a Bill of Rights. 174 With this
freedom, some tribes have rights frameworks that look nothing like the
federal one.17 5
1.

Federally imposed opportunities to interpret the Constitution

In 1968, Congress found that few tribal constitutions included the rights
guaranteed in the federal Constitution. 176 In response, Congress passed the
Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA). 177 ICRA sought to impose "certain restrictions
upon tribal governments similar, but not identical, to those contained in the
Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment," 178 but it provided only federal
habeas corpus as a remedy. 179 Because tribal courts have sentencing limits 180
and ICRA has a tribal court exhaustion requirement, ICRA cases rarely make it
to federal court before the offenders are released. 181 Thus, ICRA rights are
almost exclusively enforced-and interpreted-in tribal courts.
The Supreme Court and scholars agree that this is as intended, since ICRA
was passed to affirm tribal sovereignty as much as to protect individual

A. Carpenter, Matthew L. M. Fletcher & Angela R. Riley eds., 2012) [hereinafter ICRA
AT FORTY].

174. See, e.g., COHEN, supra note 74, at 76 (offering a bill of rights as an option in guidance to
drafters of tribal constitutions); Lindsay G. Robertson, Foreword to COHEN, supra
note 74, at vii, vii.
175. See, e.g., NAT'L CONG. OF AM. INDIANS, VAWA 2013's SPECIAL DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

CRIMINAL JURISDICTION (SDVCJ) FIVE-YEAR REPORT 70-72 (2018) [hereinafter VAWA
REPORT], https://perma.cc/77TF-BN8R (comparing victims' rights provisions in
seventeen tribal codes, one of which is framed as "duties" the government owes
victims); Matthew L. M. Fletcher, Resisting Congress: Free Speech and Tribal Law, in
ICRA AT FORTY, supra note 173, at 133, 140 (listing tribes whose constitutions have a
free-speech right or protection without a state-action requirement); Garry et al., supra
note 144, at 335 (examining how "tribal courts have incorporated First Amendment
norms" and arguing that "tribal courts have taken a slightly different approach ... [ and]
elevated community interest and values").
176. S. REP. No.90-841, at 6-7 (1967).
177. See Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. II, 82 Stat. 73, 77-78 (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1304).
178. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 57 (1978).
179. Id. at 71.
180. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)-(b).
181. See Carrie

B. Garrow,

Habeas Corpus Petitions in Federal and Tribal Courts: A Searchfor

IndividualizedJustice, 24 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 137, 137, 148 (2015) (finding that 50%
of ICRA habeas petitions are dismissed for failure to exhaust tribal court remedies and
never reappear in federal court); cf Developments in the Law-Indian Law, supra note 144,
at 1724 (noting that enhanced tribal sentencing powers under the Tribal Law and
Order Act of 2010 increase the likelihood that federal courts will hear habeas petitions).
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rights. 182 Consequently, the balancing of the two should happen in tribal
courts that are best positioned to interpret the basic language of ICRA uniquely
for their communities. 183 Despite the similarities of ICRA and federal
constitutional provisions, federal constitutional precedent does not bind tribal
courts' interpretations of ICRA, though many courts rely on it as persuasive
authority. 184 Different interpretations of the same language have evolved in
tribal courts for the last fifty years. 185 In this way, tribal jurisprudence is
particularly noteworthy within the American legal system. Since 1816,
constitutional interpretation has been the primary domain of federal courtsnot state courts-and ultimate interpretive power rests with the U.S. Supreme
Court. 186 The Court justified federal interpretive supremacy by suggesting that
without it, different interpretations could develop across the country. 187
Tribal courts prove that the Court was right, putting the flexibility of
constitutional rights' language on full display. The diversity of ICRA
interpretations has "create[ed] [some] commonality without commanding
homogeneity," 188 creating interesting hybrids of federal and tribal law. 189 A
recent example of this type of hybrid tribal law interpretation of federal law is
explored in the case study below.
2.

The VAWA tribes' creative jury-pool "community" definition

In 2013, Congress's reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act
(VAWA) included a narrow expansion of tribal criminal jurisdiction that
allowed tribes to prosecute non-Indians for the first time in over thirty
182. See Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 66-67; see also Note, The Indian Bill of Rights and the
Constitutional Status of Tribal Governments, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1343, 1360 (1969); Donald L.
Burnett, Jr., An HistoricalAnalysis of the 1968 "IndianCivil Rights"Act, 9 HARV.J.ON LEGIS.
557, 589-94 (1972).
183. See Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 65-66; Developments in the Law-Indian Law, supra
note 144, at 1722-23 (arguing that even where habeas cases reach federal courts, federal
courts ought to defer to the tribe's interpretation of ICRA).
184. Fletcher, supra note 175, at 140; Navajo Nation v. Rodriguez, 8 Navajo Rptr. 604, 614
(2004) (No. SC-CR-03-04), 2004 Navajo Sup. LEXIS 13, at *10-11 ("While we are not
required to apply federal interpretations [of ICRA], we nonetheless consider them in
our analysis.").
185. ICRA creates a "framework" and limits tribal interpretations to those rights which
might "fit[] within its terms." Developments in the Law-Indian Law, supra note 144, at
1722-23, 1723 n.108.
186. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 348 (1816).
187. Id. ("[T]he constitution ... would be different in different states, and might, perhaps,
never have precisely the same construction, obligation, or efficacy, in any two states.").
188. Rosen, supra note 173, at 276.
189. See Mark D. Rosen, Multiple Authoritative Interpretersof Quasi-ConstitutionalFederalLaw:
Of Tribal Courts and the Indian Civil Rights Act, 69 FORDHAM L. REV.479, 485-86 (2000).
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years. 190 The provision allows tribes to prosecute certain non-Indians who
violate qualifying protection orders or commit domestic or dating violence
against Indian victims on tribal lands. 19 1 However, when tribes prosecute nonIndian defendants, they are required to guarantee an additional set of rights,
including two constitutional rights not previously required for Indian
defendants under the ICRA: the right to an attorney and the right to a trial by
jury. 192
Like tribes' ICRA interpretations, tribes' interpretations of VAWA rights
vary. Twelve tribes' interpretations of how to ensure that a fair cross section of
their "community" is represented in their jury pools reveal a longunquestioned assumption of federal courts operating under the confines of
identical language. The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants a
"trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed." 193 Federal courts have interpreted this provision to
require the jury be selected from "a fair cross section of the community." 194 The
jurors selected need not perfectly mirror community demographics, 195 but
there is no consensus on how much underrepresentation would violate the
Sixth Amendment-or how to measure it. 19 6 For the exclusion of a "distinctive
group" from a jury pool to violate the fair-cross-section requirement, the
exclusion must undermine the purposes of the requirement: guarding against
the exercise of arbitrary power by entrusting justice to the community,
preserving public confidence in fairness, and fostering civic responsibility. 197
VAWA requires tribes to protect non-Indian defendants' right to an
"impartial jury" and also incorporates fair-cross-section jurisprudence-with
an explicit nod toward racial-balancing concerns-by requiring an "impartial
jury that is drawn from sources that . . . reflect a fair cross section of the
community and ... do not systematically exclude any distinctive group in the

190. See Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, §§ 904905, 127 Stat. 54, 120-24 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1304 and 18 U.S.C. § 2265); see also VAWA
REPORT, supra note 175, at 1.
191. 25 U.S.C.§ 1304.
192. Id. §§ 1302(a)(10), 1302(c)(1), 1304(d).
193. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
194. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975); see also Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357,
364 (1979) (establishing the test for a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section
requirement).
195. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 538.
196. Berghuis v. Smith, 559 U.S. 314, 327, 329 (2010) (stating that while Duren applies to
Sixth Amendment claims, "neither Duren nor any other decision of this Court specifies
the method or test courts must use to measure the representation of distinctive groups
in jury pools").
197. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 174-75 (1986).
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community, including non-Indians." 198 State and federal courts are bound by
the fair-cross-section requirement as a matter of constitutional case law and
because the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968 (JSSA) made it a statutory
requirement of federal courts. 199
To comply with the fair-cross-section requirement, most state and federal
courts rely on the same assumption: that the "community" is composed of the
residents of the judicial district. This assumption suffuses juror source lists and
explicit residency requirements. In most states, jury lists are created using a
preexisting list of district residents, such as voter-registration rolls or driver'slicense databases.200 The JSSA requires that all federal jury pools are composed
of community residents. 20 1 Many states have passed their own equivalent
residency requirements. 2 02
But twelve of the eighteen tribes that first implemented VAWA did
something unexpected and unprecedented: They included nonresidents in their
jury pools.2 03 Conscious of the impartiality and fair-cross-section
requirements, tribes drafted tribal codes to include nonresidents. 204 Oddly
enough, it was precisely the fair-cross-section requirement that led tribes to
think beyond residency.
These tribes were acutely aware of fairness concerns because several
Republican lawmakers had opposed VAWA by arguing that non-Indians could
not receive a fair trial from an Indian jury. Senator Chuck Grassley, for

198. 25 U.S.C. § 1304(d)(3).
199. See Pub. L. No. 90-274, § 101, 82 Stat. 53, 54 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1861) (requiring
federal jurors to be "selected at random from a fair cross section of the community in
the district or division wherein the court convenes").
200. Nancy J. King, Racial Jurymandering: Cancer or Cure? A Contemporary Review of
Affirmative Action in Jury Selection, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 707,712 n.11 (1993).
201. Residency is mentioned throughout the statute, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861, 1863(b)(2)-(3), and
there is an explicit one-year residency requirement, id. § 1865(b)(1).
202. E.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-11-101(a)(i) (2020) (requiring a juror to be "a resident of the
state and of the county ninety (90) days before being selected and returned").
203. See PASCUA YAQUI TRIBAL CODE tit. 3, ch. 2-1, § 160(B) (2015); TULALIP TRIBAL CODES
tit. 2, § 2.05.110(1) (2020); WAGANAKISING ODAWA TRIBAL CODE OF L. tit. IX, ch. 7,
§ 9.706(B)(2) (2020); ALA.-COUSHATTA TRIBE OF TEX. COMPREHENSIVE CODES OF JUST.

tit. IV, ch. 1, § 125(D) (2014); SEMINOLE NATION OF OKLA. CODE OF L. tit. 3, ch. 6, § 603(a)
(2015); id. tit. 7, ch. 1, § 102(d); id. tit. 7, ch. 3, § 302(a); SAC & Fox NATION CODE OF L. tit. 6,
ch. 6, § 613(d) (2014); id. tit. 11, ch. 3, § 302(a); KICKAPOO TRIBE OF OKLA. CRIM. PROCS.
ch. 3, § 302(a) (n.d.); KICKAPOO TRIBE OF OKLA. RULES OF CIV. PROC. ch. 6, § 613(d) (1991);
NOTTAWASEPPI HURON BAND OF THE POTAWATOMI TRIBAL CODE § 8.20-2 (2020);
SISSETON-WAHPETON OYATE CODES OF L. §§ 23-10-02 to -04 (2015); MUSCOGEE (CREEK)
NATION CODE tit. 27, ch. 2, § 2-111, app. 1, r. 13 (2010); SAULT STE. MARIE TRIBE OF
CHIPPEWA INDIANS TRIBAL CODE § 70.126(4) (2016); CHITIMACHA COMPREHENSIVE CODES
OF JUST. tit. II, §§ 509-510 (2017).
204. VAWA REPORT, supra note 175, at 66, 68.

590

The Other American Law
73 STAN. L. REV. 555 (2021)

example, said at a town hall: "Under the laws of our land, you've got to have a
jury that is a reflection of society as a whole, and on an Indian reservation, it's
going to be made up of Indians, right? So the non-Indian doesn't get a fair
trial."205 Legal advocates noted there was little difference between Grassley's
concerns and the worries that arise when racial-minority defendants commit
crimes in areas that are predominately white and are thus tried by all-white
juries, or even when Indians are tried in federal courts for major crimes. 206 Yet
tribes were still concerned about the legitimacy of their jury verdicts and
possible public scrutiny. 207
Tribes wanted to include non-Indians, but they did not always have an upto-date list of their non-Indian residents. 208 Assembling such a list could be
difficult since tribes' taxing authority over non-Indians is limited (and rarely
exercised) and many tribes lack information about their non-Indian
residents.2 09 Some tribes decided, nonetheless, to compile a list of non-Indian
residents by requiring all non-Indians to register with the tribal
government. 2 10
Other tribes took a different route. There were other groups of nonIndians who had relationships with the tribe and whose names they could
easily assemble. The nonresident non-Indians added to jury pools included
tribal employees, tribal land lease or housing recipients, or tribal spouses and
family.2 11 Though not all of these non-Indians lived on tribal land, they
commuted to work on tribal land or willingly spent time there through a

205. Jennifer Bendery, Chuck Grassley on VAWA: Tribal Provision Means "The Non-Indian Doesn't
Get a FairTrial,"HUFFPOsT (Feb. 21, 2013, 5:33 PM ET), https://perma.cc/SP3U-ZYXY.
206. Id.; Cynthia Castillo, Special Feature, Tribal Courts, Non-Indians, and the Right to an
ImpartialJury After the 2013 Reauthorization of VAWA, 39 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 311, 319,
323-25 (2015); Kevin K. Washburn, American Indians, Crime, and the Law, 104 MICH. L.
REV. 709, 758 (2006) (highlighting a similar mismatch in the jury composition for
Indians prosecuted for federal crimes, noting those juries are "overinclusive because
they include persons who do not live in Indian country and are not routinely subject to
federal Indian country jurisdiction").
207. See Nat'l Cong. of Am. Indians, Webinar on Developing an Effective and Defensible
Jury Plan for Tribal Courts (2018), https://perma.cc/36CN-8GFY (one of several
webinars developed by NCAI to help VAWA tribes come up with "defensible" jury
plans that included non-Indians, anticipating scrutiny on non-Indian representation).
208. Id.; VAWA REPORT, supra note 175, at 66.
209. VAWA REPORT, supra note 175, at 66.
210. See, e.g., Aaron J. Tohtsoni, Community Implements VAWA with Ordinances and Grants to
Prosecute Offenders, GILA RIVER INDIAN NEWS (Nov. 2, 2018), https://perma.cc/4GKZ3TQF; Gila River Indian Cmty., Notice of Requirement: Non-member Resident
Registration (2019), https://perma.cc/7HUN-HTHH (publicizing the ordinance that
implemented VAWA).
211. VAWA REPORT, supra note 175, at 68.
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relationship with the tribe or a tribal member.2 12 The tribes had the names of
these potential jurors because of their relationship with the tribe or its
members-precisely the same relationship that could also give rise to tribal
jurisdiction.213
These pools not only reflect a more accurate picture of the community of
persons subject to tribal jurisdiction, but they also give this broader
community the opportunity for civic participation in tribal justice. 214 This
nonresident approach is in keeping with "thevery idea of a jury-'a body truly
representative of the community,' composed of 'the peers or equals of the
person whose rights it is selected or summoned to determine; that is, of his
neighbors, fellows, associates, persons having the same legal status in society as
2 15
that which he holds."
The tribes' decisions to think more creatively reveal how much the
assumption that the jury pool must be limited by residency has restricted
experimentation in the rest of the country. The Sixth Amendment does not
mandate residency requirements, and there is no case that explicitly holds that
the phrase "of the State and district" must mean a jury pool that is composed of
residents of those districts rather than a pool that is assembled by those
jurisdictions and that otherwise complies with the Sixth Amendment's
requirement of an "impartial"jury.2 16 While some circuit courts have held that
a juror residency requirement is not unconstitutional, they have not held that
such a requirement is constitutionally mandated.217 Cases that have examined
212. See id. at 68 (noting that non-Indians in jury pools can include tribal employees, tribal
member spouses or family, and voluntary registrants).

213. See 25 U.S.C. § 1304(b)(4)(B).
214. See Richard M. Re, Note, Re-Justifying the Fair Cross Section Requirement: Equal
Representation and Enfranchisement in the American Criminal Jury, 116 YALE L.J. 1568,
1570 (2007) (noting that "two opposing conceptions of the criminal jury's legitimacy"
are the "[d]emographic conceptions"-defining a legitimate jury as one with traits "in
proportion to the larger population, such that defendants have a 'fair possibility' of
being judged by a representative jury"-and the "enfranchisement conception"emphasizing all persons' democratic opportunity participate in a jury (quoting
Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 478 (1990))).
215. Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320, 330 (1970) (footnote omitted) (first quoting
Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940); and then quoting Strauder v. West Virginia,
100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880)).
216. See City of Bothell v. Barnhart, 257 P.3d 648, 651 n.2, 652 (Wash. 2011) (en banc)
(holding that drawing jurors from a county outside the one where a crime was
committed violated the Washington state constitution, but noting that federal jury
requirements have no explicit residency requirement).
217. The Fifth Circuit upheld the one-year-residency requirement in the JSSA on the basis
that new voters are not a cognizable class. See United States v. Perry, 480 F.2d 147, 148
(5th Cir. 1973) (per curiam); see also United States v. Maskeny, 609 F.2d 183, 192 (5th Cir.
1980) (reaffirming Perry after Duren). The Tenth and Seventh Circuits rejected similar
challenges with no discussion. See United States v. Test, 550 F.2d 577, 594 (10th Cir.
footnote continued on next page
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residency requirements in fair-cross-section contexts have, if anything, subtly
implied that residency requirements are not required by the Sixth Amendment
and seem to suggest that residency requirements are simply a permissible way
of meeting the fair-cross-section requirement. The Ninth Circuit said as much
in United States v. Duncan, where it upheld the federal residency requirement
and further described the statutory provision as "an attempt to give effect to
the requirement of the Sixth Amendment." 218
3.

Jury residency requirements in segregated America

There is, of course, nothing unconstitutional about a jury pool composed
solely of district residents.2 19 But residency is just one of several plausible ways
to define a community of persons for jury selection. Residency may not even be
the best way to define a "community" for jury selection, considering racial
segregation in housing in the United States.220 For decades, jury scholars have
criticized the racial imbalance in jury pools created by residential
segregation. 22 1 In searching for solutions to racial imbalances, scholars
overwhelmingly focus on the use of strike challenges to shape jury
composition 222 and have largely ignored the problem of racially homogenous

1976); United States v. Gast, 457 F.2d 141, 142-43 (7th Cir. 1972). The Ninth Circuit
rejected similar challenges on rational-basis review. See United States v. Duncan, 456
F.2d 1401, 1406 (9th Cir. 1972). The Fifth Circuit also upheld a Florida juror-residency
requirement under rational-basis review. Reed v. Wainwright, 587 F.2d 260 app. at 264
(5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
218. 456 F.2d at 1406; see also Wainwright, 587 F.2d at 264 (holding that the residency
requirement supported "the nexus between the jury and the community whose laws
the jury is duty-bound to uphold"); Reed v. State, 292 So. 2d 7, 10 (Fla. 1974) (upholding
a one-year residency requirement because having local jurors promoted efficient juror
selection and administration, and ensured jurors could consider evidence in light of
local circumstances).
219. Claims arguing that residency requirements are unconstitutional would likely be dead
in the water given the doctrine's tolerance for geographically imbalanced or arguably
unrepresentative jury pools. See, e.g., Johnson v. Norris, 537 F.3d 840, 852 (8th Cir. 2008)
(holding that a Black murder defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury selected
from a fair cross section of the community was not violated by a change of venue to a
county that contained few Black residents).
220. See Aaron Williams & Armand Emamdjomeh, America Is More Diverse than Ever-But
Still Segregated, WASH. POST (updated May 10, 2018), https://perma.cc/LE6G-7XPF.
221. See, e.g., King, supra note 200, at 717 & n.31 ("Traditional methods of jury selection ...
[offer] no guarantee that areas with a concentration of Blacks will be sampled...."(first
alteration in original) (quoting Hiroshi Fukurai, Edgar W. Butler & Richard Krooth,
Cross-SectionalJury Representation or Systematic Jury Representation? Simple Random and
Cluster Sampling Strategies in jury Selection, 19 J. CRIM. JUST. 31, 33 (1991))).
222. See, e.g., Charles J. Ogletree, Just Say No!: A Proposal to Eliminate Racially Discriminatory
Uses of Peremptory Challenges, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1099, 1100 (1994); Leonard L. Cavise,
The Batson Doctrine: The Supreme Court's Utter Failure to Meet the Challenge of
footnote continued on next page
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jury pools. Some scholars have argued for creatively dividing jury districts or
reconfiguring the selection lottery process, 223 but few have considered
expanding the pool itself.224
The Supreme Court has emphasized time and again that these kinds of
decisions about community boundaries are best made at the local level:
Our duty to protect the federal constitutional rights of all does not mean we must
or should impose on states our conception of the proper source of jury lists, so
long as the source reasonably reflects a cross-section of the population suitable in
2 25
character and intelligence for that civic duty.

While federal courts must comply with JSSA's use of jury-pool residency
requirements, states retain the discretion to define the appropriate community
of persons as long as they comply with the Sixth Amendment's impartiality
and fairness requirements. Expanding lists to include persons such as the
employees within a district might diversify jury pools with precisely the
persons who are already part of the community-persons who could find
themselves in front of a jury in that district if they committed crimes closer to
work than to home.
Despite frequent criticisms of the jury system, states have followed the
federal courts and relied on residency in constructing their jury pools, even
though they are-as these twelve tribes demonstrate-free to make different
choices. By examining these twelve tribes' different interpretations of this
single right, we see that tribal laws' differing interpretations provide
reinventions or variations on even some of the oldest assumptions in public
law jurisprudence.

Discrimination in Jury Selection, 1999 Wis. L. REV. 501, 505; Kenneth J. Melilli, Batson in
Practice: What We Have Learned About Batson and Peremptory Challenges, 71 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 447, 448-49 (1996); Douglas L. Colbert, Challenging the Challenge:
Thirteenth Amendment as a ProhibitionAgainst the Racial Use of Peremptory Challenges, 76
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 8-9 (1990); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury,
83 MICH. L. REV. 1611, 1656 (1985).
223. See e.g., Kim Forde-Mazrui, JuralDistricting:Selecting ImpartialJuries Through Community
Representation, 52 VAND. L. REV. 353, 389 (1999) (proposing that juries should be pooled
from constructed subdistricts organized around "communities of interest"); Nancy J.
King & G. Thomas Munsterman, Stratified Juror Selection: Cross-Section by Design, 79
JUDICATURE 273, 274 (1996) (discussing the possibility of strategic sampling to balance
out jury-pool lists).
224. See Jose Felipe Anderson, Catch Me If You Can! Resolving the Ethical Tragedies in the Brave
New World of Jury Selection, 32 NEw ENG. L. REV. 343, 398-99 (1998) (mentioning efforts
to supplement voter rolls with DMV lists of residents in order to find eligible jurors
only in passing).
225. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 474 (1953).
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B.

Separation-of-Powers Crisis in the Navajo Nation

Over twenty years ago, Adrian Vermeule suggested that American
constitutional law scholars turn their attention to the "large (and largely
neglected) body of information" available in "separation-of-powers cases
decided by the state courts."226 Arguing that the debate on federal separationof-powers law was exhausted through repeated focus on the same few cases, he
suggested that state cases are not only "worthy of study in their own right," but
also that "from the standpoint of federal constitutional law [they] are
particularly valuable as data about comparative constitutional law, in
particular comparative separation-of-powers law." 227 These arguments apply
equally to tribal law. And this section presents a similar analysis of another
American sovereign's separation-of-powers law, specifically the Navajo
Nation's.
The Navajo Nation offers an illuminating comparison to similar moments
of clash, crisis, and evolution between competing branches of the federal
government. Some moments are eerily familiar, while others are strikingly
different. Although the Navajo (or Din6) people, culture, and aspects of their
contemporary politics-including some of the laws they use to this day-are
very old, the Navajo Nation is relatively new, existing as a unified state for
only the last century.2 28 And in this past century the Navajo Nation has
undergone tremendous change.
The Navajo Nation is the largest Native nation in the United States,
governing an area larger than West Virginia, and is the second most populous,
with over 330,000 enrolled members as of 2010.229 Around half of Navajo tribal
members live on the reservation, and another 10% live in nearby border
towns.2 30 About 175,000 people live on the Navajo reservation, 231 around 90%
232
of whom are Indian.
The Navajo Nation is a traditional, isolated, and sparsely populated
place. 233 Navajo is still spoken by at least half of the population and nearly 20%
226. Adrian Vermeule, The Judicial Power in the State (and Federal) Courts, 2000 SUP. CT. REV.
357, 358.
227. Id. at 358-59.
228. See WILKINS, supranote 145, at 18.
229. See Navajo Facts, supra note 3; TINA NORRIS, PAULA L. VINES & ELIZABETH M. HOEFFEL,
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMM., C2010BR-10, THE AMERICAN INDIAN AND
ALASKA NATIVE POPULATION: 2010 CENSUS BRIEFS 17 tbl.7 (2012).
230. NAVAJO EPIDEMIOLOGY CTR., NAVAJO DIV. OF HEALTH, NAVAJO POPULATION PROFILE:

2010 U.S. CENSUS 6 (2013), https://perma.cc/KWC4-8Q7T.
231. Id. at 36 tbl.1.6.
232.

Id.

233. The Navajo Nation has only 6.33 people per square mile, compared to the average
population density of 345 people per square mile in the United States. Id. at 21.
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of households claim they do not speak English "very well."234 Approximately
40% of the Navajo living on the reservation lack running water, and 10% live
without electricity. 235
Navajo Nation is one of the last places in Indian Country where you would
expect to see the diffusion of broader American culture or Western legal ideas.
And yet, the Navajo Nation has developed a three-branch system of
government with a robust separation-of-powers jurisprudence. 236 But it would
be a mistake to assume the Navajo copied the United States. Navajo separationof-powers law simultaneously mirrors and dismisses parts of federal law, but it
is also rooted in its own, far-older legal tradition.2 37 After providing this legal
history, this case study examines three clear structural takeaways regarding
independent institutions and offers a lens for viewing Navajo jurisprudence
that may be of interest to American constitutional law scholars.
1.

The creation of a centralized Navajo government

Though the Din6 people share a common culture, they did not have a
unified government until about 100 years ago.238 They were previously
organized into local political bands that, on occasion, sent leaders to gather
together at a meeting called the Naachid. 239 The United States primarily dealt
with Navajo leaders on an individual basis, occasionally signing treaties with
groups of leaders, until a violent era of U.S. military campaigns and oppression
crippled the Naachid. 240 The federal government's Indian agent and the
Secretary of the Interior asserted a tremendous amount of control over the
weakened Navajo bands' governments and even appointed or approved
individual band leaders.2 41
Then someone struck oil on Navajo land in 1922.242 Due to an earlier
treaty, the United States needed the approval of three-fourths of Navajo adult
234. See JULIE SIEBENS & TIFFANY JULIAN, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COM.,
ACSBR/10-10, NATIVE NORTH AMERICAN LANGUAGES SPOKEN AT HOME IN THE UNITED

STATES AND PUERTO RICO: 2006-2010, at 2 tbl.l (2011), https://perma.cc/7RJE-TF56;
ARIZ. RURAL POL'Y INST., N. ARIZ. UNIV., DEMOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS OF THE NAVAJO
NATION USING 2010 CENSUS AND 2010 AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY ESTIMATES

app. C, at 59 (n.d.), https://perma.cc/J8VY-5MQV.
235. Laurel Morales, For Many Navajos, Getting Hooked Up to The Power Grid Can Be LifeChanging, NPR (May 29, 2019, 5:00 AM ET), https://perma.cc/DA86-MNGE.
236. See infra Part III.B.3.
237. See infra Part III.B.4.
238. WILKINS, supra note 145, at 5-9, 18.
239. Id. at 5-8.
240. Id. at 9, 15.
241. Id. at 15-16.
242. Id. at 18.
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men to buy or lease any Navajo land. 243 So the United States, not the Navajo,
urgently needed a centralized Navajo government to negotiate with. 244 The
Secretary of the Interior began working on a centralized Navajo
government. 245 In 1935, the Navajo Nation rejected an IRA constitution by a
narrow margin.2 46 Nevertheless, some Navajos and John Collier, the architect
of the IRA, retained the desire for governmental reform-and a constitution.
By 1936, the Navajo Nation began assembling delegates to draft a
constitution.2 47
After a period of confusion and internal division following failed attempts
to adopt a Navajo constitution, the Navajo constitutional delegates declared
themselves the Tribal Council. 248 The resulting "Rules for the Navajo
Council," which were promulgated on July 26, 1938, provided for a seventyfour-member Tribal Council composed of members elected from districts,
apportioned by relative population, and a Council Chairman and Vice
Chairman elected at large. 249 This basic legislative body evolved into the
Navajo government of today.250
The Navajo government changed and grew almost immediately in
response to demands from its people. Navajo soldiers returning from World
War II sparked a need for jobs and a desire for growth. 25 1 Coincidentally, the
termination policies of the 1950s led to a massive transfer in responsibility and
funding from the federal government to the Navajo Nation, as the federal
government sought to dismantle its supervision of tribes.2 5 2 In 1958, the
Navajo Nation replaced federally administered courts with its own judicial
branch whose judges have lifetime appointments. 25 3
As the Navajo Nation central government expanded in size and strength
throughout the 1950s and 1960s, it needed not only to function but also to
reinforce its legitimacy. Having emerged from the shadow of heavy-handed

243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 18-20.
246. ROBERT W. YOUNG, A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE NAVAJO TRIBE 86 (1978).

247. Id. at 93-94.
248. Id. at 93-94, 107-08.
249. Id. at 114-15.
250. See WILKINS, supra note 145, at 25.
251. YOUNG, supranote 246, at 120-22, 144-45.
252. Id. at 123, 144-45.

&

253. Ezra Rosser, Displacing the Judiciary: Customary Law and the Threat of a Defensive Tribal
Council, 34 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 379, 384 (2010) (book review); YOUNG, supra note 246, at
148; WILKINS, supra note 145, at 141-47; United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 327
n.45 (1978).
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rule by another sovereign, the Nation had to prove its capacity for
independent rule-rule that was truly Navajo rather than colonial.
2.

The rise and fall of Chairman MacDonald

Peter MacDonald was very charismatic. And he had a good story. He was
with the Navajo Code Talkers in World War II at age fifteen and later became
an electrical engineer. 25 4 When elected as Navajo Chairman in 1970, he became
the first university-educated Chairman.25 5 MacDonald won a resounding
victory despite corruption allegations tied to a previous Navajo government
job, which he successfully portrayed as political smear campaigns. 25 6
MacDonald wielded his instinctive understanding of group identities to appeal
to Navajo voters and advocate for Navajo rights, often using an "'us versus
them' strategy." 25 7 He ran on a bold platform of Navajo nationalism that
emphasized traditionalism and self-sufficiency. 25 8
Within a year of taking office, MacDonald began amassing power in an
executive branch that had already grown rapidly in prior decades. The
executive branch originally comprised only the Tribal Council Vice Chairman
and the Tribal Council Chairman, the latter of which presided over council
meetings, appointed legislative committee chairs and members, and served as
the chair of certain particularly powerful committees. 25 9 But as the Nation
rapidly expanded in the 1950s, it built an administrative state. 260 By 1959, four
departments and three divisions collectively oversaw twenty-three other
sections, and all reported to the Chairman. 26 1 MacDonald further expanded the
Chairman's power by creating more council standing committees and offices
whose appointments he controlled. 262 MacDonald won two more terms and
expanded his celebrity status, famously riding on and off Navajo land in a fleet
of white limousines. 263

254. Sandy Tolan, Showdown at Window Rock, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Nov. 26, 1989),
https://perma.cc/R9RL-LCMD.
255. WILKINS, supra note 145, at 26.
256. PETER IVERSON, DINE: A HISTORY OF THE NAVAJOS 246-47 (2002).

257. Id. at 249.
258. Id. at 248.
259. WILKINS, supra note 145, at 133-34.
260. See YOUNG, supra note 246, at 146-51, 160, 166.
261. Id. at 160-61.
262. WILKINS, supra note 145, at 26.
263. See IVERSON, supra note 256, at 285; Sandy Tolan, For a Navajo Leader, Another Chance,
SANTA FE REP., Feb. 25, 1987, at 4; see also Tolan, supra note 254 (noting MacDonald's
increasing prominence in national Republican Party politics).
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MacDonald's second and third terms were embroiled in controversy and a
tension with the judiciary that led to MacDonald expanding his control over
that branch as well. In 1977, he was tried in Navajo court for mismanaging
federal funds, tax evasion, and mail fraud. 264 A hung jury acquitted
MacDonald, but four Tribal Council members sued to force MacDonald to pay
for his defense personally, and they won in the Navajo Nation Appellate
Court.2 65 In 1978, MacDonald created the Supreme Judicial Council, composed
of five Tribal Council representatives, two retired appellate justices, and the
current Navajo Nation Court of Appeals Chief Justice. 266 All were appointed
by the Chairman 267 except for the Chief Justice, who could only vote in the
event of a tie.268 The Supreme Judicial Council had jurisdiction to review only
those decisions of the Navajo Nation Courts of Appeals that invalidated Tribal
Council resolutions.2 69
In 1982, Peterson Zah challenged MacDonald's twelve-year "stranglehold"
on the Chairmanship, running on a promise of partnering with the Council,
reforming tribal government, and prioritizing education. 270 Similarly collegeeducated and charismatic, Zah attacked MacDonald, called out the failure of
MacDonald's Navajo nationalism to produce its promised results, and

highlighted that ideology's role in alienating the neighboring Hopi Tribe,

which had still not signed an important land agreement.2 7 1 Zah promised an
end to the "imperial" executive and promised a new tone in the Chairman's
office. 272
After Zah won the 1982 election by 5,000 votes, 273 he immediately cut his
own salary and ordered sedans to replace MacDonald's famous fleet of white
limousines. 274 In 1985, the Nation adopted several government reforms,
including the Judicial Reform Act, which revamped and strengthened the

264. WILKINS, supra note 145, at 26; IVERSON, supra note 256, at 253.
265. IVERSON, supranote 256, at 253.
266. Id.; WILKINS, supra note 145, at 26; see also Rosser, supranote 253, at 384.
267. IVERSON, supranote 256, at 253.
268. RAYMOND D. AUSTIN, NAVAJO COURTS AND NAVAJO COMMON LAW: A TRADITION OF
TRIBAL SELF-GOVERNANCE 31 (2009).
269.

Id.

270. WILKINS, supra note 145, at 26-27.
271. IVERSON, supranote 256, at 271-72.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 272.
274. Id. at 285.
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judiciary, including creating a Navajo Supreme Court. 275 But just as Zah's term
neared completion, MacDonald announced he was running again. 276
Zah had also failed to reach a deal with the Hopis, and MacDonald and his
supporters successfully portrayed Zah's outreach efforts as naive and weak. 277
MacDonald, charismatic and beloved as ever, campaigned on bold promises,
like a home for every veteran, job growth, and a college scholarship for all
high school graduates.2 78 MacDonald won the election by a hair, with 50.47% of
the vote. 279
MacDonald reassumed the Chairmanship in 1987 in grandiose fashion,
adorning his executive suite with turquoise inlay tiling and gold-plated toilet
fixtures to signify his power.2 80 MacDonald's short term in office was also
filled with corruption. Money rolled in through both corruption payments
and illegal campaign contributions, which directly supported his personal
lifestyle.2 81
MacDonald's "us versus them" politics had also changed by this time in his
political career to a "me and us versus them" mentality. 282 He would
consistently dismiss criticisms of him as anti-Navajo and often cast things in
black or white, with him or against him, with no middle ground. 283 When new
allegations of wrongdoing would arise, he continued to say they were smear
campaigns from "sore losers" and dismiss media reports of misconduct as biased
or attempts to divide the Navajo people. 284
One month after retaking the Chairmanship, MacDonald also sought to
control the narratives about him by closing the tribe's newspaper, the Navajo
Times Today.285 Like 95% of tribal newspapers, it was owned by the tribal
government at the time.2 86 But unlike many tribal newspapers, which more so
275. WILKINS, supra note 145, at 27; Navajo Nation Tribal Council Res. CD-94-85, § 14 (1985)
(codified as amended at NAVAJO NATION CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 201(b) (2010)).
276. See WILKINS, supra note 145, at 27.
277. IVERSON, supranote 256, at 286.
278. Tolan, supra note 254.
279. WILKINS, supra note 145, at 27.
280. SPECIAL COMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE S. SELECT COMM. ON INDIAN AFFs., FINAL
REPORTAND LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS, S. REP. NO. 101-216, at 183-88 (1989).
281.

Id.

282. IVERSON, supranote 256, at 250.
283.

Id.

284. Id. at 293. This view of politics and the media is also apparent in MacDonald's own
account of his time as Chairman. See PETER MACDONALD & TED SCHWARZ, THE LAST
WARRIOR: PETER MACDONALD AND THE NAVAJO NATION 252, 288 (Herman

1993).
285. WILKINS, supra note 145, at 27-28; IVERSON, supra note 256, at 287-89.
286. WILKINS, supra note 145, at 173.
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resembled newsletters, the Navajo Times Today exercised journalistic
autonomy and criticized the government that owned it.287 When MacDonald
won, the paper lambasted MacDonald's "lavish inauguration ceremony." 288
MacDonald closed the paper, but many reporters moved to nearby
publications and continued to report on Navajo politics.289 One such reporter
unearthed a corruption scandal involving the sale of ranch land that ultimately
brought MacDonald down. 290
Before retaking office, MacDonald had arranged to personally profit from
a mark-up on a sale of a large ranch, which he would arrange for Navajo
Nation to buy after he took office. 291 After a newspaper article called attention
to the suspicious sale, more and more information started coming out about
the corrupt deal. A U.S. Senate inquiry revealed the full scope of MacDonald's
corruption. 292 Only once the full scope of the corruption finally came to
light-after MacDonald's own son testified under immunity before the Senate
investigators 293 -did enough members of the Tribal Council finally turn on
MacDonald.
On February 17, 1989, the Tribal Council voted 49-13 to place MacDonald
on involuntary administrative leave.2 94 MacDonald challenged the suspension
in tribal court, strategically filing his suit in the district court where his
brother-in-law was the presiding judge. 295 His brother-in-law entered an order
in MacDonald's favor, leading to the first real test for the newly formed Navajo
Nation Supreme Court.296 On March 23, 1989, the Supreme Court issued the
first in a series of rulings that would solidify both its power and its
independence in the Navajo Nation. The Court dispensed with MacDonald's
case on immunity grounds and made clear that the nepotism was a violation of
the Nation's judicial-conduct rules and that the district judge had a duty to
disqualify himself or else a "writ of prohibition" would issue.297

287. See id. at 173-74; IVERSON, supra note 256, at 288-89.
288. IVERSON, supranote 256, at 289.
289. Tolan, supra note 254; WILKINS, supra note 145, at 174.
290. Tolan, supra note 254 (explaining how Betty Reid, a former Navajo Times Today
reporter who had closely covered the 1986 election, discovered the fraudulent sale).
291. SPECIAL COMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE S. SELECT COMM. ON INDIAN AFFS., FINAL
REPORT AND LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS, S. REP. NO. 101-216, at 184-85 (1989).

292. See id. at 195-97.
293. Id. at 196; Tolan, supra note 254.
294. S. REP. No. 101-216, at 197; IVERSON, supranote 256, at 294.
295. See Plummer v. Brown, 6 Navajo Rptr. 88, 88, 93 (1989) (No. A-CV-03-89), 1989 Navajo
Sup. LEXIS 7, at *1-2, '13.
296. S. REP. No. 101-216, at 197.
297. Plummer, 6 Navajo Rptr. at 93-94, 1989 Navajo Sup. LEXIS 7, at *12-13.
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The tribal district judge assigned to MacDonald's newly filed case, now
cured of the immunity issues, granted a temporary restraining order affirming
the Tribal Council's decision to suspend MacDonald. 298 In response,
MacDonald produced a letter-backdated to before the assignment of the case
to that judge-that purported, under MacDonald's authority as Chairman, to
remove the judge and to refuse his permanent appointment. 299 On April 13,
1989, the Navajo Nation Supreme Court slapped down MacDonald's attempt to
undermine the judiciary by removing judges without a recommendation for
removal from the Judiciary Committee-the process specified under the
Navajo Tribal Code. 3 0 Moreover, it upheld the Council's power to place
MacDonald on involuntary administrative leave, because the Council and the
Chairman came from the same font of power, and thus the greater body of the
Council could limit those powers granted to the Chairman.301
Even after he was removed from office, MacDonald called the charges
"hogwash," blaming them on jealous critics willing to "spend[] millions of
dollars in an effort to crucify [him]" and to "silence people like [him] who speak
out against those who are trying to erode tribal sovereignty." 302 In spite of the
evidence, MacDonald's supporters continued to believe and fight for him. His
core base included very traditional Navajo people who felt that he understood
the old ways more than other leaders and trusted him to preserve the herding
lifestyle, which was becoming harder to maintain. 303 One religious leader told
a reporter at the time,
Some ask me... "Why are you supporting Chairman MacDonald? He's a liar and a
thief." And I say to them, "I know MacDonald. He has done a lot for me." And they
say, "Suppose they put MacDonald in jail?" And I say to them, "If they put him in
304
jail, I will follow him to jail."

Indeed, some of MacDonald's supporters would do just that. In March 1989, the
Tribal Council appointed an interim Chairman and Vice Chairman, but
MacDonald's supporters continued to believe that the government was
wrongfully stolen.305 Some of MacDonald's most ardent supporters-including

298. See MacDonald v. Yazzie, No. A-CV-08-89, 1989 Navajo Sup. LEXIS 1, at *1 (Mar. 24,
1989); MACDONALD & SCHWARTZ, supra note 284, at 334.
299. Navajo Nation v. MacDonald, 6 Navajo Rptr. 105, 110 (1989) (Nos. A-CV-13-89 & WRCV-99-89), 1989 Navajo Sup. LEXIS 5, at *13-14.
300. Id. at 106, 1989 Navajo Sup. LEXIS 5, at *2-3.
301. Id. at 115, 1989 Navajo Sup. LEXIS 5, at *25-26.
302. Tolan, supra note 254 (quoting MacDonald).
303. See IVERSON, supra note 256, at 248; Tolan, supra note 254.
304. Tolan, supra note 254 (quoting medicine man Dan Chee).
305. Id.; WILKINS, supra note 145, at 222; MACDONALD & SCHWARTZ, supra note 284, at 333.
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some Council members 306 -physically occupied the Chairman's office in
protest throughout March and April. 307 Things continued to escalate until the
Navajo police forcibly removed the MacDonald supporters.308
On July 19, MacDonald returned to Navajo carrying a letter purportedly
from the U.S. Attorney's office, declaring that he had been cleared of all
charges. 309 The next day, MacDonald issued an "executive order" that
reinstated his police chief, directed the police chief to "take all action necessary"
to rehire the MacDonald-affiliated law-enforcement personnel that had been
fired following his removal, and demanded those personnel "assist with the
orderly restoration and transition of the administration of the Navajo
Government" that very day. 3 10 That evening, over 250 MacDonald followers,
armed with clubs and lumber, tried to forcibly retake his office. 311 The crowd
was also armed with unsigned documents on Navajo Nation stationary
authorizing "Citizen's Arrest" for "Criminal Conspiracy to illegally overthrow
the Navajo Tribal government." 312 The crowd handcuffed a Navajo police
officer and began beating him, at which point another Navajo police officer
rushed to his aid.3 13 When a demonstrator grabbed a weapon and fired at the
officer, the Navajo police opened fire, killing that demonstrator and one other
and wounding nine. 3 14
In the winter of 1989, the Tribal Council set about remedying the
structural problems that allowed MacDonald's rise to power. The Council
passed legislation now commonly known as the "Title II Amendments," which
took effect on April 1, 1990.315 The law explicitly stated that "[r]ecent
controversy . . . demonstrated that the present Navajo Nation Government
structure allows too much centralized power without real checks on the
exercise of power . . . [and] that this deficiency in the government structure
allows for, invites and has resulted in the abuse of power." 3 16 The Nation
306. Tolan, supra note 254; MACDONALD & SCHWARTZ, supra note 284, at 334.
307. SPECIAL COMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE S. SELECT COMM. ON INDIAN AFFS., FINAL
REPORT AND LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS, S. REP. NO. 101-216, at 197, 210 n.68

(1989) (collecting citations to contemporaneous news sources).
308. Id.; IVERSON, supra note 256, at 294.
309. See S. REP. No. 101-216, at 197.
310. IVERSON, supranote 256, at 295.
311. Id.; S. REP. No. 101-216, at 198.
312. IVERSON, supranote 256, at 295-96.
313. S. REP.No. 101-216, at 198.
314. Id. at 198, 210 n.69 (collecting citations to contemporaneous news sources).
315. Navajo Nation Tribal Council Res. CD-68-89 (1989) (codified as amended at NAVAJO
NATION CODE ANN. tit. 2 (2010)) [hereinafter Navajo Title II Amendments].
316. Id.; Charles Morris, Special Feature, Navajo Nation Council Reforms, 16 AM. INDIAN L.
REV. 613, 613 (1991).
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needed a "definition of power and separation of legislative and executive
functions." 3 17
The Title II Amendments transformed the Chairman and Vice Chairman
into the President and Vice President, now heads of a separate executive
branch.3 18 The reform also created the position of Speaker of the Council to
disperse some of the Chairman's legislative responsibilities and create a
counterweight to check executive power. 319 The Speaker presides over the
Council and makes legislative-committee appointments. 320 Perhaps most
importantly, the legislation separated the powers of the legislative and
executive branches. 32 1 The Title II Amendments are widely regarded as a
necessary curtailment of executive powers, enacted in direct response to
MacDonald's rise and hold on power. 322
In the end, the law finally caught up with MacDonald. Over the next few
years, he was convicted, along with various allies and followers, on federal
charges related to the riot and the corruption. 323 MacDonald was convicted of
several counts of "bribery, instigating a riot, fraud, racketeering, ethics
violations, extortion, and conspiracy," and he was sentenced to fourteen years
in federal prison. 324 And in the newly invigorated Navajo courts, MacDonald
was tried and convicted of forty-one violations of Navajo Nation criminal law,
including bribery, kickbacks, and use of office for personal gain.325
3.

Institutional independence

There is more to MacDonald's rise, hold on power, and fall. A full history
and analysis would take far more than an article, but even this brief account of

317. Navajo Title II Amendments, supra note 315; Morris, supranote 316, at 613.
318. Navajo Title II Amendments, supra note 315; WILKINS, supra note 145, at 30.
319. Navajo Title II Amendments, supra note 315; WILKINS, supra note 145, at 30.
320. Navajo Title II Amendments, supra note 315; WILKINS, supra note 145, at 30.
321. WILKINS, supra note 145, at 30.
322. See, e.g., Off. of Navajo Gov't Dev. & Comm'n on Navajo Gov't Dev., PowerPoint
Presentation 12 (2012), https://perma.cc/L73A-YRFG (describing the 1989 changes as
instituting a "Three Branch Government" because there was previously "[t]oo much
power vested in [the] Chairman"); Off. of the Navajo Nation President & Vice
President v. Navajo Nation Council, 9 Am. Tribal Law 46, 62 (Navajo 2010) (No. SCCV-02-10), 2010 Navajo Sup. LEXIS 15, at *31-33.
323. Former Navajo Leader Convicted, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 1992), https://perma.cc/G5LP-

EX5Y.
324. WILKINS, supra note 145, at 29; see also Bill Donovan, The Riot of '89, NAVAJO TIMES
(July 16, 2009), https://perma.cc/5SLW-3B4W.
325. Navajo Nation v. MacDonald, 6 Navajo Rptr. 432, 432 (1991) (No. A-CR-09-90), 1991
Navajo Sup. LEXIS 18, at 'I.
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the Navajo Nation offers important lessons about government structure and
independent institutions.
First, appointment powers were critical to MacDonald's rise and hold on
power. The power imbalance was caused not by an independently powerful
executive but instead by his ability to wield power over the other branches such
that he was insulated from criticism or accountability. MacDonald commanded
loyalty among the ranks of the other branches of government by creating
bodies he could control and appointing their members. The other branches'
inability, unwillingness, or manifest lack of desire to rein in a corrupt
executive "spurred the 1989 government reforms that resulted in the present
three-branch government with checks and balances." 326
The MacDonald story and subsequent reforms demonstrate the
importance of functional checks within separation-of-powers law. 327 In
interbranch appointments, the power to check another branch through
appointment and removal can easily slide into branches losing precisely the
independence needed to hold one another accountable. 328 As Madison said,
"each department should have a will of its own; and consequently should be so
constituted that the members of each should have as little agency as possible in
the appointment of the members of the others." 329
Appointment cases are, of course, familiar in separation-of-powers
jurisprudence in federal constitutional law, but the primary focus of these cases
is preventing limits on interbranch appointments from interfering with the
ability of a branch (usually the executive) to effectively and efficiently do its
job. 330 The Navajo experience, by contrast, highlights how interbranch
appointments not only frustrate a branch's cohesiveness but also can facilitate
corruption. While concern with this kind of cross-branch patronage is
explicitly built into the Constitution in the Incompatibility Clause, it is not as
prominent a concern within separation-of-powers jurisprudence, although

326. See AUSTIN, supra note 268, at 17 (describing the desire for governmental accountability).
327. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("[T]he
constant aim is to divide and arrange the several offices in such a manner as that each
may be a check on the other-that the private interest of every individual may be a
sentinel over the public rights.").
328. See Victoria Nourse, Toward a "Due Foundation"for the Separation of Powers: The
Federalist Papers as Political Narrative,74 TEx. L. REv. 447, 469 (1996) (describing how
the Founding-era Virginia Assembly obtained control of the judiciary and executive
"by manipulating the appointment, removal, and salary powers of the members of
other departments").
329. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison), supra note 327, at 321.
330. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 161 (1926); Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States,
295 U.S. 602, 625-26 (1935); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691 (1988); Free Enter.
Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 513-14 (2010).
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some scholars have suggested it ought to be. 33 1 The Navajo example of
executive aggrandizement through the appointment powers affirms what
scholars have said about the need to recenter questions of branch independence
as a structural check against corruption. 332 Learning from the MacDonald
example might help us avoid an United States President MacDonald holding
onto power through similar aggrandizement, whereby other branches come to
fear his disfavor and so avoid criticizing him.
The second observation is that democracy was not a good check on a
runaway executive. The Navajo people continued to vote for MacDonald
despite corruption allegations from the beginning to end of his tenure. In fact,
many people remained enthralled with MacDonald long after his corruption
seemed objectively indefensible. MacDonald won the presidential primary in
1990 and had to be disqualified by the Navajo Board of Election Supervisors
two days after he was convicted in Navajo courts. 333 Of course, none of this
should surprise scholars, who have long identified populist movements and
charismatic leaders like MacDonald as threats to democracy. 334 Even after
governmental reforms, MacDonald's core supporters remained a powerful and
well-recognized voting bloc while MacDonald sat in prison.335
Finally, the institutions that eventually brought MacDonald down were
an independent press and the Navajo Supreme Court. Though MacDonald
closed the only Navajo-specific press, the Nation still benefited from the
freedoms afforded to nearby local papers that covered the Nation, employed
Navajo writers, and unearthed MacDonald's corruption. The press served as an
331. See Steven G. Calabresi & Joan L. Larsen, One Person, One Office: Separation of Powers or
Separation of Personnel?,79 CORNELL L. REV. 1045, 1056-65 (1994) (discussing the history
of the Incompatibility Clause).
332. See Nourse, supra note 328, at 512 (explaining that congressional appointment of
agency heads "permits one department-the Congress-to exercise a political
influence-the influence of patronage-over the members of another department");
Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633, 669-70, 700
(2000) (critiquing presidential use of agency appointments to install personal loyalists
and endorsing institutional constraints on presidential appointment of judges); cf
Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 117 (1994) (suggesting that, under Morrison, "cross-branch appointments should
be permitted only in the narrowest circumstances" if presidential appointment itself is
a "conflict of interest" or lacks an important political check).
333. MacDonald v. Redhouse, 6 Navajo Rptr. 342, 342 (1991) (No. A-CV-54-90), 1991 Navajo
Sup. LEXIS 11, at *1-2.
334. MacDonald fits the mold of Ginsburg and Huq's "charismatic populist" leader, who
expounds a privileged and exclusive claim to represent the people no matter what
other institutions say, and who engages in other antidemocratic behaviors such as
suppressing the media. See TOM GINSBURG & AzIz Z. HUQ, HOW TO SAVE A
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY

78, 109 (2018).

335. Scott C. Russell & Eric Henderson, The 1994 Navajo PresidentialElection: Analysis of the
Election and Results of an Exit Poll, AM. INDIAN Q., Spring 1999, at 23, 32.
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important independent institution, not because they convinced the people, but
because their reporting enabled institutions outside MacDonald's reach to
bring him to justice: the U.S. Senate and a reformed Navajo court system.
The Navajo Supreme Court that decided the key cases against MacDonald
did not include MacDonald appointees. Chief Justice Tso and Associate Justices
Bluehorse and Austin were all appointed in 1985 following recommendation
by the Tribal Council Judiciary Committee and confirmation by Zah. 336
Though the Navajo judiciary had demonstrated independence and power prior
to the MacDonald scandal, 337 the creation of the Navajo Supreme Court under
Zah's brief term significantly strengthened the judicial branch and gave it
enough independence to affirm the Council's decision to promptly remove
MacDonald from power by placing him on leave. 338 Reflecting on these key
moments of Navajo Supreme Court strength, former President Zah said that,
when reconstructing and strengthening the Navajo Court system, the
reformers "thought about that," and it was precisely their hope that the
Supreme Court could assume this role. 339
4.

Navajo formalism, functionalism, and Fundamental Law

The MacDonald years were only the first of many instances of interbranch
conflict that solidified the power and prominence of the Navajo Supreme
Court and developed its separation-of-powers jurisprudence. For example, in
2008, President Joe Shirley introduced popular ballot initiatives designed to
reduce the size of the Tribal Council from eighty-eight to twenty-four and to
create a presidential line-item veto. 340 Both initiatives passed with a 64%
majority vote. 341 But the Council refused to accept a reduction in its size,
instead invoking a provision of the Navajo Nation Code that the Council
argued required a majority vote of the registered voters in each of the voting

336. See generally NAVAJO NATION CODE ANN. tit. II, art. 9, § 574(C) (2010); Navajo Nation
Supreme CourtJustices, SUP. CT. NAVAJO NATION, https://perma.cc/SRV6-35H7 (archived
Sept. 12, 2020).
337. See George v. Navajo Indian Tribe, 2 Navajo Rptr. 1, 5-6 (1979), 1979 Navajo App.
LEXIS 31, at *5 (invalidating a tribal code provision excluding non-Indians from jury
service); Yazzie v. Navajo Tribal Bd. of Election Supervisors, 1 Navajo Rptr. 213, 217-18
(1978), 1978 Navajo App. LEXIS 17, at *4-5 (per curiam) (rejecting the Tribal Council's
apportionment plan in favor of the district court's proposal).
338. See WILKINS, supra note 145, at 29.
339. PETERSON ZAH & PETER IVERSON, WE WILL SECURE

NAVAJO NATION 147 (2012).
340. WILKINS, supra note 145, at xx, 230.
341. Id. at 231.
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chapters to change the government's structure. 342 This dispute between the
people, the executive, and the legislature ended up in the Navajo Supreme
Court. In the unanimous opinion in Nelson v. Initiative Committee to Reduce
Navajo Nation Council, the Navajo Supreme Court called that reading of the
Navajo Nation Code pure legislative overreach and a practical impossibility,
instead interpreting the Code as allowing for the Navajo people to amend their
government structure by a simple majority of voters who participated in a
given election. 343 While the legislature could limit itself, it could not "limit the
Din6 when they are attempting to address the structure of their governing
system." 344
The rise of the Navajo Supreme Court's prominence was also bolstered by
the 2002 passage of Dine bi beenahaz'danii, or "Fundamental Law," 345 which
officially codified precolonial legal concepts and further reinforced their
supremacy jurisprudence. 346 Navajo Fundamental Law is broken down into
four categories: Diyin bitsqqdg' beehaz'danii' (Traditional Law), Diyin Dine'e
bitsqqdgg' beehaz'danii (Customary Law), Nahasdzddn d66 Yddilhil bitsqqdg
beehaz'danii (Natural Law), and Diyin Nohookdd Dine bi beehaz'danii (Common
Law). 347 The Navajo Supreme Court is the final interpreter of Navajo
Fundamental Law, as the following case makes abundantly clear.
During the same period as the ballot initiative dispute, President Shirley
was accused of corrupt business dealings and was placed on administrative
leave by the Tribal Council. 348 Shirley sued for reinstatement, and while his
case was on appeal, the Tribal Council sought to redefine Navajo Fundamental
Law to include Tribal Council enactments, which would make their actsincluding removing Shirley-unreviewable by the Navajo courts. 349 The
decision excerpt below, from the Supreme Court's resolution of Shirley's
appeal in Navajo Nation President v. Navajo Nation Council, was not only an
opportunity for the Navajo Supreme Court to strike down the Council's
attempt to redefine Navajo Fundamental Law, but also an opportunity to
explain Navajo separation-of-powers law as flowing not from the explicit

342. Nelson v. Initiative Comm. to Reduce Navajo Nation Council, 8 Am. Tribal Law 407,
418 (Navajo 2010) (No. SC-CV-03-10), 2010 Navajo Sup. LEXIS 17, at *26-28.
343. See id at 409,418-19,2010 Navajo Sup. LEXIS 17, at '1, '26-28.
344.

Id. at 418,

2010 Navajo Sup. LEXIS 17, at *25-26.

345. NAVAJO NATION CODE ANN. tit. 1,

§§ 201-206

(2014).

346. WILKINS, supra note 145, at xix-xx, 32.
347. NAVAJO NATION CODE ANN. tit. 1,

§ 202.

348. Off. of the Navajo Nation President v. Navajo Nation Council, 9 Am. Tribal Law 46, 52
(Navajo 2010) (No. SC-CV-02-10), 2010 Navajo Sup. LEXIS 15, at *1-2.
349.

Id. at 52,

57, 2010 Navajo Sup. LEXIS 15, at *2, *17.
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structures or enactments of government, but from the lessons of history and
life as embodied in Navajo Fundamental Law.
This appeal concerns a clash between the Executive and Legislative Branches of
our government....
[T]he Navajo People have long resisted the imposition of a written
Constitution in the mold of the U.S. Constitution. The notion of a piece of
writing, even if popularly "enacted" to serve as the higher law, has been anathema
to our People for whom Dint bi beenahaz'danii, the Fundamental Laws, are
immutable as given to the Dint by Nohookdd Dine'e'Diyinii, the Holy Ones....
We have said before that participatory democracy does not come from the
non-Navajo nor does it come from the Council. It comes from a deeper, more
profound system of governance: the Navajo People's traditional communal
governance, rooted in the DintLife Way....
This present system was established in 1989 ... in response to turmoil in the
Navajo Nation government (Title II Amendments). At the heart of the turmoil
were allegations of self-dealing, fraud, and receipt of kick-backs involving the
Council leadership of the Navajo Nation....
The Council made a decision that the Navajo Nation government cannot
have concentrated power, and the government was thereby split into
branches....
A shared leadership in which each leader performs separate functions in a
proper way for the public good is an intrinsic part of our Navajo history.
"Separation of functions is a concept that is so deeply-rooted in Navajo culture
that it is accepted without question. It is essential to maintaining balance and
harmony." [Navajo Nation Code] §§ 200 et seq. acknowledges that our
Fundamental Law is the premise for our principles of separation of powers and
checks and balances....
[The Court then recounted a Navajo story about how each of four proposed
leaders, wolf protector Mq'iitsoh, nurturing bluebird Dolii, survivalist mountain
lion Ndshdoj'tsoh, and spiritual honorable hummingbird Dah yiitjhi, had different
traits their proponents each argued were more valuable, but in the end, each
demonstrated their unique value so were all made leaders to work together.] We
re-tell this story to emphasize that, since beyond recorded time, the People have
understood the separation of functions of leaders ....
We have seen in the last few decades what occurs when, instead of thinking
of the best interest of the People, one of these components tries to assume a
superior position. Our experience in 1989 and our present experience in 2010
shows the extremes of what may occur....
[W]e reject Appellants' argument that there is no separation of powers on
3 50
the Navajo Nation.

350. Off of the Navajo Nation President, 9 Am. Tribal Law at 52, 61-64, 66, 2010 Navajo Sup.
LEXIS 15, at *1, *28-29, *31-39, *43 (citation omitted) (quoting Tuba City Jud. Dist. of
the Navajo Nation v. Sloan, 3 Am. Tribal Law 508, 511 (Navajo 2001) (No. SC-CV-5797), 2001 Navajo Sup. LEXIS 12, at *6).
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The Navajo Supreme Court views its separation-of-powers law
consciously in the shadow of the MacDonald years. It also is quite clear that
primary guidance on the separation of powers does not come from any written
law that delineates boundaries-including the Title II Amendments-but from
Navajo Fundamental Law. These two atextual sources of legal guidance-the
Nation's recent experience with government dysfunction under MacDonald
and Navajo Fundamental Law-are discussed together. The Navajo Supreme
Court relies on both to demonstrate a similar lesson about the values of
separate coordinated governance and the dangers of power imbalances.
The context of corruption paired with unwritten guidance as supreme law
provides an insight relevant to separation-of-powers debates in American
federal constitutional interpretation. The U.S. Supreme Court's separation-ofpowers jurisprudence-and the academics who write about it-sort themselves
as formalists and functionalists. Formalists advocate an "approach to
separation-of-powers
issues grounded in the perceived necessity of
maintaining three distinct branches of government (and consequently
appearing to draw rather sharp boundaries)" 35 1 as laid out in the Constitution,
which delegates specific powers to each branch. 35 2 In contrast, functionalists
argue for an "approach that stresses [the] core function and relationship"
between the branches but otherwise "permits a good deal of flexibility when
these attributes are not threatened." 35 3 Functionalists believe the Constitution
gives each branch a clear purpose but otherwise remains ambiguous enough to
allow for flexibility in service of an efficient and functional government. 35 4
It would seem that the Navajo, without a written constitution and with
only a basic division of powers set out in Title II, must have a functionalist
jurisprudence, since there is no document upon which to base a rigid
formalism. 355 And yet cases like Nelson and Navajo Nation President are
reminiscent of formalist U.S. Supreme Court decisions striking, if not slapping,
down legislation as a clear overreach of enumerated powers. 35 6 There is a
general assumption that a functionalist court will underpolice the separation of
powers. 357 We might view the Navajo Supreme Court as a functionalist court
351. Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions-A
Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488, 489 (1987).
352. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983) ("[T]he exercise of power [is] subject to the
carefully crafted restraints spelled out in the Constitution."); John F. Manning,
Separation of Powers as OrdinaryInterpretation,124 HARv. L. REv. 1939, 1943 (2011).
353. Strauss, supra note 351, at 489.
354. See Manning, supra note 352, at 1943.
355. Cf Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951, 958 (stating that "carefully defined limits on the power of
each Branch" come from the text of the Constitution).
356. See, e.g., id. at 956-59; Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714,722-23 (1986).
357. Vermeule, supranote 226, at 370.
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that bucks this assumption. 358 The Navajo Supreme Court is-much like the
U.S. Supreme Court-policing relatively strict boundaries between its branches
and amassing a tremendous amount of power in the process.
The Navajo Supreme Court's emphasis of Navajo traditions and the
MacDonald years also suggests a functionalist rationale for policing firm
boundaries: It supports the government's legitimacy. 359 Legitimacy is a
functionalist rationale for overprotectingthe boundaries between governmental
powers, especially necessary for a new government still proving itself.
Moments of interbranch conflict served as opportunities for the Navajo people
to judge their new institutions. 360 Navajo institutions had to prove themselves
to a people deeply skeptical of centralized power, especially power initially
imposed by the United States. Following a government crisis and subsequent
reforms to government structure, the Navajo courts illustrate one way that
legitimacy concerns can shape judicial decisionmaking.
The Navajo Supreme Court's decisions not only illustrate how legitimacy
concerns shape judicial decisionmaking, but they are also refreshingly clear in
owning up to it. The Navajo Supreme Court acknowledges the elephant in the
room: the risk that the people could lose faith in government. While the U.S.
Supreme Court may also be motivated by this concern, it does not so explicitly
admit it. In United States v. Nixon, for example, the Court noted that "public
confidence" in the entire "criminal justice" system was at stake, but it declined
to comment beyond that on the broader concerns with public confidence in
government overall in light of the Nixon corruption scandals. 36 1 And in Bush v.
Gore, the Court resolved a closely contested presidential election with a
remarkably flat tone until the end of the opinion, where it noted that despite
"vital limits on judicial authority" and "admiration" for democracy, the Court
may at times be forced to assume its "unsought responsibility" to resolve
constitutional issues. 362 The legitimacy elephant is present yet largely
unaddressed in U.S. Supreme Court opinions.
The contrast is unsurprising given that the two supreme courts have
different relationships to their histories. There is a third element of Navajo
358. Vermeule found that this assumption was likewise not borne out based on his review
of state separation-of-powers cases, at least those concerning state judicial power. See
id.
359. I use the "intuitive" definition of legitimacy recently referred to by Tara Leigh Grove,
who described legitimate governments or institutions as those deemed "worthy of
respect or obedience." Tara Leigh Grove, The Supreme Court's Legitimacy Dilemma, 132
HARv. L. REV. 2240, 2240, 2244 (2019) (book review).
360. See David Wilkins, Governance Within the Navajo Nation: Have Democratic Traditions
Taken Hold?, 17 WICAZO A REV., Spring 2002, at 91,94, 114-15.
361. 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974).
362. 531 U.S. 98, 111 (2000) (per curiam).
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separation-of-powers jurisprudence that does not fit into functionalism or
formalism: Navajo Fundamental Law's relationship with the lessons of recent
Navajo history. Navajo Fundamental Law, as described and used by the Navajo
Supreme Court, is a different kind of source for decisionmaking. Both
formalism and functionalism are tied to the structure of a government and its
committed boundaries or evolving needs, respectively.
Navajo Fundamental Law, however, is more closely described as
fundamental principles that predate existing government structures and
purport to offer insight for Navajo governments that may change and look
quite different in another 100 years. Navajo stories preserve broad and timeless
lessons. Navajo recent history, including the MacDonald years, echo or become
such stories. They serve as real evidence for the Navajo Supreme Court of the
necessity of its Fundamental Law principles and the consequences of failing to
abide by them. Rather than representing a failure of their government,
moments like the MacDonald years are seen as a lesson, part of the growth of
the Nation, not in tension with its founding.363
The Navajo Nation may not be the only place where American law is built
upon underlying fundamental principles, whether explicitly or implicitly.
There may be similar parts of our legal doctrine that are more than rhetoric or
mythology but that carry real fundamental meaning for our law.
C.

Citizen Potawatomi Nation's Radical Redistricting

The word "Citizen" in Citizen Potawatomi Nation means something. The
tribe was created by a political choice to split off from the other Potawatomi.
The Citizen Potawatomi was once part of a confederation of tribes known as

the N'swi Ish-Ko-Day-Kawn Anishinabeg O'dish Ko-Day-Kawn. 364 This
confederacy comprised the Nishnab6 (or Anishnabek) Nations of the
Potawatomi, Ojibwe, and Odawa, and it controlled nearly 90 million acres in
the Great Lakes region of the United States.365 But by the mid-nineteenth

363. See, e.g., Off. of the Navajo Nation President v. Navajo Nation Council, 9 Am. Tribal
Law 46, 64-65 (Navajo 2010) (No. SC-CV-02-10), 2010 Navajo Sup. LEXIS 15, at *38-40
("Fundamental Law was established that there should not be concentrated power....
We must remind ourselves of this history to come to terms with the modern
challenges that face us as a People. Our government, run by human beings, our
relatives, is susceptible to internal decay and imperfect government.").
364. See Jerry Fontaine, I Naw Koo Ni Gay Win N'swi Ish Ko Day Kawn O'Dish Ko Day
Kawn Ojibway, Ota'wa and Boodewaadamig Anishinabe 5 (2009) (M.A. thesis,
University of Manitoba) (ProQuest). Fontaine interviewed political leaders fluent in
Ojibway, so I trust his translation of "Confederacy" over other descriptions of the
political arrangement. Id. at 5-6.
365. Culture, CITIZEN

POTAWATOMI

NATION,

Jan. 10, 2021).
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century, settlement and treaties had weakened the tribes enough that the
United States was able to forcibly remove them.366 On September 4, 1838,
through the powers granted to the United States by the Indian Removal Act,
mounted militia marched the Potawatomi from northern Indiana to Kansas on
what became known as the "Trail of Death." 367 In 1861, the Potawatomi in
Kansas were offered a treaty that would require them to stop "living
communally" in exchange for granting them U.S. citizenship and private land
ownership in Kansas.3 68 The Potawatomi who signed the treaty became the
"Citizen Band," which eventually ended up with reservation land in presentday Oklahoma. 369
Given this history, it is unsurprising how much the Citizen Potawatomi
value political citizenship and participation. Their ancestors gave up their
homes and prior tribal memberships for them. And having survived relocation
by force and by choice several times before, the Nation demonstrated long ago
that it could transcend its land base.
1.

Reforming legislative districts to reach the people

As a result of the Dust Bowl in the 1930s, the Indian Relocation Act of
1956, and other economic pressures, approximately two-thirds of the Citizen
Potawatomi Nation's citizens moved far from the tribe's lands in Oklahoma
and now live throughout the rest of the United States. 370 The Citizen
Potawatomi's original constitution was based on the Oklahoma Indian Welfare
Act model constitution 371 and left all major decisions up to a Council, which
comprised all members who resided in Oklahoma, who were over the age of
twenty-one, and who showed up to a meeting on the last Thursday in June. 372
These meetings were, as described by Chairman John "Rocky" Barrett,
366. See id.
367. Native History: Potawatomi Removed at Gunpoint, Trail of Death Begins, INDIAN COUNTRY
TODAY (Sept. 4, 2014), https://perma.cc/J65S-SYYZ.
368. CPN Pub. Info. Off., The Treaty of 1861 Is CPN Origin Story, CITIZEN POTAWATOMI
NATION (Nov. 16, 2016), https://perma.cc/X2YL-JCF6.
369.

Id.

370. Harvard Project on Am. Indian Econ. Dev., Honoring Nations: 2010 Honoree: Citizen
Potawatomi Nation Constitutional Reform; Citizen Potawatomi Nation (n.d.)
[hereinafter Harvard Honoring Potawatomi], https://perma.cc/RJ4N-2257; Nat'l Cong.
of Am. Indians, Modern Tribal Governments, Constitutions, and Sovereignty: John
"Rocky" Barrett, at 9:42-10:05, YouTUBE (Sept. 16, 2016), https://perma.cc/7JKS-EG9C
[hereinafter Rocky Video] (to locate, click "View the live page").
371. Rocky Video, supra note 370, at 1:45-2:00; see also Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act, 25

U.S.C. §§ 5201-5210.
372. See CITIZEN POTAWATOMI CONST. of 1938, art. III; id. art. VI, § 1; CITIZEN POTAWATOMI

BY-LAWS of 1938, art. III.
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unproductive and chaotic. 373 The Nation's first constitutional reforms in 1985
redefined its supreme governing body as the entire voting electorate and
allowed referenda by ballot.3 74 This reform crucially allowed the large
absentee-voter population to participate for the first time. 375
By the turn of the century, the tribe's government was much more
functional and the tribe was experiencing rapid economic growth: from
contributing $55 million to the Oklahoma economy in 2001 to contributing
almost $350 million in 2006.376 Still, the Nation struggled with low voter
turnout-especially among absentee voters-and a general sense of "apathy"
about the Nation's government, as citizens did not feel truly represented. 377
The Nation "decided to take the government to the people" and held meetings
throughout the United States to solicit input from the large populations of
relocated Citizen Potawatomi.3 78 The result was a decision to completely
overhaul the government in order to reengage the Nation's expatriate
population. 379
The Nation decided that to represent all its citizens, it would include them
in an innovative way. In 2007, the Nation adopted a new constitution that
included a legislature comprising sixteen legislators.380 Eight of these
legislators are chosen from new legislative districts drawn to represent citizens
who live outside the state of Oklahoma; five legislators chosen from districts
within Oklahoma and three at-large elected executive officials make up the
remainder of the legislature. 381 The tribe recognized that there was a risk that
out-of-state constituents would have an incentive to undervalue in-state
interests (such as land purchases), so it divided the legislature's weighted
representation. 382 Although out-of-state citizens make up two-thirds of the
373. Rocky Video, supra note 370, at 2:00-5:30.
374. Id. at 7:50-9:10.
375.

Id.

376. See HARVARD PROJECT ON AM. INDIAN ECON. DEV., HONORING NATIONS: ALL-STARS
PROFILE-CONSTITUTIONAL
REFORM CITIZEN POTAWATOMI
NATION 5 (2014)

[hereinafter ALL-STARS], https://perma.cc/WK6G-GJ8V.
377. Harvard Honoring Potawatomi, supranote 370, at 2; ALL-STARS, supranote 376, at 6.
378. Rocky Video, supra note 370, at 10:05-:21.
379. In her review of a book on voting rights in Indian Country, Pamela Karlan highlighted
this difficult "off-reservation"-citizen-voting issue. She analyzed how it interacts with
the "one person, one vote" principle and questions of discrimination between citizens,
noting how the Cherokee off-reservation citizens at-large elect two of seventeen
legislators. Pamela S. Karlan, Lightning in the Hand: Indians and Voting Rights, 120 YALE
L.J. 1420, 1450-52 (2011) (reviewing LAUGHLIN MCDONALD, AMERICAN INDIANS AND THE
FIGHT FOR EQUAL VOTING RIGHTS (2010)).
380. ALL-STARS,

supranote 376, at 1.

381. CITIZEN POTAWATOMI CONST. art. 7, § 1; id. art. 12, §§ 1, 3.

382. Rocky Video, supra note 370, at 16:10-17:23.
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population, they receive only half of the seats in the legislature. 383 Similarly,
though executive positions are elected by Nation-wide popular vote,
executives must maintain Oklahoma residency. 384
Figure
Citizen Potawatomi Nation Legislative Districts as of 2017 Redistricting

6
Adapted from: CPN Pub. Info. Off., Population Growth Results in Redistricting for CPN Tribal
Legislature, CITIZEN POTAWATOMI NATION (June 30, 2017), https://perma.cc/UPP6-P565.

To facilitate this system, the Citizen Potawatomi legislators hold regional
meetings and communicate with their constituents about news and issues
impacting their jurisdictions. 385 The Nation also conducts regular legislative
sessions via publicly accessible videoconference. 386 Overall voter participation
for the Nation more than doubled as a result of these changes in the structure
of the legislature. 387 Moreover, the Nation saw significant increases in other

383. Id. at 9:42-10:05, 16:10-17:23.
384. Id. at 17:00-:15.
385. See CPN Pub. Info. Off., Population Growth Results in Redistricting for CPN Tribal
Legislature, CITIZEN POTAWATOMI NATION (June 30, 2017), https://perma.cc/UPP6-P565.
386. See id.; Harvard Honoring Potawatomi, supra note 370, at 2.
387. Turnout grew from 1,145 voters to 2,533 voters between 2006 and 2009. ALL-STARS,
supranote 376, at 9.
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forms of civic engagement and cultural participation.3 88 Voter data from the
last decade suggest the increased voter participation has generally held steady,
aside from slight dips in years where all candidates ran unopposed. 389 Notably,
with these reforms, the Nation achieved geographic participation parity, with
out-of-state voters composing approximately two thirds of the vote.390 In 2017,
Citizen Potawatomi conducted its first ten-year constitutionally mandated
redistricting to reflect population growth. 391
The scope and impact of the Citizen Potawatomi system make it
distinctive even compared to international examples of expatriate voting
districts. Portugal implemented such a system in 1976, when it reserved two
seats in its upper chamber for expatriates.3 92 France may be the most
prominent example, having held eleven districts for its expats since 2008.393
But representatives from the Citizen Potawatomi's extraterritorial districts
make up half of the tribe's legislature. 394 Unlike in international cases,
extraterritorial-resident citizens are the rule rather than the exception. The
Potawatomi redistricting was thus not only a way to increase voter turnout

388. See id.
389. Turnout has stayed steady around two thousand since the reforms, except for in 2014
when it was noticeably lower-around 1,500-in an election where only two district
elections were not unopposed. See id. at 9; Elections, CITIZEN POTAWATOMI NATION,
https://perma.cc/4G7R-B23V (archived Jan. 10, 2021) (to locate, click "View the live
page") (compiling election results from 2012 to 2020) (calculations on file with author).
While this seems to be a low percentage of the eligible electorate, nearby local
government elections held outside of the November national election cycles also turn
out only a few thousand voters. See, e.g., Vicky O. Misa, Election Day: Ed Bolt Named
Shawnee Mayor, SHAWNEE NEW-STAR (updated June 30, 2020, 10:13 PM CT),
https://perma.cc/7328-4QS6 (noting that the similarly sized, nearby Shawnee had
around 5,500 voters turn out for its most recent mayoral election held in June, the
same month the Citizen Potawatomi elections are held).
390. See Elections, supranote 389 (calculations on file with author).
391. CPN Pub. Info. Off., supra note 386; CITIZEN POTAWATOMI CONST. art. 12, § 6.
392. Michael Tager, Expatriates and Elections, 15 DIASPORA 35, 58 n.2 (2006); Marco Lisi, Ana
Maria Belchior, Manuel Abrantes & Joana Azevedo, Portuguese Emigrants' Political
Representation: The Challenges of the External Vote, in NEW AND OLD ROUTES OF
PORTUGUESE EMIGRATION: UNCERTAIN FUTURES AT THE PERIPHERY OF EUROPE 73, 74-81

(Claudia Pereira & Joana Azevedo eds., 2019).
393. See Lizzy Davies, French Expats Prepare to Vote in ParliamentaryElections, GUARDIAN
(June 1, 2012, 3:27 AM EDT), https://perma.cc/NAP7-J6BY.
394. See CITIZEN POTAWATOMI CONST. art. 12, § 3; id. art. 7, § 1.
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and grant more of a voice to extraterritorial citizens; 395 it was also a bold
statement about what the Citizen Potawatomi Nation is: its people. 396
It's an example of a tribal government willing to profoundly reform its
government structure to address a problem. This willingness to strip parts of
government down to the studs in order to solve problems is an increasingly
common theme in Indian Country. 397 As Chairman Barrett put it: "If you're
not in the constitution-fixing business, you're not in economic development;
you're not in self-governance; you're not sovereign." 398
2.

Creating United States expatriate voting districts

The United States could look to the Citizen Potawatomi example because
it too has a problem with voter turnout among citizens living abroad. As of
2016, there were 5.5 million United States citizens living outside the country,
and nearly 3 million of them were of voting age. 399 That is a total population
that is approximately the size of South Carolina 400 and a voting age population
on par with Oklahoma's. 40 1 The total number of expatriate citizens grew by
23% between 2010 and 2016.402
This large expatriate voting population is demographically interesting; it
includes a significant number of military service members and their families,
and it is much more educated than the general population of the United
States. 40 3 Among the voting-age expatriate population, 54% hold a bachelor's

395. Not fully examined here is the potential for this case, and other tribal cases, to expand
on the idea of citizenship. See, e.g., Kim Barry, Home and Away: The Construction of
Citizenship in an Emigration Context, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 11, 58 (2006).
396. See generally Peter J. Spiro, Perfecting Political Diaspora, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 207 (2006)
(explaining that the extension of political rights to nonresidents indicates a changed
perspective on the relationship between national membership and physical location).
397. See, e.g., Introduction to AMERICAN INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL
REBUILDING OF NATIVE NATIONS, supra note 72, at 1, 1-3.

REFORM AND

THE

398. ALL-STARS, supranote 376, at 4.
399. FED. VOTING ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, 2016 OVERSEAS CITIZEN POPULATION ANALYSIS:

STUDY FINDINGS-VOLUME 1, at 6 (2018) [hereinafter FVAP 2016 OVERSEAS],
https://perma.cc/D9MV-NZSF; Electorate Profile: South Carolina, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU
(Feb. 11, 2016), https://perma.cc/2FAZ-AACA.
400. See Quickfacts: South Carolina, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://perma.cc/PJS4-JVCU
(archived Feb. 23, 2021) (2019 population estimate).
401. See Electorate Profile: Oklahoma,
https://perma.cc/43EQ-NC4Y.

U.S.

CENSUS

BUREAU

(Feb.

23,

2016),

402. FVAP 2016 OVERSEAS, supranote 399, at 3.
403. See FED. VOTING ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, 2018 REPORT TO CONGRESS 3, 45 (2019)

[hereinafter FVAP 20181, https://perma.cc/D9XN-PTB4 (noting that 25% of physical
ballot requests received from overseas voters in 2018 were from Uniformed Service
members);

FED. VOTING ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, THE BIENNIAL OVERSEAS CITIZEN

footnote continued on next page
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degree or higher, compared to just 30% of the general population. 404 And of the
current, registered expatriate population, an estimated 80% have at least a
bachelor's degree, and 46% have an advanced degree. 40 5
Domestically, 72% of eligible voters participated in the 2016 election. 406
Based on comparisons to similar domestic demographics, around 72% of the
3 million voting-age expatriate citizens should vote. 407 They do not participate
at even half that rate. Or a third. Or a tenth. In 2016, only 6.9% of eligible
expatriates voted in the presidential election. 408
The Department of Defense is tasked with helping these citizens vote, but
despite the Department's best efforts, they just don't vote. 409 The Department
can only attribute 30.5 of the 64.9 percentage-point discrepancy in voter
participation to the particular obstacles faced by overseas voters (such as
difficulties receiving mail in a particular country), which the Department calls
the "Obstacles Gap." 410 That still leaves what the Department calls the
"Residual Overseas Gap"-34.4 percentage points between actual expat voter
turnout and its expected rate of 71.8%.411
This low-turnout problem extends to overseas, active-duty military
personnel. Between 26% and 31% of this group voted in 2018.412 According to a
model projecting voter turnout for domestic citizens of similar demographics,
these service persons should be voting at approximately double that rate. 413
Oddly enough, among active military personnel who did not vote, 50% cited
lack of interest, selecting, for example, "I did not want to vote" as their
justification. 414 And 66% of nonvoting active-duty military personnel
indicated the same apathy in 2014. 415
Were the United States to copy the Citizen Potawatomi, it could give
expatriates their own district and possibly representatives in Congress. As was
the case for the Citizen Potawatomi, an overseas district would be more
POPULATION ANALYSIS: U.S. CITIZENS ABROAD AND THEIR VOTING BEHAVIORS IN 2016, at

4 (2018) [hereinafter FVAP BIENNIAL ANALYSIS], https://perma.cc/F76V-3ULK.
404. FVAP 2016 OVERSEAS, supranote 399, at 6.
405. FVAP BIENNIAL ANALYSIS, supranote 403, at 4.

406. FVAP 2016 OVERSEAS, supra note 399, at 1.
407. Id. at 9 n.7, 12-14.
408. Id. at 1.
409. See FVAP 2018, supra note 403, at 3-5.
410. FVAP 2016 OVERSEAS, supra note 399, at 12-14.
411. Id.

412. FVAP 2018, supranote 403, at 16.
413. See id. at 15-16.
414. Id. at 17.
415. Id. at 17 fig.4.
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representative than forcing this massive population to vote absentee in the last
state they lived. In debates on whether to initially extend the vote to overseas
citizens, some members of Congress argued that "[t]here is no doubt that the
local inhabitants of the [home] district[s] [in which expatriates vote] may not
have the same interests as citizens outside the United States." 4 16 People develop
different interests and identities and likewise have different expectations of
their government when they live away from its territorial boundaries.
Overseas voters likely have much more common, and vote more in kind, with
each other than they do with voters in their last state of residency. 417
Expatriate voters are unified and shaped by the same kinds of geographic and
cultural identities that rationalize grouping representative democracy by
residency. They are also a unique population. The distinct challenges facing
overseas citizens-taxes, access to U.S. services, voting-are (ironically enough)
all easily ignored when the voting impact of expatriates is spread across the
entire United States.
Lack of representation from active-duty military voters is especially
concerning. By deploying members of the military overseas, the United States
is effectively disenfranchising them. Why not reconfigure the system such that
an overseas deployment means becoming part of a sizable voting bloc of
military personnel with a representative uniquely tasked with listening to
them and fighting for their needs in Congress? This solution is particularly
salient because, as of 2016, the United States had more of its active military
personnel serving overseas than any other country in the world. 418
The idea of reconfiguring or expanding Congress is a popular topic these
days. Some consider it an outrage that the territories and D.C. lack adequate
representation, but this outrage never overcomes the political reality that these
new states may be filled with Democrats. 419 But an Overseas State could have

416. See, e.g., COMM. ON RULES & ADMIN., OVERSEAS CITIZENS VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1975, S.

REP. No. 94-121, at 2 (1975).
417. See Andreas C. Goldberg & Simon Lanz, Living Abroad, Voting as If at Home? Electoral
Motivations of Expatriates, MIGRATION STUD. (May 21, 2019), https://perma.cc/VZU8-

ALWS.
418. Niall McCarthy, Which Countries Have the Most Active Troops Abroad? [Infographic],
FORBES (Nov. 20, 2017, 8:43 AM EST), https://perma.cc/53H4-RMMJ.
419. See, e.g., Peter Raven-Hansen, The Constitutionalityof D.C Statehood, 60 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 160, 161-62 (1991); Adam H. Kurland, PartisanRhetoric, Constitutional Reality, and
Political Responsibility: The Troubling Constitutional Consequences of Achieving D.C.
Statehood by Simple Legislation, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 475, 475-76 (1992); Jamin B.
Raskin, Is This America? The District of Columbia and the Right to Vote, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 39, 55 n.87 (1999); Andr6s L. C6rdova, Opinion, PuertoRico: Statehood as Equality,
THE HILL (July 3, 2017, 2:30 PM EDT), https://perma.cc/P2QQ-VJF5; Note, Pack the
Union: A Proposal to Admit New States for the Purpose of Amending the Constitution to
Ensure Equal Representation, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1056 (2020).
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at least some bipartisan value. Democrats would find appealing an electorate
that is highly educated, and Republicans would like that it is heavily military
(especially considering that voter participation among military personnel is
higher overall than among nonmilitary personnel within the overseas
population 420 ). An Overseas State-with presumably the population equivalent
of South Carolina-could elect seven Representatives and two Senators,
carrying nine electoral college votes. 421 This transformation of the overseas
population-from a status so irrelevant that they don't bother voting into an
influential voting bloc-could draw unprecedented participation and new
voters for both parties to fight over. The Democratic Party already groups
overseas voters together like this by allowing "Democrats Abroad" to operate
just like one of the state parties 422 -organizing primary elections for citizens
living abroad and selecting twenty-one delegates. 423
If the United States ever decided to reconfigure representation for
expatriate voting,424 it could look to the Citizen Potawatomi for guidance on
doing it in a way that creates buy-in. That is, the United States could "go to the
people" as the Citizen Potawatomi did, having town halls throughout the
world to determine what lines it should draw and what changes would better
engage our citizens living abroad. Perhaps this could include town halls in the
United States to determine whether expatriates ought to have equal votes or
"one person, one vote" should be set aside in such a restructuring. 425 Such a
420. Compare FVAP 2018, supra note 403, at 3 (noting a 26% participation rate for overseas
active-duty members in 2018), with FED. VOTING ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, U.S. CITIZENS
ABROAD AND THEIR VOTING BEHAVIORS IN 2018: OVERSEAS CITIZEN POPULATION

ANALYSIS SUMMARY BRIEF 2 (2018), https://perma.cc/7Q85-QTQQ (noting a 6.9% voterturnout rate among all overseas voters in 2016).
421. See The Electoral College, NAT'L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, https://perma.cc/D7GY-AYU3
(last updated Nov. 11, 2020).
422. See 2020 Democratic Primary: Democrats Abroad Global PresidentialPrimary, DEMOCRATS
ABROAD, https://perma.cc/PXP9-D44T (archived Jan. 11, 2021).
423. DEMOCRATIC PARTY COMM. ABROAD, DEMOCRATS ABROAD DELEGATE SELECTION PLAN
FOR
THE
2020
DEMOCRATIC
NATIONAL
CONVENTION
1,
13-14
(2019),

https://perma.cc/TJU2-RNG5.
424. Interestingly, Congress passed the Overseas Citizens Voting Rights Act (OCVRA) in
1975 despite concerns that allowing overseas voting might be unconstitutional;
Congress expected litigation would resolve the issue, but no such challenge ever came.
See Brian C. Kalt, Unconstitutionalbut Entrenched: Putting UOCAVA and Voting Rights for
Permanent Expatriates on a Sound Constitutional Footing, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 441, 446-50
(2016) (detailing the history of this debate while discussing OCVRA's amended form);
Alan Gura, Ex-Patriatesand Patriots:A Constitutional Examination of the Uniformed and
Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, 6 TEx. REV. L. & POL. 179, 191-93 (2001) (arguing
that OCVRA and its amended form remain unconstitutional and collecting Supreme
Court cases emphasizing the importance of states' geographic boundaries).
425. Cf Karlan, supra note 379, at 1450-51 (discussing how tribes have been able to set aside
"one person, one vote" in their political choices).
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strategy would both approach the issue as an electoral-integrity problem and
engage the people in the process, thereby creating buy-in for the ultimate
design. The Citizen Potawatomi pursued election and redistricting reform
based on improving representation instead of calculations based on politics or
existing balances of power. Town halls across America where the structure of
our elections was really up for debate-that would be a sight to see.
IV. The New Era of American Tribal Law
The examples of tribal law explored in the preceding pages have not been
included to prove that tribes are uniquely brilliant innovators or that they are
always successful at self-governance. While they certainly can be at times,
tribal governments struggle and fail just like any other governments do. The
point isn't that tribal law is good law. The point is that tribal law exists-and it
isn't primitive, or foreign, or concerned exclusively with niche Indian issues.
These examples should feel both new and familiar because the study of tribal
law is just American public law (as these examples show) or private law (as I'm
sure another article could show). Papers about these governments should be
seen and read for what they are: criminal law papers, constitutional law papers,
election law papers, and so on. They should no longer be ignored or kept
separate and on the sidelines.
The examples in this Article only begin to scratch the surface of the
broader set of possibilities that can come from incorporating tribal law into
American law. Recognizing that tribal law is American law not only expands
our scholarship of American law but enriches and complicates our picture of
American law and legal institutions. Studying tribal governments can redefine
the boundaries of American law, add hundreds of additional laboratories for
American governance, and provide dynamic reflections of, or contrasts to,
other American sovereigns' laws and legal institutions.
Indian Country is America too. We should stop excluding tribes from our
assessments in Restatements and anywhere else we are discussing the full set of
laws in the United States. The success or failure of tribal innovation or
attempts to incorporate other American sovereigns' laws should inform or
complicate what we see as the best practices for American governance. We
ought to ask why the Citizen Potawatomi reforms worked, why the Navajo
parliamentary system failed, and how those lessons translate (or don't
translate) to other institutions.
Likewise, because tribal governments sometimes start with federal or state
law language or ideas, their interpretations, innovations, or reinventions are
particularly insightful. Tribal law can be a place to explore the utility of other
American sovereigns' laws in different contexts. Or, as the VAWA tribes
demonstrated, tribal law can complicate our assumptions about how we canor must-interpret law, including federal constitutional rights. Tribes may
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likewise complicate our concept of American legal exceptionalism, as they
force us to wrestle with the implications of American governments rejecting
even some of our most lauded and cherished legal innovations. Finally, and
most obviously, tribal law ought to inform how-or change where-we
interpret Indian treaty rights and tribal sovereignty.
Part II of this Article demonstrated why we ought to reject the assumption
that tribal law should be ostracized. Part III took a peek behind a door that,
once kicked open, might reveal an incredibly fruitful realm not only for more
scholars to engage in tribal law but also for cross-sovereign legal research,
debate, and discourse. Part IV now addresses readers who are generally
convinced that tribal law belongs in the mainstream study of American law
and are wondering what the next steps are for the legal academy, their
teaching, or their work.
In other words, what can we do to usher in a new era where our
collectively shared conception of American law includes and accepts tribal
law? This new era involves ending the invisibility of tribal law, normalizing
its presence in mainstream legal discourse, expanding the infrastructure
needed to study tribal law, and calling for more focus on exploring tribal law.
All of this is required before we can even begin to collectively synthesize tribal
law or provide informed answers to the questions looming in the background
of this paper about the future of tribal law, tribal governments, and their
powers. I may disappoint some readers by not offering a framework for an
entry into either the academic study of tribal law, or for placing tribal law
within the rest of the United States government system. That is because I do
not believe developing such a framework is possible yet.
A.

The Need to Expand Tribal Law Research Infrastructure

For anyone interested in tribal law, the first issue is access. Because tribal
governments are largely independent, their laws, projects, and opinions are
not tracked by the federal government or any other central agency on even a
basic level. When the BIA was heavier-handed with tribes, it kept more
records, but since its role has diminished following self-determination, a
"vacuum" has formed. 426 Even for experts working in tribal law, there is a lot
we do not know and-because we have yet to build a reliable and consistent
infrastructure-cannot find out easily. 427 For example, while we can

426. HARVARD NATIONS, supranote 73, at xxi.

427. See Jacob Franchek, Note, Digitizing Tribal Law: How Codification Projects Such as Tribal
Law Online Could Give New Rise to American Indian Sovereignty, 94 WASH. U. L. REV.
1025, 1026-27 (2017). See generally David E. Selden, Researching American Indian Tribal
Law, COLO. LAW., Feb. 2014, at 51 (providing a guide on researching tribal law).
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confidently say that there are at least 188 tribal courts, 428 there may be as many
as 400;429 even experts are unsure about the precise number. 430 Many tribal
legislative and executive documents are made available by a tribe on the tribe's
websites, and they come in a wide range of formats, not all of which are easy to
navigate. 43 1 There have been attempts by universities or other nonprofits to
try to collect and centralize tribal codes, 432 which have resulted in a patchwork
of different resources. 433 The most successful is the National Indian Law
Library, which, as of 2014, had approximately 250 tribal-code documents and
480 constitutions available in hard copy, with many also available digitally on
its website. 434 But even if documents can be found from an indirect source, it is
best practice to call the tribe to verify that codes are still current. 435 Some
tribes are certainly better than others at preserving records of prior versions of
laws, legislative history, and other legal documents. 436
For tribal court documents specifically, the picture is slightly better, with a
series of prior attempts at centralization. 437 The National Indian Law Library
428. The Bureau of Justice Statistics last surveyed tribal governments almost twenty years
ago, and out of the 314 tribes who responded, about 188 reported that they had some
form of justice system in place. STEVEN W. PERRY, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE,

NCJ

205332, CENSUS OF TRIBAL JUSTICE AGENCIES IN INDIAN COUNTRY, 2002,

at 3 (2005), https://perma.cc/49WJ-CCZS.
429. Bureau of Just. Assistance, Fact Sheet: Coordinated Tribal Assistance SolicitationPurpose Area #3, at 3 (2015), https://perma.cc/38QW-9A2W (noting that since 1999,
more than 400 tribes received funding from the Tribal Courts Assistance Program to
support tribal court development).
430. Email from Chia Halpern Beetso, Tribal Ct. Specialist, Tribal L. & Pol'y Inst., to author
(Nov. 7, 2019, 1:08 PM) (on file with author).
431. The Navajo Nation makes its code available through a series of PDFs for each of the
code amendments, which are organized by title and current as of 2014; there are also
four PDFs covering an annotated code, which are current as of 2010. This material
totals over 4,000 pages. See Navajo Nation Code, NAVAJO NATION OFF. LEGIS. SERVS.,
https://perma.cc/CAC7-GSF8 (archived Jan. 11, 2021) (to locate, click "View the live

page").
432. See, e.g., Franchek, supra note 427, at 1028 (describing a project at the Washington
University School of Law to digitize the Oglala Sioux Tribe's codes).
433. See Researching Tribal Codes and Constitutions, NAT'L INDIAN L. LIBR.,
https://perma.cc/827Y-JTSG (archived Jan. 11, 2021) (collecting links to a variety of
resources).
434. See Selden, supra note 427, at 52.
435. Kelly Kunsch, A Legal Practitioner'sGuide to Indian and Tribal Law Research, 5
INDIAN L.J. 101, 129-30 (2017).

AM.

436. Conference Transcript, Heeding Frickey's Call: Doing Justice in Indian Country, 37 AM.
INDIAN L. REV. 347, 350 (2013) (statement of Matthew L.M. Fletcher) ("The Navajo
Tribe is great-they will send you to every single agency that doesn't have that
information.").
437. See Find Tribal Courts and CourtOpinions, NAT'L INDIAN L. LIBR., https://perma.cc/4QZ782NM (archived Jan. 11, 2021) (collecting resources).
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has those major cases that were briefly, until 2013, included in the Indian Law
Reporter. 438 VersusLaw, Lexis, Casemaker, and most recently Westlaw have
each, at one point or another, tried building databases of tribal court opinions
or tribal codes. 439 A great deal of tribal court opinions are accessible through a
simple search in these databases. However, each database covers only a handful
of tribes, and some are subject to paywalls. For example, Westlaw recently
expanded its tribal law collection, but those documents are behind a paywall
that is prohibitively expensive even for law schools with otherwise excellent
access. 440 Niche indeed.
This is certainly a challenge, but it's also an opportunity. If there is real
demand from the academy for centralized, ready access to existing tribal law
documents, the market will answer by increasing the availability of such
documents. Once the channels are built to start collecting and updating tribal
laws, they will be far easier to maintain. Once there is real infrastructure and
access, so much more will be possible.
Yet even with the limited access we have, it is possible to quickly and easily
access enough tribal court opinions to accomplish one important goal:
normalizing tribal law through legal education. Tribal law opinions, executive
documents, or codes could provide interesting contrasts with the case law in
our existing curriculum, or they could simply complement established case law
while exposing students to the existence of tribal sovereigns and their legal
systems. An easy way to introduce students to and normalize tribal law would,
of course, be to include similar tribal court opinions alongside state common
law opinions in the first-year curriculum. Assuming the case method and a
preference for short, simple cases that cover basic topics, the following are just
a few cases to start with based on a search of common topics in first-year
courses using either Lexis's database narrowed to "Tribal" opinions or the
Tribal Court Clearinghouse's 441 database: Civil Procedure, Coin v. Mowa, Hopi

438. Selden, supra note 427, at 53; Mary Whisner, Univ. of Wash. Sch. of L., Sources of
Tribal Court Decisions 2 (2021), https://perma.cc/8KQ6-XZ88.
439. Selden, supra note 427, at 53; Whisner, supra note 438, at 2-3; Researching Tribal Codes
and Constitutions, supranote 433.
440. Email from Sheri Lewis, Dir., D'Angelo L. Libr., Univ. of Chi., to author (Dec. 29, 2019,
5:14 PM) (on file with author); Email from Sheri Lewis, Dir., D'Angelo L. Libr., Univ. of
Chi., to author (Dec. 10, 2019, 11:30 AM) (on file with author); Email from William A.
Schwesig, Anglo-Am. & Hist. Collections Libr., D'Angelo L. Libr., Univ. of Chi., to
author (Dec. 4, 2019, 10:45 AM) (on file with author); Email from M. Constance
Fleischer, Rsch. Servs. Libr., D'Angelo L. Libr., Univ. of Chi., to author (Dec. 3, 2019,
4:42 PM) (on file with author).
441. Tribal Court Decisions, TRIBAL CT. CLEARINGHOUSE, https://perma.cc/G8TQ-PZAW
(archived Jan. 11, 2021).
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Appellate Court; 442 Contracts, Jackson, Inc. v. Tribal Bingo Enterprise of the
Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, Supreme Court of the Eastern Band of
Cherokee Indians; 443 Criminal Law, Amundson v. Colville Confederated Tribes,
Colville Confederated Tribes Court of Appeals; 444 Torts, Sullivan v.
Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enterprise, Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Court; 445
and Property, In re Estate of Nelson, Navajo Nation Court of Appeals. 446
Moreover, Matthew Fletcher's excellent casebook on tribal law is both useful
for anyone interested in teaching an introductory course on the subject and a
well-organized and accessible resource of tribal law materials generally.447
B.

The Prematurity of an Academic Tribal Law Framework

While a framework for an academic approach to tribal law would
undoubtedly be useful, developing one is decidedly premature given the vast
diversity and many unknowns outlined above. Indeed, it would require
making overly broad or uninformed claims about hundreds of governments,
or else flattening out the diversity of tribal nations in precisely the same way
criticized in this piece. If this Article were a call for the academy to notice, talk
about, research, study, and write about state or local law for the first time, an
immediate call for a unifying framework that would allow scholars to
approach the new topic would surely seem to be a wildly premature ask that
would require monumental oversimplifications. So I offer the reader no such
framework within these pages.
442. 25 Indian L. Rptr. 6208 (Hopi App. Ct. 1997) (No. AP-005-95), 1997 Hopi App. LEXIS 4
(discussing venue, dismissals for lack of jurisdiction, construing parties' motions, and
the importance of standards of review).
443. 3 Cher. Rep. 19 (E. Cherokee Sup. Ct. 2001) (No. CV 98-051), 2001 WL 36239697
(involving anticipatory repudiation and discussing the appropriate damage
calculations).
444. 25 Indian L. Rptr. 6178, 6179 (Colville Confederated Tribes Ct. App. 1998) (No. AP97018), 1998 Colville App. LEXIS 10, at *6-8 (concluding that conspiracy cannot include
government actors as persons and that a drug purchaser does not conspire in a
distribution crime).
445. 32 Indian L. Rptr. 6128, 6129-30 (Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Ct. 2005) (No. MPTCCV-2004-126), 2005 Mashantucket Trib. LEXIS 18, at *7-16 (discussing assumption of
duty in a slip-and-fall case where the plaintiff's weight complicated the reasonableness
inquiry).
446. 1 Navajo Rptr. 162, 163, 166 (1977), 1977 Navajo App. LEXIS 30, at '1, 5 (listing the
requisite elements of inter vivos gifts and specifically examining donative intent over a
joint tenancy).
447. MATTHEW L.M. FLETCHER, AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBAL LAW (2d ed. 2020). Sarah Deer and
Justin Richland's book is also an excellent resource, but it focuses more on skimming
the surface of tribal diversity and providing context and commentary and so includes
fewer materials overall. JUSTIN B. RICHLAND & SARAH DEER, INTRODUCTION TO TRIBAL

LEGAL STUDIES (3d ed. 2016).

625

The Other American Law
73 STAN. L. REV. 555 (2021)

Nor do I offer uniform advice about the best place for someone to start
(large tribes, constitutional tribes, and so on) since the answer ought to vary
depending on the scholar, teacher, or generally interested person's subject. I
will neither oversimplify nor generalize nor prematurely synthesize trends
across a group of tribes that is vast, where much is unknown, and where the
mistakes of the past make clear that the prescription is less generalization and
more contextualization, qualification, and humility.
I can propose, however, that the three things just mentionedcontextualization, qualification, and humility-are good practices, and I
recommend them as vital for a new era of studying and accepting tribal law.
They are, as I will explain more fully below, key to laying a new foundation,
though in truth, they are familiar best practices combined with a constant
vigilance informed by the errors of the past.

1.

Tribal individuality

Each tribal government is a unique individual sovereign entity. While we
may acknowledge tribes' or Indian peoples' similarities or common
experiences-with certain colonial powers or federal laws, for example-we
should do so only where appropriate and where supported by evidence. "The
Indian tribes" is a fictional monolith void of collective meaning. To combat
this inaccurate homogenization, we can be more precise both in making claims
about tribes and in talking about them generally.
Because there are many different tribal governments, relevant knowledge
comes from specific experiences or expertise with particular tribes. In order to
stop ourselves from letting anything else-including information about other
tribes or assumptions-fill in the gaps in our knowledge, we have to be
especially self-aware, reflective, and critical. This means rejecting broad
statements and claims about tribal law without equally broad support. It means
scrutinizing specificity by asking-as we would in other disciplines-not
"What evidence do I have for thinking this about tribes?" but "What evidence
do I have for thinking this about this particulartribe?"
Not only does this demand for accurate and careful claims about tribal
governments mean scrutinizing evidence, assumptions, and conclusions, but it
also means fixing how we talk about "Indians" or "tribes." We ought to use
these terms more accurately to reflect tribal diversity and combat myths of
tribal or Indian uniformity. For example, when using "Indians," we must keep
in mind that the term refers to a continent's worth of people-much like
"Europeans"-and only use "tribes" where it would sound appropriate to
substitute in the other American subsovereign governments-"states." If
substituting in one term for the other immediately sounds uncomfortably
naive or filled with incorrect assumptions of uniformity, we ought to reframe.
For example: "How many tribes are there?" and "Are Indian language groups
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similar?" become "How many states are there?" and "Are European language
groups similar?" Those are simple enough questions with straightforward
enough answers. By contrast, "What are tribal governments like?" and "How
much does Indian culture influence tribal dispute resolution?" are difficult to
answer since they carry numerous assumptions of uniformity and are
otherwise either confused or incorrect. Perform the substitution ("What are
state governments like?" or "How much does European culture influence
European courts?"), and it's immediately clear what's wrong. These are not
specific enough questions to answer without parsing what the question is
really asking. "Like, in what way?" or "European culture isn't monolithic, so
what European country and court do you mean?" would be obvious starting
points. Though asking these kinds of questions might seem like a silly or small
thing, doing so is a helpful step toward ending the comfortable and powerful
homogenization of terms like "Indians" and "tribes"-instead of allowing them
to continue flourishing as mischaracterizations pervading both our laws and
our legal discourse.
2.

The familiar best practices of contextualizing and not overclaiming

As scholars, we need to start by questioning our assumptions about tribes
and the sources of our information. These familiar best practices from other
fields are all the more necessary because of the long history of poor scholarly
practices when it comes to Indians. Assuming that tribal governments are
simply governments like any other, we ought to engage with tribal
governments and tribal law with an open mind. We cannot assume that all
tribal-government experiences, contributions, or legal insights are similarly
limited, incompatible, translatable, or valuable. We ought to just assess the
specific limitations in any given project based on subject, scope, size, culture,
location, or history.
In each of the three examples in Part III above, this Article models this
engagement in its approach to the tribes involved and the scope of the
examples' implications. In the first example, without the shared circumstances
of opting into VAWA's provisions, we could not assume that tribes were
working with the same legal framework. Nor would we extrapolate that some
of the ideas explored by these tribes are potentially relevant to federal law
because of the similarities between VAWA's language and federal
constitutional doctrine. Even so, the example minds its limits. Jury trials are
rare, so there is very little data on how this experiment is going for these tribes.
The example is thus presented not as a proven, effective model for jury
construction but instead as a surprising and promising new way of
interpreting shared language.
The other two examples in this Article examine just one tribe each,
starting with a brief account of the tribe's history prior to the relevant legal
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period. Both examples explore each tribe's experience with structural
governmental changes similar to those faced by other American governments,
telling unique stories that complicate old assumptions or provoke new ideas.
But they certainly do not prove anything about the broader applicability,
desirability, or scalability of the government reforms involved.

3.

Scholarly humility

Scholars have earned a negative reputation in Indian Country. 448 Vine
Deloria Jr.'s famous Indian manifesto dedicates an entire chapter to scathing
commentary on the familiar figure of the hated, mistrusted, and mocked
"anthropologist" who comes to Indian communities and sensationally
documents errors that misrepresent the community but pass for fact to
outsiders. 449 We must own this history before we can have any hope of doing
any better. Humility is the key-truly contextualizing our knowledge, our
research, and their limitations. Though difficult, it is vital when working with
Indigenous people, laws, or knowledge. As discussed earlier in this Article,
prior failures in this regard allowed incorrect and destructive ideas about
Indians to permeate the academy and the collective American consciousness
for centuries. 450 Whether because of malevolent intent, presupposed agendas,
exploitative methods, or just plain ignorance, there is a consistent academic
arrogance behind the bad scholarship and bad blood-scholars were confident
in their ability to figure out Indians as subjects with very little involvement,
input, or critique from Indian people themselves. Since unbridled arrogance
created unbounded disaster, nothing short of unbridled humility is required.
Only then can we ever hope to get it right.
If, in this Article, I captured an incomplete version of even some of the
tribal histories and laws portrayed in these pages, I welcome the criticismbecause it will be an invitation to get it right or to learn from the mistake.
Navajo culture, for example, is fiercely guarded, and the Nation's politics are
very complex. Despite my best efforts to scrutinize my sources and
corroborate my claims, there are things that may be missing. Scholars should
also accept the possibility of being told to go away by certain tribal
communities who have no interest in collaborating or being studied and who
must be able to make that choice freely for themselves.
Gaining the trust of communities sufficiently enough to work with
them-not only to build projects or access data but also to accurately
448. See NAT'L CONG. OF AM. INDIANS POL'Y RSCH. CTR. & MONT. STATE UNIV. CTR. FOR
NATIVE HEALTH P'SHIPS, "WALK SOFTLY AND LISTEN CAREFULLY": BUILDING RESEARCH
RELATIONSHIPS WITH TRIBAL COMMUNITIES 14-15 (2012).
449. See VINE DELORIA, JR., CUSTER DIED FOR YOUR SINS: AN INDIAN MANIFESTO 78-100 (1969).

450. See supraPart II.A.
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understand the tribal context discussed above-may involve swimming
upstream due to the history of mistrust. There are resources available with
guidance 45 1 and insights 452 on how to navigate this process and build
relationships.

C. A Federal Indian Law (If We Still Call It That) Informed by Tribal Law
The final questions some readers might have loom largest: Where is the
framework for how we ought to think about tribal law, and where is the claim
about where it belongs within American law? Since its inception, federal
Indian law has struggled with just these questions about where Indian tribes
belong in the United States' federal framework. The entire jurisprudence and
academic field are attempts to answer these questions and their component
parts. I do not have the answers in this Article. But this Article does provide a
roadmap for how to get there: tribal law.
Therein lies a monumental and consistent intellectual bankruptcy in
federal Indian law: It is missing tribal law. Attempting to answer the questions
above without first considering tribal law and understanding tribal
governance is as nonsensical as asking what powers states ought to retain
without any idea of what states are, what they do, or how they exercise their
sovereignty. Scholars and judges must understand tribes before they can
answer these questions. The invisibility of tribal law undermines the study and
practice of federal Indian law, which-without a robust tribal law foundationbecomes an unmoored study of sovereignty in the abstract, a kind of federalism
without foundation.
Phil Frickey alluded to a version of this problem in federal Indian law
years ago. He suggested that "[f]ederal Indian law needs a much better, more
grounded understanding of tribal law and institutions" because otherwise it
"just consists of the federal judiciary engaged in guesswork prone to dissolve
into suspicion." 453 These remarks sparked a conference on what the Indian law
field could to do respond to this concern, 454 but the tides have not turned

significantly.

451. See generally NAT'L CONG. OF AM. INDIANS POL'Y RSCH. CTR. & MONT. STATE UNIV. CTR.

FOR NATIVE HEALTH P'SHIPS, supra note 448 (advising on best practices).
452. See Conference Transcript, Heeding Frickey's Call: Doing Justice in Indian Country, supra
note 436 (compiling speeches alluding to the challenges of working with tribes).
453. Frickey, supra note 1, at 28-29; see also POMMERSHEIM, supra note 151, at 130-31 (noting
that "Indian law scholarship is in danger of becoming a misleading abstraction"
preoccupied with sovereignty, jurisdiction, and power).
454. See Fletcher, American IndianLegal Scholarship and the Courts, supra note 136; Conference
Transcript, Heeding Frickey's Call: Doing Justice in Indian Country, supra note 436.
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Native nations are different from other American governments and also
vastly different from each other. Native sovereignty is not a theoretical
concept but a reality: Tribal governments exercise their powers all across the
country every day. Scholars too often engage with tribal sovereignty on a
solely theoretical level, focusing exclusively on a uniform pantribal concept
defined exclusively by federal law. This way of thinking assumes tribes have
shared or interchangeable "sovereignty" despite the differences in the tribes'
histories, treaties, exercises of sovereignty, and tribal law definitions of their
own authority. These arguments about where tribes belong in the federal
framework 455 do not engage with the diversity of Native nations, the
contemporary practice of tribal governance, or potentially competing
demands of tribal law. Tellingly, almost all of these works assume there will be
a one-size-fits-all answer for tribal governments-a status that will work
better for all tribes-and very few contemplate the existence, let alone
importance, of a process for each of these sovereign nations to separately
consider and agree to status changes. 456 In my experience working with tribal
governments across the country, some describe themselves as peers of the local
county governments, while others consider themselves closer to states, and still
others emphasize their status as nations. Even the desire for complete political
independence-including
rejection of United States citizenship-still
dominates some tribes to this day. 457 Different tribes may have vastly different
answers to the question of how they can or should fit into the federal
framework.
Tribal law scholars have powerfully suggested we pay more attention to
tribal governments by making the Brandeisian federalism point that tribes are
laboratories whose work is valuable to other sovereigns. 458 Other sovereigns

455. See, e.g., KOUSLAA T. KESSLER-MATA, AMERICAN INDIANS AND THE TROUBLE WITH
SOVEREIGNTY: STRUCTURING SELF-DETERMINATION THROUGH FEDERALISM 27, 121-23

(2017) (arguing for including tribes as subnational units in the federal system as a
matter of political theory); FRANK POMMERSHEIM, BROKEN LANDSCAPE: INDIANS, INDIAN

TRIBES, AND THE CONSTITUTION 6 (2009) (advocating for a constitutional amendment to
place tribes in the federal system but not suggesting tribes could separately navigate or
negotiate their new status).
456. Tallchief Skibine's proposal for a new tribal "compact" or "covenant" with Congress to
formally place tribes within the federal system is the closest to an individual sovereign
approach because each tribe would separately reject or adopt the compact, but it is still
quite far off since he would still have Congress adopt a uniform compact for all the
tribes. Alex Tallchief Skibine, Redefining the Status of Indian Tribes Within "Our
Federalism" Beyond the Dependency Paradigm, 38 CONN. L. REV. 667, 669, 691-92, 695
(2006).
457. See, e.g., Joshua Keating, The Nation That Sits Astride the U.S.-Canada Border, POLITICO
MAG. (July 1, 2018), https://perma.cc/P6YR-CYQZ.
458. Katherine Florey's work explores "what contribution tribal regulation can and should
make to the larger patchwork of regulatory innovation among states" and what
footnote continued on next page
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are certainly a potential audience for the kinds of tribal law scholarship this
piece advocates. But framing tribal law as American law is not a model for how
to fit tribes into the federalism framework of regulatory innovation, as
Katherine Florey has suggested is needed.459 This Article answers none of these
looming questions about the place of tribes in the federal system or their
relationship to the other sovereigns. The point is that we shouldn't answer
them without first engaging in a more robust study of tribal law itself. Indian
law ought to take a step back and reground itself in the realities of tribal
governments.
This comfort with tribal sovereignty in the abstract as opposed to clear
understandings of the nitty-gritty of daily tribal governance, simply put,
makes bad law. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized this in its
jurisprudence on state sovereignty, which disclaims the Court's institutional
capacity to independently discern or deduce the core of state sovereignty. The
"integral"- or "traditional"-government-function test for state regulatory
immunity was rejected after the Court found it to be "unsound in principle and
unworkable in practice," because the Court "ha[s] no license to employ
freestanding conceptions of state sovereignty." 460 And yet the last forty years
of Indian law jurisprudence, which created implicit divestiture, is just that:
judicial
decisionmaking
from freestanding
conceptions
of tribal
sovereignty. 461
The Court's test for tribal civil jurisdiction over non-Indians involves just
such a freestanding inquiry concerning the core of sovereignty. In Montana v.
United States, the Court held that while tribes undoubtedly retain the power to
govern themselves, when it comes to non-members who do not enter into
consensual relationships with the tribe, the tribes' laws only apply in a case
where the tribe "retain[s] inherent sovereignty."462 It then clarified that a tribe
"mechanisms" might facilitate that contribution. Florey, supra note 26, at 720. Elizabeth
Ann Kronk Warner's piece suggests, much like Angela Riley's Indians and Guns, supra
note 26, that tribal independence and diversity are assets and that "tribes may in some
instances be even better placed than states to experiment with environmental laws in
new and innovative ways." Kronk Warner, supra note 26, at 858-59; see also RENNARD
STRICKLAND, FIRE AND THE SPIRITS: CHEROKEE LAW FROM CLAN TO COURT, at xiii (1975)

("Cherokees were ...
a laboratory for the 'civilization' dreams of the nineteenthcentury policymakers.").
459. Florey points out that "neither the Constitution nor established doctrine provides a
ready model of how states and tribes should interact within the realm of regulatory
experimentation." Florey, supra note 26, at 717.
460. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 546, 550 (1985).
461. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 563 (1981); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian
Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208 (1978) ("Indian tribes are prohibited from exercising ... those
powers 'inconsistent with their status." (quoting Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1009
(9th Cir. 1976), rev'd sub nom. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191)).
462. See 450 U.S. at 564-65.
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has "inherent power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of nonIndians on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct threatens or has
some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the
health or welfare of the tribe."463 Despite the language of this test seeming to
rest on questions that go to the heart of a tribe's sovereignty-suggesting the
Court ought to be informed by tribal law and an understanding of tribal
governance-the Court regularly decides these cases over a tribe's objections
and without engaging with tribal law. Instead, the Court relies on its own logic
to determine whether the regulated conduct fits the Court's own definition of
what is essential to the tribe's welfare or survival. 464 Indeed, the Court decided
Montana-a case about hunting and fishing on reservation land-after simply
citing the ordinance, noting its basic function (prohibiting non-Indian fishing),
and concluding that nothing in the complaint suggested hunting and fishing
threatened tribal "subsistence or welfare."465 The Court confidently stated:
"[N]othing in this case suggests that such non-Indian hunting and fishing so
threaten the Tribe's political or economic security as to justify tribal
regulation." 466
Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, a case
involving a tribe's attempt to zone its reservation lands, likewise illustrates the
Court's failure. 467 The Court, ostensibly applying the Montana test, walked
through the history of the Yakima Tribe's land rights before reaching a divided
holding that the tribe's authority turned on demographics, land ownership,
and the tribe's right to exclude.4 68 The Court certainly did not rely on Yakima
law for specifics about what the power to zone means to the tribe, nor-as the
dissent pointed out-for the simple notion that zoning is such a fundamental
attribute of most local government sovereignty that it is particularly
unworkable (if not pointless) to administer incompletely. 469
By contrast, when the Court decides state sovereignty cases it does so with,
at the very least, a basic understanding of a state's powers and goes into far
more detail about how the alleged interference with state sovereignty plays out
463. Id. at 565-66.
464. See Nevada v. Hicks 533 U.S. 353, 361, 364 (2001) (holding that state officers harming
tribal-member property while executing a warrant on tribal land for off-reservation
violations of state law do not violate the tribe's political integrity); Strate v. A-1
Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 442, 452-53 (1997) (holding that auto accidents on tribal
highways do not threaten the health or welfare of the tribe).
465. Montana, 450 U.S. at 566.
466. Id.
467. 492 U.S. 408 (1989); see also Singer, Sovereignty, supra note 30, at 7 (critiquing Brendale).
468. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 433-44 (Stevens, J., opinion of the court in part and concurring in
part) (plurality opinion).
469. See id. at 458 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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for the state and its governing structures. Take, for example, National
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, a case in which challenges to the
Affordable Care Act (ACA) implicated state sovereignty.4 70 The Court began
by speaking of "[s]tate sovereignty" as a clear enough concept that it can
affirmatively limit federal powers because "the police power[s]" of the statesdescribed as "the facets of governing that touch on citizens' daily lives [that] are
normally administered by smaller governments closer to the governed"-are a
clear enough set of powers that belong to the states. 47 1 This makes sense only
because the Justices-and we as readers-are all familiar with this bundle of
state powers as citizens of states who know what state governance means in
practice. After holding that the ACA's individual mandate, if characterized as
such, would interfere with the states' police power to regulate, 472 the Court
turned to the ACA's Medicaid expansion. In this portion of the opinion, Chief
Justice Roberts, relying on detailed figures from the states' budgets, discussed
the coercive effect of the ACA as an infringement on the states' sovereignty. 473
Chief Justice Roberts not only displayed a basic awareness of the impact on
state law, but also acknowledged the disruption the Court's ruling could cause
to the states' "intricate statutory and administrative regimes" for Medicaid
implementation. 474 This is not to say that the Court has a robust
understanding of state law or rigorously interrogates it, but simply that the
mere nod is remarkable by contrast.
Federal Indian law sovereignty opinions are nothing like this. Read Indian
sovereignty opinions and you learn a lot about the history of colonialism and
about prior Supreme Court cases, which similarly reasoned this way or that
about what powers tribes must have, of course, lost due to their conquest. 475
You learn nothing about what tribal statutory or administrative regimes are at
stake, tribal budgets, or the tribes' frustrated attempts to govern their citizens.
We need a better federal Indian law. One that is more principled by being
informed by tribal law.

470. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 536, 581 (2012) (opinion of Roberts,

CJ.).

471. Id. at 536.
472. Id. at 558-61.
473. Id. at 581 (citing footnotes and tables from briefs and state budget reports for this
insight).
474.

Id.

475. See, e.g., Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 358, 364 (2001) (heavily prioritizing state
interests over tribal interests in assessing whether a civil tort suit against state officers
who served a state warrant on tribal land fit under the Montana test).
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Conclusion: The Cost of Invisibility
This Article began with a simple, yet transformative, truth: Tribal
governments are American governments and thus we should stop excluding
their laws from the study of American law. It then discussed and demonstrated
how much we might all gain from paying attention to tribal governance. It
ends here with another truth, a hard one, and a prediction of what may happen
if we continue to ignore tribal law.
Exclusion has powerful consequences. At best, we continue to other
something without engaging with it. This othering bizarrely treats Indian
governments as conquered but still too foreign to be relevant to, or part of,
America. Invisibility breeds ignorance. And ignorance is incredibly
dangerous-especially when such ignorance pervades our justice system and
can harm the rights of citizens or result in law that rests on inexcusable and
dehumanizing errors, with disastrous consequences.
That was Oliphant, where the Court stripped tribal governments of the
power to prosecute non-Indians, motivated in part by claims about the
lawlessness of Indian tribes.4 76 The Court stated that its principle "would have
been obvious a century ago when most Indian tribes were characterized by a
'want of fixed laws [and] of competent tribunals of justice."' 477 This bold and
broad statement was far from harmless. In rather horrific irony, it helped
create the jurisdictional maze that itself promotes a state of lawlessness in
Indian Country, where Indian people are easy targets for non-Indian criminals
because offenders know that federal prosecution is unlikely and tribes can't
touch them. 478 In 2003, Indian women became the demographic most likely to
be victims of violent crime, with a victimization rate 50% higher than the next
highest group: African American men. 479
We should likewise cringe every time someone with a law degree writes
or executes a law that needlessly excludes tribal governments due to simple
ignorance. This happens all the time, and the omission of tribal governments
has dangerous, unintended consequences. 480 As described by the U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights, this normalized invisibility leads to "[u]nequal

476. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 210 (1978).
477. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 23-474, at 18 (1834)).
478. U.S. COMM'N ON C.R., A QUIET CRISIS: FEDERAL FUNDING AND UNMET NEEDS IN INDIAN
COUNTRY 67-68 (2003). https://perma.cc/EBB9-CM8F; see also INDIAN L. & ORD.
COMM'N, A ROADMAP FOR MAKING NATIVE AMERICA SAFER: REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT

& CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, at v-ix (2013), https://perma.cc/89QT-WZ3D
(describing the "jurisdictional maze" in Indian Country that treats Indian people like
second-class citizens).
479. U.S. COMM'N ON C.R., supra note 478, at 67.
480. See U.S. COMM'N ON C.R., supranote 35, at 5.
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treatment of tribal governments" by the other American sovereigns, who
consistently leave tribes out of funding programs, relationships, enterprises,
and even basic data collection. 481 For example, until recently, most tribes were
unable to access basic cross-jurisdictional criminal databases because both
Congress and the FBI forgot about tribes.4 82 This meant that tribes couldn't
access prior criminal records, protection orders, or warrants from other
jurisdictions or input their arrests and criminal records into even the most
basic cross-jurisdictional databases.4 83 As a result, countless persons have likely
evaded justice, illegally bought guns, or violated restraining orders on and off
reservations across the country because someone-or many people-forgot
about tribes.
Finally, there is a risk that invisibility may become erasure. As mentioned
in the Introduction, the Supreme Court recently considered whether to uphold
the plain text of tribal treaty rights when doing so would make half of
Oklahoma Indian Country. At oral argument in Sharp v. Murphy,484 Oklahoma
was able to plant an initial assumption into the minds of the Justices that tribal
jurisdiction-tribal law-would derail Oklahoma, without considering what
that tribal law is. Justice Breyer asked at the first oral argument, "if we say
really this land ... belongs to the tribe, what happens to all those people? What
happens to all those laws?" 485 The tribe's attorney responded by emphasizing
the limited power tribes hold over non-Indians and fee land. 486 This strategic
response directly countered the opposing side's argument that tribal rule
would "plunge eastern Oklahoma into civil, criminal, and regulatory turmoil"
and "drastically change[]" the lives of 1.8 million Oklahomans who would have
to deal with the "'uncertainty'" of tribal law and, possibly, tribal courts. 487
Indeed, by the time the case was reargued as McGirt v. Oklahoma, the attorneys
arguing for tribal jurisdiction dedicated an entire section of their brief, titled
"The Sky Is Not Falling," to counter the fearmongering. 488 In reality, holding

481. See id.; DataDisaggregation,supra note 8.
482. The Tribal Access Program did not begin until 2015 and was the result of holes in
access that the federal government learned about at VAWA-implementing tribal
meetings. Tribal Access Program(TAP), U.S. DEP'T JUST., https://perma.cc/DC6H-W6X5
(archived Jan. 11, 2021); VAWA REPORT, supra note 175, at 36.
483. VAWA REPORT, supra note 175, at 36.
484. Transcript of Oral Argument, Sharp v. Murphy, 140 S. Ct. 2412 (2020) (No. 17-1107),
2018 WL 6200336.
485. Id. at 44.
486. Id. at 45-48.
487. Brief for Petitioner at 3, 56, Sharp, 140 S. Ct. 2412 (No. 17-1107), 2018 WL 3572365
(quoting interest-group amicus briefs).
488. Brief for Petitioner at 39, McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020) (No. 18-9526),
2020 WL 583959.
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that the land belonged to the tribe would simply mean that sometimes
different laws would apply. The kinks of transitioning from life regulated
completely by Oklahoma to life occasionally regulated by the Muscogee Creek
Nation should have been the only question. Instead, the petitioners were able
to play into a fear of tribal rule, maybe not as "lawless" anymore, but as an
unknown. The unknown can be scary. But tribal law is not unknowable.
The victory for tribal jurisdiction in McGirt is hopefully as much a
rejection of the fear of tribal governance as it is in keeping with the plain text
of the law. 489 Time will tell. Every time a case with large implications like
McGirt reaches the Supreme Court, many people tied to tribal governments in
one way or another are quietly afraid. There is always the fear that the Court
will make bad (that is, ill-informed) law. But the great, omnipresent fear is that
the Court or Congress will finally do away with tribes. The tragedy-and the
injustice-would be that after all these years, and all the blood, ink, and tears
spilled, the United States will nonetheless finally do away with Indian tribes,
not because it knows what they are like, but because it doesn't.

489. See McGirt, 140 S. Ct. 2452.
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